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INTRODUCTION 
When a child is born a new person comes within the range 
of our perceptions who by his potentiality for human action 
demands from us a different kind of consideration from that 
which we might give to an amoeba or a foetus. The situation 
which exists between observer and observed is made significant 
by their histories: we bring to the study of development our 
knowledge of growth and our own experiences of birth and life 
which may sometimes obscure and complicate rather than illum- 
inate and simplify but which cannot be laid aside. We are 
the products of our histories and it is in our traffic with 
others that our own humanity is manifested. The uniqueness 
of the human species is reflected in the way man has trans- 
cended general gales relating to particular aspects of his 
functioning, and at the same time created needs which are just 
as urgent and compelling arising not from the exercise of 
animal functions but from the operation of thought. The 
psycho- social level of human existence precludes an adequate 
description of man's behaviour in terms of biological adapta- 
tion, but the incontrovertible fact of his position upon a 
continuum of biological evolution demands its place in any 
explanatory system of human personality. Each child is born 
with a history which forms part of the history of the species 
which in turn merges into the history of life itself to form 
a matrix of causation which we cannot afford to neglect in 
our efforts to define the unmistakable otherness which separates 
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man so decisively from all other species on earth. The 
apparent duality of man's nature, on the one hand subject to 
biological conditions of survival while on the other in con - 
:trol of many aspects of a complex socio- physical environment, 
has proved a major source of difficulty in previous attempts 
to arrive at a comprehensive account of his personality. The 
uniqueness of man may not be explained either in terms of what 
he has in common with animals nor solely in terms of human 
thought, but through consideration of the processes by which 
mind has arisen out of the profusion of specialised adaptation 
which marks the course of evolution and by demonstrating how 
its functions are married to the mechanisms of biological 
survival in the production of human behaviour. 
Growth is an observable phenomenon which man shares with 
all other organisms, and from the study of these we can often 
gain information relevant to an understanding of human beings. 
An interpretation of human behaviour which claimed to be 
psychological only, which failed to take into account matura- 
:tion and adaptation and which ignored the neurophysiological, 
endocrinological and metabolic aspects of behaviour would be 
incomplete, though neuro - humoral and other structures can only 
be regarded as prerequisites for the further realisation of 
general phylogenetic or specific individual functional possi- 
:bilities. Study of a simple organism like a plant shows the 
difference which lies between the capacities of its meagre 
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neural equipment and the infinity of patterns made possible 
by the multitude of interacting cortical cells. The differ- 
ence is more than quantitative however, for the variety of 
man's mental life includes qualities beyond the mere fact of 
his social organisation. The ants and the bees have a social 
organisation, but only man has a culture, made possible by his 
highly developed powers of communication which have their ex- 
:pression in language and symbolism. Increased power of 
control over the features of his physical environment has 
resulted in the enlargement and complication of his systems 
of relationships. In human ontogenesis we see more than an 
increase in physical size and the capacity for finer and more 
flexible adaptations through neurophysiological evolution, 
but also extension of the powers of communication and widen- 
:ing of the range and type of human interaction. Growth is 
a unifying concept, bringing both differentiation and inte- 
:gration and for human beings means participation in more com- 
:plex and more numerous groups from the composition of which 
much can be learned of individuals. The primary inquiry for 
psychology, however, is the effect of the group on the indi- 
:vidual rather than the nature of the group itself. Psycho - 
:logy is concerned with individuals, with real existents, 
actual persons living in these complex relationships with 
other persons each of which is himself a member of various 
groups in an environment which is at one and the same time 
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common to all and yet specific for each individual. (Brierley, 
1951, p. 126)(Freud, 1921). This environment is the concern 
of sociologists rather than psychologists, but as the groups 
are of individuals and it is individuals who comprise the 
group, the two approaches are complementary and indispensable 
to each other. 
Studies of the behaviour of animals are informative 
pointers to the composition and operation of the instinctive 
endowment of human beings and may be aided by types of 
experiment which for various reasons are impossible with human 
subjects. To avoid assuming the human being as given in 
propositions concerning his nature, which is a fruitful source 
of error in personality study, a consideration of the pro - 
:cesses which have produced him is a useful corrective. The 
study of organisms less far along the path of evolution and 
particularly comparisons with the higher primates serve to 
demonstrate at one and the same time man's dependence upon 
his biological heritage and the methods he has devised to 
overcome its limitations. Medical research and allied dis- 
:ciplines have gained much benefit from work in this field, 
and Fairb airn (1956) considers that neglect of what we know 
of animal behaviour has tended to obscure psychoanalytical 
thinking which, so far as instinct theory is concerned, may 
be a valid criticism. Yet it is of first importance to 
remember that the study of animals can yield information only 
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on the qualities which man shares with them and can take no 
account of the qualities which demonstrate his difference. 
"Because we are reflective," says de Chardin (1959, p. 166), 
"we are not only different but quite other." Those parts of 
the human personality which are concerned with the regulations 
of instinct are no less constant than instinct itself, since 
some form of morality exists in all human groups known to 
history or cultural anthropology, and although these regulating 
parts may be variable and to some extent modifiable, they 
cannot be extinguished in the individual or the race. 
Our conception of development and evolution must be related 
not only to information regarding the original state but also 
to our assumptions concerning the end to which all processes 
are directed. It is not enough to say that all processes 
of functional and structural modification during the entire 
life span result from the interaction of an individual' s 
genetic constellation and his environment (Luthe, 1957, p.122). 
Man has the power to vary his own environment and may have 
the means to vary both his functional and structural 
modifications. Thus the area of study must include not only 
the genetic constellation and the environment, but also the 
means of transaction between them and the goal towards which 
the transactions are directed. Not only personality but also 
the nature of reality and consciousness must be considered in 
the attempt to arrive at principles by which what is known 
about life, of phylogenesis, ontogenesis and the growth of 
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reflection may be related to our present observation and 
experience in a coherent system. 
In modern psychology, attempts to solve these problems 
seem to have branched out along two main lines. The first 
of these is broadly based upon the Lockean view of the 
intellect as a passive receptor of sense impressions which it 
receives from a world of external things in which it exists. 
(nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu) . The 
emphasis is strongly on stimulus -response and learning and 
the view is implicit that what is external and visible is more 
fundamental than what is not. Such presuppositions are 
congenial to modern psychological positivism and to atomistic 
and molecular explanations of human personality. Inevitably 
those features of human beings which are most characteristic 
tend to be disregarded in favour of those which support the 
hypothesis of species equivalence. The second line follows 
Leibnitz, who appended to Locke's proposition (excipe: nisi 
ipse intellectus). The conception of a purposive organism 
which is the source of acts is in the direct descent from 
Aristotle's teleological doctrines, and a similar view under - 
:lies Acquinas' doctrine of 'intention' and Spinoza's 'conatus' 
principle. In the tradition of Leibnitz, Kant evolved a 
philosophy in which the principle governing conduct was the 
formulation of universal laws and the criterion of social 
behaviour was the treatment of other human beings as ends in 
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themselves. This way of regarding human social organisation 
has important implications for later psychosocial theories of 
development. 
In the general tradition of Leibnitz both in psychology 
and philosophy there have been many different accounts of the 
participation of the person in the moulding and arrangement 
of sensory data in ways which are not allowed for in the 
systems which derive from the elementarist theories of Hume 
and Locke. Stuart Hampshire (1959) presents a view of man 
as an object moving his own position in relation to other 
objects like himself in a world of persisting objects to which 
he can refer by means of language. Unlike animals he can 
communicate with others and gain knowledge of his own situa- 
:tion by observing the results of his own manipulations and 
interferences. This is in accordance with de Chardin's 
position that the quality which separates man from animals is 
the power of consciousness to turn inward upon itself: "Non 
plus seulement connait re, mais se connáit re; non plus seule- 
:ment savoir, mais savoir que l'on sait." An animal may know, 
but it does not know that it knows. (1955, p. 165). 
In the same way as the human species has progressed from 
its animal origins through the natural progress of biological 
evolution, passing through a series of transformations all in 
the direction of greater complexity, the individual passes 
through a continuous series of states from a fertilised ovum 
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to an adult. The beginning of reflection, that minute 
alteration to a complex pattern which upset the whole equili- 
:brium and added a new dimension to the evolution of species, 
could not have been seen through an outward and visible sign, 
even had there been an observer there to see it. In the 
same way we cannot discern at what precise moment the child 
may be said to achieve intelligence, the adolescent become 
adult, nor can we isolate the instant at which the individual 
comes ultimately to die. Unlike a phyletic embryogenesis in 
which each step or stage is represented by a different being, 
the same individual passes through continuous changes of state, 
each of which it has either not yet reached or gone beyond. 
Such continuous process makes it impossible for us to express 
the difference between child and adult in quantitative terms: 
we cannot dismiss the experience of a child as merely a pre - 
:lude to complete living as an adult in an adult world, nor 
can we deny to that experience significance and meaning for 
the adult who is yet to come. Both child and adult are 
persons within a situation: the child is more than its pro - 
:mise of maturity. It is existing now, perceiving and acting 
upon its perceptions like other observers although it is still 
limited in its faculty of controlling and manipulating its 
environment. These limitations are imposed not only by 
physical and physiological factors, but by psychic factors 
also and there is no certainty in what way these two groups 
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may be connected. Until more is known of this it is unwise 
to ascribe causality to one set or the other. Phylogenesis 
is often considered in terms of the development of 
differentiated characteristics as adaptations to a particular 
environment or the result of the survival of the fittest, but 
such an explanation may be inadequate to explain the course 
of evolution which is more than a simple advance towards 
greater complexity (de Chardin, 1955, p. 147 et seg.) As 
man is the most highly developed of all species and the 
quality which distinguishes him is psychological, perhaps the 
development of characters in evolution should properly be 
considered not as the effect of external forces but as an 
expression of inner forces which have reached their highest 
present form in human psychology. Such a view of evolution 
would reinforce the necessity for us to consider individual 
human development as a psychic process with concurrent 
physical and physiological features. The dualism which 
results from an attempt to postulate two forms of energy, 
psychic and physical, and the atomism which sees the organism 
as a conglomeration of separately functioning parts which 
reach some measure of integration through development are both 
alien to a scientific account of human behaviour. Evolution 
of the species and the mental and physical development of the 
individual are both characterised by the gradual 
differentiation of unified functioning structures, not by the 
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organisation of separately functioning parts (Fairbairn, 1956, 
p. 53). Parts of an organism may be considered as functioning 
separately for the purposes of scientific analysis, but in 
fact such separate functioning only happens as the result of 
a pathological process. Consideration of these relations 
between the child and the adult and comparisons between 
phylogenesis and ontogenesis are a corrective to the neglect 
of the child and the primitive in both psychology and 
philosophy, which obscures the operation of continuous 
processes which give coherence to the whole. 
Such neglect was not apparent in the thought of Freud 
whose attention to the interaction of mental and physical 
in hysteria led him to the discovery that adult sexuality is 
not the result of physiological changes at a certain stage of 
physical growth, but rather a part of something present from 
infancy. His views were grounded in psychopathology and the 
development of theory, technique of investigation and practice 
of therapy were intricately related. An important initial 
result of his discoveries was the direction of attention to 
the early years of life: it became more difficult to sustain 
a view of children as defective or imperfectly functioning 
adults. Preoccupation with adolescence as a time of sudden 
change, an approach congenial to those who sought direct 
physical or physiological correlates of behaviour, gave way 
to a more balanced view of development. The marked bodily 
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changes together with the alteration in status and in society's 
demands which makes adolescence so patently a period of 
readjustment were rot obviously parallelled in infancy: changes 
were more subtle and less subject to comparisons between 
individuals, so that individual differences were obscured. 
Investigation became directed further and further back in 
infancy and child analysts such as Melanie Klein often quote 
material relative to the first months of life although the 
objection has been offered that this is merely a reconstruction 
from inference from conditions observed at later ages. This 
continuity of developmental processes was further emphasised 
when Freud in his later works saw the prototype of all anxiety 
experience in the birth trauma, (Freud, 1926), a view which 
formed the basis of a deviant system in the work of Otto Rank 
(1924). Jung, (1928), went even further back beyond the 
origins of the individual, tracing the roots of behaviour to 
certain 'archetypes' or primitive inherited predispositions 
to action. His concept of the collective unconscious was 
the vehicle for these archetypes which was the archaic part 
of humanity and a link with primitive organisations which 
extended far back in the history of the race and was reflected 
in its mythology. 
"One of the modern fruits of I ietzschean thought is 
Freudian pessimism ", writes Reinhold Niebühr (1941 p. 26), 
and it is not hard to understand how Freud's view of instinct 
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and the libido theory led to determinist views of human 
development and a negative view of human achievement, though 
this is by no means inevitable. By providing a reconstruction 
of individual motivation, psychoanalysis throws light on the 
individual's attitude towards society in terms of protection 
from external threats but perhaps does not do full justice 
to the satisfactions gained from moving along constructive 
social avenues (Frenkel -Brunswik, 1957, p. 166). The same 
underlying motivation may lead to a wide range of behaviour, 
the further specification of which may hinge upon other than 
dynamic factors. Psychoanalytical explanations of 'higher' 
values in terms of subliminations of primitive libidinal 
values, particularly those determined by the aims of the 
erotogenic zones, do little to explain what determines the 
aesthetic value of a work of art, for instance, and reductive 
explanations in art, religion, morals and philosophy have 
drawn the criticism that while psychoanalysis threw a great 
deal of light upon psychopathology and anthropology, it 
accentuated the negative rather than the positive aspects of 
human nature and said little about the characteristic group 
of activities so appropriately entitled 'the Humanities', 
(Fairbairn, 1954). It is clear that some explanation must 
be attempted in any system which claimed to be comprehensive, 
and historically it has been the function of philosophy to 
offer such embracing accounts of the nature and meaning of 
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the universe. The rival claim of psychoanalysis to provide 
an explanation of the motivation of all human activities, 
however, included philosophy itself, as was made clear by 
Freud when he wrote, "We venture to transform 
metaphysics into metapsychology." (Freud, 1914, D. 39)- 
From the classic psycho -analytic standpoint of course all 
'higher' values are derived values as has been demonstrated 
in many essays in the field of art and philosophy (Wisdom, 
1953). It is useful to note in passing that while Freud 
related cultural phenomena to the sublimation of libidinal 
impulses, he sought an explanation of religion and morals 
in terms of the Oedipus situation mediated by the super -ego. 
Two explanatory principles, one involving the sublimation 
of instinct and the other in terms of relationships within 
the psyche were therefore required for explanation of the 
most characteristic human activities. 
Reaction against the determinism of Freud's theory of 
instinct and reluctance to concede to the unconscious power 
which would challenge the supremacy of the will have always 
been sources of resistance to the acceptance of his view of 
development and this was demonstrated in Freud's own lifetime 
by the divergence of Adler, whose 'psychology of totality' 
(1935) viewed the organic and psychic functions of the 
individual as constituting an original unity which is in turn 
but a part of the higher unity constituted by society. This 
14. 
recognition of theAristotelianview of man as a social animal 
is a factor of great importance in the psychology of the 
person and it would only obscure the value of Freud's 
theoretical contribution in his discovery of motivational 
dynamics if it were not to be openly accepted that the 
reductive method may explain away rather than explain and 
that perhaps the conceptual tools of classical psychoanalysis 
have been up to the present time at least insufficient to 
offer a full explanation of rational and social behaviour, 
yet alone the more complex kinds of human activity shown in 
the creative arts. 
The material which Freud drew upon for the purpose of 
his theory construction and the method of investigation which 
he discovered placed little emphasis upon the direct observation 
of external behaviour, which had the result of making clear 
how inadequate were physical models for arriving at a theoretical 
system of psychic growth. Freud's own neurological training 
and his early attempts to find a neurophysiological explanation 
of psychology had a formative influence upon his concept of 
unconscious mental activity and may explain his use of 
topographical description when speaking of the mind. As a 
result of his use of associative material, Freud discovered 
an important principle which he stated aphoristically in one 
of his earliest papers (Freud & Breuer, 1893), "hysterical 
patients suffer mainly from reminiscences ". He noted a 
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compulsion to repetition of painful situations in children's 
play, in the anxiety dreams of traumatic neuroses and in the 
transference revivals of painful situations in patients' 
lives. The conclusion which he drew from this was of great 
importance for the development of his theory of instinct. 
It was that there was a tendency innate in living organic 
matter impelling it towards the reinstatement of an earlier 
condition (1920, p. 44) but discussion of this, which was 
the genesis of his view of the death instinct belongs properly 
to a later chapter (chapter 6) . What' is important to note 
here is that Freud had demonstrated the apparently reversible 
nature of psychic process, which removed it at one stroke 
from the limitations of theoretical systems tied to physical 
or physiological events. The balance between psyche and 
soma is a delicate one, nowhere better shown than in Freud's 
original field of investigation, hysterical paralysis and 
hysterical conversion. In normal life and in the records 
of primitive societies the interaction of mind and body may 
be seen: hysterical conversion mechanisms and psychosomatic 
disorders in modern life have their parallel in the death of 
a primitive tribesman who has broken a taboo. As in 
phylogenesis, the controlled complication by which life 
advances in the evolution of species, so in human ontogenesis, 
if we disregard the psychic factor, the changes which take 
place are irreversible and a condition which has once been 
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passed in the course of development cannot be reinstated. But 
psycho -analytical material in dreams, associations and particularly 
in the phenomenon of regression seemed to demonstrate that 
psychic growth was reversible and that under various pressures 
or in pathological conditions a subject might return to an 
earlier state of development either temporarily or permanently. 
The emphasis which Freud placed upon the sexual life of 
infancy and the Oedipus conflict resulted in a view of psycho- 
sexual development which, as revised by Abraham, involved a 
progression through a number of stages in which particular 
zones of the body were the medium of sexual gratification 
until genital maturity was attained (Abraham, 1927). The 
Oedipus complex was regarded as the prime source of neurosis, 
and the developmental phases of childhood were dependent upon 
the maturational stages of instinct- development. Such an 
emphasis was perhaps a direct consequence of the discovery of 
the place of the unconscious in human motivation, and Freud 
himself moved further and further away from the consideration 
of innate instinctive factors as it became clinically 
necessary to devote more and more time to the analysis of the 
ego. Abraham also soon recognised that libidinal development 
implied parallel development of object relations (1927 D. 480 
et seg.) The concept of the super -ego arose out of this 
necessity: it is concerned with the relationship between 
the individual and the outer world rather than with the 
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instinctive endowment and its developmental vicissitudes. 
Freud retained a framework of psychological instinct theory 
by the adoption of Groddeck' s term 'id' to denote an 
unorganised reservoir of instinctive drives and many later 
problems of theory arise in this area. 
In the same way as the school of Adler could not accept 
the determinism of Freudian theory, there have been movements 
in which the ego has been given much greater prominence than 
the id and the influence of cultural and social factors has 
been assigned greater importance: a movement particularly 
marked in the United States at the present day, where the neo- 
Freudians emphasise the environment much more than is the case 
in Europe. Workers such as Horney, Fromm, Erikson and 
Sullivan have drawn upon detailed cultural and sociological 
studies and while their emphasis upon human relations and 
studies of 'culture- patterns' in neurosis have considerable 
descriptive importance, these are lacking in aetiological 
depth due to the lack of attention given to the basic dynamic 
factors. Their approach to the analysis of the ego in terms 
of inferiority feelings and compensatory power drives 
constitutes an investigation of Freud's 'reality -ego' rather 
than the total psyche of which the unconscious is such an 
important part and against which the 'reality -ego' acts as a 
defensive barrier. 
Assessment of the relative significance of the groups of 
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factors operating in the development of the ego affects our 
view of the precedence given to successive stages of development. 
An adherent of the classical Freudian school will place the 
greatest emphasis upon the early years of life, while the 
educational process bulks large in the opinion of the culture - 
pattern group. Such an assessment, as a result of a 
theoretical position is of great practical importance in 
bridging the gap between theory and practice in education, 
sociology and clinical practice. There is a further result 
arising from the differing emphasis upon cultural and 
instinctive factors which is of first importance for the 
progress of scientific investigation: the theoretical 
standpoint of the investigator determines not only the method 
of investigation but also to a large extent the definition 
of what properly constitutes the data. For certain 
experimental purposes a psychologist studying the reactions 
of a young child to a ball might choose to isolate him in a 
room away from his mother, free from distracting stimuli. An 
investigator with a different theoretical orietation might 
l 
feel that data obtained under such conditions were rendered 
useless by an environment so abnormal that the child no longer 
qualified as a normally functioning individual. Surveying 
the field of psychology at the present day, it would seem that 
there are three main approaches to the study of personality: 
first, philosophical and phenomenological, second, psychoanalytic 
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and clinical, and third, experimental and psychometric. 
These are general lines of approach rather than exclusive 
divisions, as in the work of most researchers there are 
usually elements of more than one. They have a common 
element, however, in that they are concerned with the person, 
and although definitions of personality vary, most would 
agree that the individual is the unit of investigation. It 
is suggested, therefore, that not only must the study of 
development begin with a clear definition of the nature of 
the person, but also the value of a particular approach may 
be judged by the comprehensiveness of that definition. 
It is easy to see how a term such as 'adolescence' is 
tied to the events of physical and physiological maturation, 
or how a relatively modern term such as 'teenager' is 
determined not so much by chronological age as by certain 
social customs heavily reinforced by commercial forms of 
persuasion directed at habits of spending. Perhaps it is 
less easy to see that atomism of any kind, which may be 
implicit in trait theories or studies of particular functions, 
have within them a tendency to deny the child as a person. 
Freud's account of the growth of the super -ego, with its 
dependence upon the resolution of the Oedipus phase and its 
coincidence with the onset of the latency period, has on the 
other hand tended to an undervaluation of processes of 
socialisation and learning which are characteristic of this 
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period. Object- relations theory is not open to this 
objection and takes a view of development which allows for 
the social nature of man and is "a process whereby infantile 
dependence upon the object gradually gives place to mature 
dependence on the object" (Fairbairn, 1941, p. 34). What 
lies between these states is a transitional stage, 
characterised by a number of movements in the same direction, 
concurrent, interlinked, interdependent and interacting, but 
capable of being traced separately for purposes of scientific 
analysis. These threads converge upon the same end which is 
the emergence of a differentiated individual capable of 
relationships with other differentiated individuals who are 
mutually dependent and between whom there is no disparity of 
dependence (Fairbairn, 1946, p. 145). 
Each social man emerges from an ego- centric child and 
thus re- enacts the process by which the human species arose 
from the mass of differentiating and multiplying species. 
Man at the stage of reflection is the culmination of a process 
or series of processes and although the change which took place 
on the replacement of instinct by thought as the main principle 
of action in the human species altered the whole meaning of 
evolution, it was not that something alien had been added, but 
that something new had emerged through the operation of natural 
forces. In the onward movement of life a number of separate 
factors in an intricate interdependence had been simultaneously 
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in operation. The development of the brain is of course 
paramount, and there is evidence that many species became 
extinct through inadequate brain capacity. Yet if the 
creature from which man issued had not been a biped, his 
hands would not have been free in time to release the jaws 
from their prehensile function and the thick band of maxillary 
muscles which had imprisoned his cranium could not have been 
relaxed (de Chardin, 1959, p. 170). To ascribe causality to 
any one of these factors is to deny the evidence which is 
around us everywhere that the whole network of related threads 
which comprises life pushes forward at one and the same time, 
though the changes which are taking place are imperceptible 
and spurts or sudden activations such as apparently take 
place in the mitotic division of single cells are no proof of 
the abruptness of growth. When physicists first postulated 
the atomic structure of matter they conceived atoms as 
indivisible units and the superseding of this idea was the 
result of abstract processes of thought leading to experiments 
which did in fact lead to the splitting of the atom. As a 
result, the structure of matter came to be considered in the 
kind of terms used by Russell, who speaks of "a wave of 
probability undulating in nothingness" (Russell, 1951). 
Physics is the most advanced of the natural sciences and 
there is every reason for relating psychology to the movement 
of modern scientific thought by assuming that the ultimate 
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analysis of psychological functioning will be in terms of 
process rather than in terms of things (Waddington, 1944, p. 
48). At the level of the human organism the process of 
development is perceptible as a series of homogeneous physical 
patterns of growth which are related and continuous but the 
overemphasis upon critical phases of growth, biologically or 
psychologically, may obscure the operation of the general 
simple underlying processes which it is the ultimate purpose 
of science to discover. 
A clinical view of child development demands a theory 
of personality which makes it possible to consider the 
individual at every stage as complete and unique. 
Psychopathology rightly emphasises that the genesis of most 
disturbances of mental health is in early infancy and rigorist 
schools of psychology insist upon the prediction of behaviour 
as the criterion of hypothesis testing, yet the therapist is 
not immediately concerned with past or future except 
secondarily, as far as these may assist his understanding of 
actions in the present. Whether the patient is child or 
adult, he is here and now in a situation which is acting upon 
him and to which he is reacting and which may or may not be 
modified. Development is a continuous process and we may 
point only to an individual who has not yet reached or already 
passed a division between any two of the stages which have 
been arbitrarily defined for the purposes of analysis, but 
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these stages are artificial constructs to assist an 
understanding of the nature of processes. There are 
differences in the stages themselves, however: the term 
'infantile dependence', for instance, refers to a state which 
has not yet been abandoned, and to which a return may be made 
either temporarily or permanently, while 'mature dependence' 
or 'mature sociality' is a state which has been already 
achieved, although in fact the relationships involved in the 
latter state are possible only in theory, and in practice 
all that can be attained is an approximation to it. The 
first stage may be observed in animals, but they cannot 
progress with human beings to more advanced sorts of behaviour 
or to relationships more complicated than can be explained in 
terms of Innate Releasing Mechanisms and Imprinting because 
of the limitations imposed upon them by the position of their 
species upon the evolutionary continuum. Mature dependence 
is therefore theoretically possible in the human species 
only, not in any other. This does not preclude a consideration 
of all development throughout the course of evolution in terms 
of relationship and to consider it in this way makes it 
possible to place the complex human systems and powers of 
organisation at one end of a continuum which extends from the 
simplest unicellular organisms through to mammals, the 
primates and man. Such a continuum has besides this extension 
in biological time another lateral dimension in ontogenetic 
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space in that at any given instant of biological time a 
single species is composed of a multitude of individuals each 
in his own position upon the continuum determined by the 
quality of his relationships. The existence of the reflective 
qualities of man alters the nature and significance of 
relationship and transforms the whole balance and perspective 
of the evolutionary pattern, making it impossible to survey 
it under a single principle unless it is in terms of the 
human end of the continuum, a truly psychic principle. To 
do this is not to disregard the biological history of man but 
to recognise that the emergence of self -consciousness added 
another dimension to life (de Chardin, 1959, p. 180). 
In individual development it is more useful to consider 
adolescence, for instance, as part of a general process of 
continuous transition in which different types of relationship 
are rapidly becoming possible through the simultaneous 
convergence of a number of separate threads of maturation 
than as a state to be arrived at or entered into. Life does 
not proceed by fits and starts, and a view which sees the 
onset of menstruation or smermatogenesis as a traumatic event 
to which. conscious adjustments must be made is not in harmony 
with what we know of the way in which life moves forward. We 
avoid false ascriptions of causality when we give primacy to 
neither physiological nor psychic factors, but we must go one 
step further. Because the uniqueness of man lies in his 
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powers of reflection on his own nature and his ability to 
communicate with other reflecting men, it is therefore 
suggested that an adequate study of that uniqueness must be 
psychological and a sufficient explanation of the nature of 
his communication must be in terms of relationship. It is 
further maintained that an account of the changes which take 
place in these qualities through the processes of development 
must be in terms of a dynamic theory of transition. 
In this study, the uniqueness of reflective man expressed 
in a variety of separate persons, each with his own expanding 
system of relationships the separate elements of which overlap 
and form parts of the systems of others provides our 
definition of personality which is that specially human 
quality by which a person manifests his individuality in 
relationships with objects. The person who forms the unit 
is the product of processes of biological evolution and the 
force which is activating these processes is taken to be 
ultimately the same as that which energises systems of physical 
matter. The study of interchange of energy between physical 
structures and the psychic apparatus of individuals is within 
the field of metapsychology in which the unit is a mental 
process. Metapsychologically, persons are themselves systems. 
Recent developments in ego psychology indicate that the time 
has now come to attempt a synthesis of Freudian and later 
theoretical contributions to personality study, clinical 
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findings in both adult and child analysis, philosophical 
considerations of the nature of reality and consciousness and 
some recent advances in the natural sciences. Such a large 
aim is beyond the scope of this work which is confined to an 
attempt to reformulate the Freudian theory of latency and 
adolescence within a comprehensive theory of transition. 
Ultimately speculation by man on the nature of his being 
must be directed to the task of closing the gap between his 
technical mastery of his physical environment and his ability 
to enjoy his relationships. To understand better what we 
are, we must study what we have been: within the adult is 
the child that was and within the human species are the 
inchoate forces of the pre -human world. In the processes 
by which these transformations were accomplished may lie the 
key to the capacity of the individual for a life of more 
consistent satisfaction and to the avoidance by the species 
of its own destruction through its failure to strike a 
favourable balance between love and hate in the management of 
its relationships. In the life of children we can watch the 
balance being struck and perhaps, if we are fortunate, weigh 
our experience a little on the side of love. 
PART I 
THE STUDY OF THE PERSON. 
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CHAPTER 1. 
The Self, Consciousness and Reality. 
The nature of the relationships between different 
organisms or members of non -human species can be expressed in 
terms of biological needs and adaptations, but relationships 
between men and the other objects in their environments are 
subject to continual reflection and scrutiny which modifies 
and complicates them. The great leap forward in evolution 
which resulted in the sudden appearance in man of the power 
to direct his attention to his own mental processes meant 
that human ontogeny could no longer be considered as a matter 
of individuals but must be thought of in terms of persons. 
Animals, unable to refer to themselves or their own experience 
in language and whose lives are in all essential particulars 
regulated by their membership in a species, do not possess 
identity in the same way as human beings: all the animals in 
the world are psychologically less distinct from one another 
than one man is from other men. Persons choose: their 
choices are influenced by their past experience and by their 
hopes of the future. The appearance of this reflective 
quality which de Chardin calls "hominisation ", not only has 
increased man's power of action, but at the same time it has 
increased the nature and the extent of his environment. The 
description of the things that are is inexhaustible. But 
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men not only look outwards to other subjects, they also look 
inwards to themselves and from the beginning of recorded 
thought they have been concerned to discover what they are, 
what is the nature of the things around them and what is the 
nature of their transactions with these things. The 
difficulties which man encounters when he enquires into the 
nature of things are multiplied when it is himself he 
considers. We have come to accept that our own conscious 
experience is the only reality of which we have direct, first- 
hand awareness but our own unavoidable participation in the 
events which we are seeking to describe and analyse is an 
obstacle to their objective examination. "The application 
of cognition to the scientific study of mental life is the 
one of the most recent and most difficult forms of mental 
activity to which man has directed his intelligence." 
(Brierley, 1951, p. 98). In a scientific study of any human 
activity it is important that we make no sort of initial 
assumption which is not logically justified and the 
preliminary to such a study should be an examination of what 
we mean when we use the pronoun "I ". This is a task for 
philosophy, and leads to the discussion of the concepts of 
the self, consciousness and reality. To trace the 
development of philosophical thought in this area perhaps the 
best starting point is from our previous division of 
philosophical thinking into the two branches represented by 
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Locke on the one hand and Leibnitz on the other. 
Locke can be said to have taken an analytical view of 
the philosopher's task, defining knowledge, classifying 
propositions and displaying the nature of material things. 
Berkeley, however, noted that Locke's analysis of the 
concept of material things was false, in that to say of 
various 'ideas of sensation' that they belonged to a single 
material thing was not to say that they were related to an 
unobserved material substratum, but that they stood in certain 
relations to each other. He did not deny the existence of 
material things, as is often held, but stated that material 
things must be definable in terms of sense -contents. Unless 
an object is a metaphysical object, there can be no logical 
proof of its existence, only an empirical one. A self, then, 
if it is not to be a metaphysical entity, must be a logical 
construction of sense experiences (Ayer, 1958, p. 125). The 
considerations which compelled Berkeley to give a 
phenomenalist account of material things made it also 
necessary, as he failed to see, to give a phenomenalist 
account of the self. Following in this empirical tradition, 
Hume rejected the substantive underlying ego on the grounds 
that no such thing was observable: there was only 'a bundle 
of perceptions'. Whenever he looked for evidence of the 
self he failed to find it, always ending up with some 
particular perception. He saw that while self -consciousness 
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can be regarded as the production of memory, self -identity 
can never be. He was thus obliged to confess that he did 
not know what was the connection between perceptions in virtue 
of which they formed a single self. 
Ayer rejects the view that this means that it is thus 
impossible for a consistent empiricist to give a satisfactory 
account of the self and defines personal identity in terms of 
bodily identity which in turn is defined in terms of 
resemblance and continuity of sense- contents. It is self - 
contradictory to speak of a man surviving the annihilation of 
his own body just as it is nonsensical to envisage an 
experience which could exist entirely on its own, but must 
entail the existence of a person, so a perception must have a 
percipient. He himself says his proposition concerning 
bodily identification is not self -contradictory if one adopts 
a psychological criterion of personal identity (Ayer, 1958, 
p. 127 note). For while it is true to say that those who 
look forward to a 'life after death' are postulating a 
metaphysical soul which has ,o logical connection with the 
self, it may still be possible to define identity in 
psychological terms without resort to metaphysics. 
The empiricism exemplified by Hume and Locke paved the 
way for Hamilton, Trill and later for objectivism. In 
psychology the central objection to 'self' or 'soul' as a 
concept since the time of Wundt has been the extreme difficulty 
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of subjecting it to the stringent requirements of modern 
positivism, which holds that the devices employed in 
experimentation or measurement shall be specified in the 
definitions of every concept. Wundt declared definitely for 
"a psychology without a soul" as did Ladd and James whereas 
up till the publication of the 'Principles' in 1890, American 
writers such as Dewey, Royce and James had continued to 
regard the self as a necessary concept. 
The theoretical account of mental organisation developed 
by Freud is determinist in character, but it helped to preserve 
the concept of the self in a way which is contrary to its 
general direction. The concept of the ego remained intact 
despite the attacks of the positivists and this provided a 
foundation upon which the neo- Freudians and other dynamically 
inclined schools of psychology built new systems in which it 
became a more important and active agent than Freud had 
envisaged. The implications of this will be more fully 
considered when we come to look at instinct theory, but it is 
important to note here that Freud did use the word 'ego' 
himself in a way which sug -ested that it was denoting at one 
and the same time the whole person and also a psychical 
organisation. In 1921, he wrote that the nucleus of the ego, 
which comprises the 'archaic inheritance' of the human mind, 
was unconscious, (1921, p. 10 note), but two years later he 
expressedly repudiated this view, relegating the total self 
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to an impersonal id, while the ego represents only an 
adaptation to outer reality mediated by anxiety - a superficial 
entity (1923, p. 34 -5, note 2). In the tradition of Adler, 
who considered that what is frequently referred to as the ego 
is what he called the "life style" of the individual, there 
followed writers who looked to cultural and social phenomena 
rather than instinct for an explanation of our ways of dealing 
with the human environment, and who recognised that individuals 
under various pressures may create a false, superficial self 
beneath which their real nature and potentialities are 
concealed. A more profound view still is expressed by 
Winnicot, who equates what he describes as the 'psyche -soma' 
with the primary, natural self, and this is by no means 
impersonal (Winnicot, 1955, p. 16 -26). 
The development of Object-Relations theory had an 
important effect upon the concept of the self. Although 
Melanie Klein did not attempt a complete revision of Freud's 
psychodynamic theory, her work clearly implied that the infant 
was a whole true self from the beginning. Fairbairn's theory 
of endopsychic structure adopts the position that a unitary 
dynamic ego is the basis for ego -development through object - 
relations and that this constitutes the 'pristine personality' 
of the child (Fairbairn, 1955, p. 107). The danger in all 
this is the invocation of the self or ego as an external 
integrating agency for the repair of the ravages following 
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upon the fragmentation of positivistic analysis, which was 
the situation Wundt was trying to avoid when he declared for 
"a psychology without a soul ". 
The Leibnitzian tradition of the self -active monad is 
the original of a line of thinking in which instincts or 
drives are the main instigators of behaviour, while the 
Kantian view of all practical thought issuing in an imperative 
addressed to the will allows not only for a 'personal' view of 
the organism, but also takes into account the preoccupations 
of other persons within the environment. Thus there is room 
within the one broad stream of tradition for many different 
psychological schools in which varying degrees of importance 
are attributed to the participation of the intellect in the 
interpretation and arrangement of sensory data. In the field 
of cognitive psychology this led to the phenomenological 
approaches of Brentano, Husserl, Scheler and others, and less 
directly to the Gestalt school which was at the same time 
firmly attached to a tradition of experimental psychology. 
It can be seen that while acceptance or non -acceptance 
of some notion of the self varies in different schools of 
psychology, there is no single clear -cut definition of the 
concept which would serve as a principle of division into two 
groups. In dealing with the question of the self, Locke and 
Berkeley were first concerned with the nature of material 
things, while Descartes had begun with thought in the search 
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for an initial proposition which it would be self- contradictory 
to deny, and upon which he could base a deductive system. 
Hampshire points out that the sense of the Cogito lies in its 
reference to the speaker as a source of action, the reference 
in itself involving an act of intention (Hampshire, 1959, p. 
82.) Ayer's contention that the Cogito must be understood 
in terms of "there is a thought now ", rather than "I think ", 
and that "I exist" does not necessarily follow from this is 
difficult to sustain. Just as a perception cannot exist 
without a percipient, so a thought cannot occur without a 
thinker, whose intention it is to make this movement outward 
from himself or inward again to himself in the form of 
directed thought. It is equally true of the statement 
"there is a thought now" that a thinker is responsible for 
the statement, which is his own thought expressed in the form 
of language and addressed to other thinkers like himself. If 
then we search for the true self in sense- experiences, perhaps 
then it might be fruitful to examine the nature of a person's 
traffic with his sense -experiences, which has been traditionally 
approached by considering the nature of consciousness. 
The distinction between a conscious man and an unconscious 
machine always can be resolved into differences in perceptible 
behaviour and one of the reasons which we adduce for the 
absence of the same sort of consciousness in animals as in 
ourselves lies in the complete lack of any ostensible signs of 
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it in their outward behaviour. The first difficulty which 
arises is what sort of behaviour should come under review and 
often in deciding this question other considerations arise, 
and there have been some notable changes in the attitude of 
psychologists to this question in less than a century. 
Physiological and scientific psychologists in the latter part 
of the nineteenth century, although they rejected the personal 
self or soul, did define psychology as the "science of 
consciousness ", but the rise of behaviourism and the development 
of reactology in the work of Pavlov at the turn of the century 
brought about a reaction against the use of the data of 
consciousness or experience. This trend was recognised by 
Buhler in 1927, when he drew attention to the "three aspects 
of psychology" which included both introspection and the "new" 
aspect of behaviour, (Buhler, 1929). Psychoanalytic thought 
also played a part in these changes of emphasis. Freud 
pointed out the importance of unconscious motivation and drew 
attention in his instinct theory to the capacity of instincts 
to act vicariously for one another and to change their 
objects. Although psychoanalysis was concerned more with 
verbal and symbolic behaviour rather than overt motor 
behaviour, it did not encourage an 'introspectionistic' view 
of psychology, but had rather the opposite effect of casting 
doubts upon the face value of introspection. Hull expressed 
a behaviourist view of what matters were properly the concern 
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of psychological study when he wrote: 
"Humans have the added capacity of speech, symbolic 
behaviour, with the accompanying advantages of the higher 
mental processes. Whether this introduces any primary 
behavioural laws remains to be determined." (Hull, 1952, 
p. 4). 
He leaves the question open, though it is clear in his work 
that the doctrine of species equivalence is implied. The 
difficulty is, of course, that it is only through these same 
'capacities' and 'accompanying advantages' that behaviour of 
any sort may be studied at all. A similar type of criticism 
is expressed by Skinner (1953) to the effect that looking 
inside the organism for an explanation of external behaviour 
can easily lead to neglect of some of the environmental 
factors, and this is of course the case though it is not an 
argument for a complete disregard of motivational dynamics. 
The view which Eysenck takes of objective and subjective 
description, however, leads to a much more extreme position 
and there is no suggestion of leaving the question open as 
Hull does. Eysenck says: 
"If we are really concerned with 'understanding' 
human beings rather than explaining their behaviour, 
then we might very well concentrate on introspection, 
poetry, drama and the other arts. This is not a 
scientific aim, and it does not call for a scientific 
method." (Eysenck, 1954). 
This characteristic comment is open to rather more serious 
objections, and it is not merely a matter of semantics to 
draw attention to the difficulty of arriving at an adequate 
explanation without being concerned with understanding. The 
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sort of distinction which Eysenck is trying to make arises 
from the mistaken impression that an empirical proposition 
may have the same sort of validity as an "a pry iori" 
proposition, which, as Ayer points out, always owes its 
certainty to the fact that it is a tautology and cannot be 
confuted by experience (Ayer, 1958, p. 79). The objections 
to this view of science will be discussed in Chapter 3, but 
it is necessary to note here the arguments which support a 
view that the study of human behaviour is in fact a study 
of consciousness, and which tend to a rejection of rigorist 
interpretations such as we have quoted. 
Poetry and drama are occurrences like any other 
phenomena, and they have the added quality of taking place 
only within a limited context, as indeed does introspection 
which Eysenck unaccountably lists among the arts. It is the 
function of science to attempt to ascribe all happenings to 
the operation of a few simple laws and it is a useful matter 
of technique in formulating hypotheses that the repetition 
of phenomena in certain given circumstances and not in any 
others should lead us to examine these surrounding circumstances 
in a search for causes. There can be no justification for 
disregarding the phenomena because they present initial 
obstacles to a particular type of analysis. The justification 
for equating the study of behaviour with the study of 
consciousness must therefore lie in the definition we have 
adopted of personality as a specially human quality. Man 
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unlike animals, "knows that he knows ", he is not only 
experiencing, but conscious of his experience. It is in the 
nature of his thought that the essential difference lies. 
Men may think with a view to knowledge or they may think with 
a view to action and there would be nothing properly called 
thought unless there were words and language which could be 
employed to refer to the recurrent elements in men's 
experience and which form the medium by which they communicate 
with other men. This is the starting point from which 
Hampshire has developed his view of the person in his situation. 
He sees the necessity of singling out constant objects of 
reference to give sense to every other type of description. 
Each speaker or thinker carries with him the idea of himself 
as a persisting body among others, changing his standpoint 
in relation to constant objects around him and to objects 
changing in relation to himself. He believes that philosophers 
in the tradition of Hume failed to make a clear distinction 
between the object perceived and the perceiver, by omitting 
to take into account the individual's capacity to act upon 
the objects around him. Coenesthesis is not the only basis 
of awareness of one's own body, one also controls it and 
moves it about and observes the result of intentional movement. 
In the same way external objects which may be pointed at 
intentionally and referred to by means of language can also 
be manipulated and the observer may increase his knowledge of 
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the environment by calculated interference. Below the level 
of communication in language and the making of statements 
there is the act of intentional pointing, away from oneself 
and towards an object. This act of pointing is performed 
from a point of view and a standpoint which is the present 
situation of the abserver as a persisting object placed among 
other objects. In order to refer to his own feelings and 
sensations, the subject has to fit them into a framework of 
a narrative of his own life which must cross the narrative 
and history of other things and persons at many points and 
this necessity is not merely a requirement of language and 
description, but arises from the necessity of relating his 
sensations and perceptions to the possibility of action and 
to the experience of others. This view of the person is in 
accordance with the aim expressed in the introduction to 
consider the uniqueness of man in terms of his power of 
reflection on his own nature and his ability to communicate 
with other men, which is an essentially relational view of 
the human personality. Consideration of the nature of these 
other objects which comprise the environment and investigation 
of the nature of man's transaction with them must however 
involve us ultimately in speculation concerning the nature of 
reality. 
Ayer holds that it must be possible to define material 
things in terms of sense -contents because it is only by the 
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occurrence of certain sense- contents that the existence of 
any material thing can ever be in the least degree verified. 
The reason for believing in the existence of physical objects 
is simply that sentences which are taken to refer to physical 
objects are used in such a way that our having the appropriate 
experiences counts in favour of their truth. He is prepared 
to concede that if the personality of others were something 
we could not observe, then we could have no reason for 
believing in the existence of anyone else. He believes that 
the way of refuting this is not to argue from analogy of one' s 
own experience based on the fact that there is a perceptible 
resemblance between the behaviour of other bodies and that of 
one's own. This is an unverifiable hypothesis, as I can 
legitimately use the argument from analogy to establish the 
probable existence of an object which has never in fact 
manifested itself in my experience only if the object is such 
that it could conceivably be so manifested. If it cannot, 
then it is a metaphysical object. The conclusion to be 
drawn is that I have as good reason to believe in the 
existence of other people as I have to believe in the 
existence of material things. In each case the hypothesis 
is verified by the occurrence in my sense history of the 
appropriate series of sense contents. Hampshire points out 
that while Descartes could assume that a thinking being 
could be conceived as existing at no particular place or time 
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alone and disembodied, the individual's reference to himself 
in his own thought is a reference to something which is 
capable of shifting its attention and changing its perceptions 
by its own actions. To say 'I doubt whether anything else 
exists besides myself' is intelligible if by that I mean that 
I cannot describe any other thing the existence of which I 
can be so directly sure as I can of this meaningfully pointing, 
doubting being that is myself. However, to say that I cannot 
doubt that I exist, but I cannot be sure in the same way and 
to the same degree that I am not the only existing thing in 
the world, is unintelligible, as when I make reference to 
myself as doing something, active even if the activity is 
only directed thought, I make a contrast between that which I 
do myself and that which. happens to me, a contrast which I 
could not understand unless something external to myself 
does sometimes impinge on me. There is a body of clinical 
evidence that the localisation of the self in one's own body 
is a gradual process and that in psychosis this is often not 
achieved or only imperfectly so. Winnicot (1958) quotes the 
case of a psychotic patient who in analysis came to recognise 
that as a baby she thought her twin at the other end of the 
pram was herself. She even felt surprised when her twin was 
picked up and she remained where she was. Her sense of self 
and other -than -self was undeveloped. 
Among the results of Freud's theory of the unconscious 
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was that it brought a need to re- examine previous views of 
reality and consciousness. It is, however, possible to 
maintain as part of a rigorist position that psychology should 
be wholly concerned with observable changes in behaviour and 
thus avoid the necessity for this re- examination. Not only 
psychoanalysis took the view, however, that re- examination 
was necessary as Hampshire's discussion of unconscious motives 
in intention and action shows (1958, p. 132 -135). For 
Freud's theory of mind lies between those who would exhibit 
behaviour as a series of responses to external stimuli 
determined by predisposing causal factors and those like 
Sartre and the French existentialists of the present day who 
see all important behaviour as the fruit of human decision 
with no relation to antecedent conditions or physical 
causality of any kind. In giving a place to unconscious 
factors in human motivation it is thereby made more difficult 
to arrive at a definition of reality in terms of sense contents 
as the person may be unaware of these, might possibly be 
mistaken about their nature in some important way or may ascribe 
them wrongly to a particular source. Hampshire (1958, p. 133) 
however, holds that there is no contradiction in the term 
'unconscious purposes' and that confusion arises only when 
intention is separated from consciousness. There is nothing 
in the Freudian system which Hampshire finds incompatible with 
his view of the person in his situation, nor does his 
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reconciliation of the two approaches involve the separation 
of the knowing, intentional agent from his own unconscious 
mind. There is no need to assume that what I knowingly do 
constitutes what I really do. 
Perception, Freud noted, was connected not only with the 
response to stimuli but also with the rejection of stimuli. 
This, together with the revision of his original instinct 
theory in 1915 and his formulation of the principles of 
introjection and projection, paved the way for Melanie 
Klein's views on internalised objects and Fairbairn's 
thoroughgoing revision of Freudian psychodynamic theory. As 
a result of these developments which will form the substance 
of later chapters some examination of our conception of 
external and psychological reality is required. The 
perceptions of the individual are seen to play a much larger 
part in determining the nature of the environment in which he 
is functioning and Fairbairn believes that Freud's original 
distinction between conscious and unconscious now becomes 
less important than the distinction between the two worlds of 
inner and outer reality (1952 b, p. 124). Psychological 
reality is not vested either in the instinct stimulus nor in 
the sensory stimulus, but in the responses to combinations of 
these stimuli and their endopsychic determinants. In these 
terms we can made no distinction between an hallucination and 
a veridical perception, yet there is a sense in which 
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perception is more real than hallucination, and it has been 
suggested that the criterion to which we might appeal is that 
of biological or psycho- biological adaptation. Without 
anticipating discussion of Object -Relations theory, it can be 
said that perhaps a better criterion might be successful 
object -seeking, which resolved itself into purposive action 
in the environment. In the case of hallucination, the 
intention is directed to an inappropriate object and action 
will not result in a satisfactory end. 
These are the considerations preliminary to an examination 
of the Freudian theory of mind and the concept of the 
unconscious. They have been set down in detail because it 
is difficult to arrive at a fair assessment of these 
controversial concepts without a knowledge of the background 
in the history of psychology and philosophy of the related 
concepts of the self, reality and consciousness. In this 
connection it is useful to recall that Einstein prepared his 
great early discoveries not by experiments but from a careful 
study of Hume and Mach. There is so much disagreement about 
terminology common to psychoanalysis, academic psychology, 
behaviourism and other sciences that an analysis of concepts 
and an examination of the logical basis of theory can hardly 
fail to help the progress of the scientific study of 
personality. To confine study to overt motor behaviour is 
restricting and out of tune with modern scientific philosophy: 
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there is the parallel in physics where the earlier ultra - 
positivistic requirement that only observable qualities may 
be used in formulating principles has been relaxed to include 
indirection. Freud recognised clearly the necessity for 
modifications in theory and was not unaware of movements in 
other sciences, and most of the important modifications in 
fact originated in his own lifetime from Freud himself. 
Since his death there have been others, notably in the work 
of Melanie Klein, who did not make her important descriptions 
of internalised object -relations the basis of any radical 
re- thinkinE of Freudian psycho- dynamic theory. Fairbairn 
has begun this, however, and perhaps the time has come for 
the adoption of his suggestion that a complete revision is 
required in the light of later clinical findings and the 
changing climate of scientific thought. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
The Concept of the Unconscious. 
There are many different directions from which 
consideration of Freud's theory of mind can be approached for, 
as he said himself, the theme of mental processes beneath the 
surface appearance of things, or to use the words of Herbart 
'behind the curtains' was a familiar one in poetry, philosophy 
and literature before Freud's time. This is particularly 
true in the case of the more sensitive novelists such as 
Henry James and in pre -Freudian usages of 'unconscious' there 
seem to be two main categories of meaning. There is first 
the sense of not having consciousness, used of things rather 
than people, or of people in a state which is being 
deliberately differentiated from the normal waking condition, 
as for instance a trance or a coma. Second, there is the 
adverbial use, most commonly occurring when an activity or 
piece of behaviour is described. From a study of these 
usages it can be seen that there are further subdivisions of 
meaning, some relatively unambiguous and others of shades of 
difference which are difficult to distinguish. One of the 
first difficulties encountered in searching for the roots of 
the concept is that there is nothing in the everyday phenomena 
of consciousness, it could be argued, which would necessarily 
lead us to assume unconscious activity, and William James 
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dealt with this as early as 1890. When the solution to a 
problem appears as a sudden illumination at a time when we 
had abandoned all hope of reaching success, and had ceased to 
concentrate upon it, is it necessary to make the assumption 
that this is evidence of a process at a level outside our 
awareness? Even if we do accept this evidence is it necessary 
to assume that this points to the existence of an unconscious 
mind? We cannot assume that things should have turned out 
otherwise, as this may be the way in which things do happen 
in consciousness and if we wish to seek some background to 
the mental activity of which we are aware, then it is only 
necessary to look at the mechanics of the brain and the 
central nervous system. This is indeed where Freud first 
directed his attention (1954), but apart from what he was 
writing we can deduce a great deal from what he was doing and 
from what he wrote at a later date. As is the case with 
psychoanalysis at the present day, theory and therapy were 
closely linked so that in Freud's early years both were 
developing together and it can be seen how he was moving 
towards what were to be his central concepts from a number of 
different directions simultaneously. It is because of this, 
perhaps, that while Freud has in formulating the concept of 
the unconscious left us with new insight and an instrument of 
great potency for investigating human conduct, he has also 
left us with many theoretical difficulties which have been 
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only partly solved since his original discoveries began to 
receive attention. 
The first difficulty which emerges is that because Freud 
was engaged upon the treatment of patients by revolutionary 
methods which were in an evolving state, he did not leave a 
clear -cut or systematic account of his own system. As time 
went on he introduced changes and modifications which he did 
not always relate expressedly to his previous views so that 
the development of his thought could be clearly traced. In 
addition to this, his doctrine of the mind depends upon a 
number of key concepts which are mutually dependent and 
which can only be understood in terms of each other. A 
further problem lies in the fact that he did not always make 
a clear distinction between that usage of the word 'unconscious' 
which signifies that the activity is unknown to the agent and 
that which signifies that it is performed automatically. 
Sometimes both are suggested at the one time, but the 
distinction is an important one as each requires a separate 
justification. The final difficulty which we note is that 
later psychoanalysts like Jung or the neo- Freudians seem to 
have concepts of the unconscious which differ not only from 
one another but also from Freud's original. When Freud used 
the words 'unconscious' or 'unconsciously' his meaning may be 
related to earlier usages of which it is very often an 
extension, but when he used the definite article and introduced 
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the term the unconscious ", this is a new term for which he 
must prescribe a meaning and a use (MacIntyre, 1958, p. 44). 
The first published occurrence of this term (das Unbewüsste) 
in the psychoanalytical sense occurs in Joseph Breuer's case 
history of Anna O. in 1893, and he quotes it in inverted 
commas, which may mean that he is attributing it to Freud 
(Freud & Breuer, 1893 -95, P. 45). Freud himself uses the 
tern in his history of Frau Emmy von N. (Ibid, p. 76) in the 
same year. This serves as a direction to the investigator 
where first to look for the origins of Freud's concepts. 
Anna 0. fell ill in 1880 and Breuer's treatment of her case 
lasted until 1882. Freud was so impressed by the history 
which he heard from Breuer in November of that year that he 
attempted to interest Charcot in it while he was studying 
under him in 1885, but without success. It is easy to see, 
however, that this was the beginning of the process of 
speculation which was to lead to the discovery of new methods 
of treatment, to observance of unexplained resistances to the 
treatment and through the investigation of these to the 
devising of new theoretical concepts in an attempt to reach 
an exhaustive account of the nature of mental function. 
Despite the variety of directions from which Freud 
approached the solution of his problem, the origins of his 
system lie clearly in the field of psychopathology and his 
independent researches into the nature of hysteria were the 
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direct result of his inability to account for the reactions 
of hysterical patients in his practice at Vienna within the 
limitations of the existing frame of reference. His 
background as a medical neurologist led him first to an 
attempt to explain mental functioning on a neurophysiological 
basis in an unpublished essay which has only recently come to 
light, in which he defines a scientific psychology as one 
which conceives mental phenomena in terms of material states 
of affairs whose changes are susceptible of measurement and 
subject to laws of motion. He soon abandoned this attempt 
at a reconciliation of contemporary discoveries in 
neurophysiology and the schematisation of Newtonian 
mechanics. The reasons for its non -publication may be 
conjectured when the date of writing is seen to be close to 
that of the "Studien über Hysterie" in which all recorded 
four case -histories in which Freud used the cathartic method. 
All of these had been published along with that of Fraulein 
Anna 0. two years before and had received extensive discussion 
since. The changes which were taking place in his thought 
may be seen through the fact that while in 1895 he had used 
the word "Nervensystem" (nervous system) throughout, in 1925 
he replaced it by "Seelenleben" (mental life) in the last 
sentence of the book. James Strachey points out that this 
does not change the meaning of the sentence in the least: 
"the old neurological vocabulary had already been no more than 
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a husk at the time when Freud penned the words." (Freud & 
Breuer, 1893 -5, p. XXV). His clinical experience was 
compelling him to reject the possibility of the simple 
synthesis which he had at first envisaged but his neurological 
training made him reluctant to accept purely psychological 
explanations as ultimate and to the end of his life he 
believed that a physical basis for all mental phenomena might 
in the end be found. Both Breuer and Freud were considerably 
influenced by the school of Helmholtz, of which their teacher, 
Ernst Brücke, was a prominent member. According to their 
views all natural phenomena are ultimately explicable in 
terms of physical and chemical forces. On the other hand, 
Freud's truly scientific approach to his data led him more 
and more to abandon his neurological bias. In the "Studies 
on Hysteria" it is Breuer who professes that "Psychical 
processes will be dealt with in the language of psychology" 
(Freud & Breuer, 1893 -95, p. 185), but his whole theoretical 
chapter draws parallels between the nervous system and 
electrical installations. We know that the treatment of 
Anna O. was terminated abruptly because as later emerged she 
had a positive transference of a sexual nature to Breuer. 
He considered this irrelevant to her treatment and it is not 
reported in her history. Around the same time, however, 
Freud was noting patients' resistance to treatment but making 
the critical decision to consider this not as irrelevant nor 
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merely as an obstacle to be overcome but as a further 
important source of data for his researches. Breuer 
preferred existing models, Freud was prepared to abandon -these 
if they did not fulfil his purposes. That he was aware of 
this direction in his work is clear from the beginning: 
"I have not always been a psychotherapist. Like 
other neuropathologists, I was trained to employ local 
diagnoses and electro- prognosis, and it still strikes 
me myself as strange that the case histories I write 
should read like short stories and that, as one might 
say, they lack the serious stamp of science. I must 
console myself with the reflection that the nature of 
the subject is evidently responsible for this, rather 
than any preference of my own." (Freud & Breuer, 1893- 
95, p. 160). 
This quotation is interesting as it shows Freud ranging 
himself with the imaginative describers of human behaviour, 
a position which he reached not from choice but through the 
inadequacy of the existing models. He was concerned to 
account for all the data, not just those parts which could be 
dealt with under a particular method of classification. His 
thinking, however, continued to bear traces of his earlier 
preoccupations and in the seventh chapter of "The 
Interpretation of Dreams ", published in 1898, three years 
after the "Studies on Hysteria", he retained a great part of 
the theoretical structure used in his neurological writing. 
Increasingly the nature of the material with which he was 
dealing compelled him to explanation in purely psychological 
terms. We have already noted that therapy and theory were 
closely related, but now we can see that theory arose out of 
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therapeutic experience and that the formulation of new 
concepts was always based upon the inadequacy of the old in 
the face of clinical evidence. Investigation of the sources 
of his terminology and of the nature of his scientific 
orientation is useful and informative but for a balanced 
picture must be related to the events which unfold themselves 
in the early case histories. At the present day, psycho- 
analysis depends largely upon clinical verification and it is 
as a therapeutic method that its existence is justified. 
Further than this, it is only through the therapeutic setting 
that investigation can be made and it is the self -transcendant 
interaction between patient and therapist in the transference 
which tests and exemplifies the principles upon which it is 
based. The understanding of normal processes which 
psychoanalysis has brought originated in the study of the 
abnormal, and in Freud's day some of the abnormal states 
which are now familiar were only beginning to be clinically 
described. Psychoanalysis originated not as.a philosophical 
speculation but as a psychopathology of hysteria. 
When Freud qualified in medicine, physical methods of 
treatment of mental disorders enjoyed little success and such 
successes as there were went largely unexplained. In no 
case was this more marked than in hysterical paralysis and the 
lesser symptoms of the same kind which were named for the 
first time "conversion" in Breuer' s theoretical chapter of the 
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"Studies on Hysteria" (Freud & Breuer, 1893 -95, p. 206). 
Freud paid an extensive visit to the Saltpetriere where 
Charcot, whose pupil, Janet, was the first to describe 
hysteria as a recognisable clinical entity, was directing 
work to which Freud and Breuer made frequent reference in 
their Preliminary Communication which was to form the basis 
of the "Studies on Hysteria". The majority of Freud's 
researches were, however, independently conducted in the 
course of his practice in Vienna. He had a large proportion 
of hysterical patients whom he treated by a variety of the 
currently recommended and generally unsatisfactory ways until 
he tried for the first time the cathartic method in the case 
of Emmy van N. whom he began to treat in 1889. His use of 
this method stems from his reflection on Breuer' s account of 
the treatment of Fraülein Anna 0., which had impressed him so 
much that he had tried without success to bring it to the 
attention of Charcot while he was in Paris. The empirical 
or neurological approach to psychoneurosis or the neurological, 
classificatory or philosophic approach to psychosis which was 
characteristic of the period did not provide an explanation 
of why in hysterical paralysis the areas affected did not 
correspond with definite anatomical or physiological 
boundaries but rather with the patient's subjective and 
usually quite erroneous notions. Janet attempted to provide 
a scientific explanation of the genesis of the phenomena displayed 
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by the hysteric in the concept of dissociation, which was 
described as a failure of the ego to exercise its usual 
cohesive function, resulting in disintegration so that certain 
functions of the personality became separated from it and 
began to operate independently. This is a purely passive 
process, unlike Freud's later concept of repression, and so 
it was inadequate fully to account for the range of 
phenomena which Freud had observed in his own patients. 
Particularly it could not account for resistance to therapy. 
He noted again and again in patient's histories the appearance 
of 'traumatic events' or incidents charged with such painful 
emotional significance that the emotion aroused could not 
find expression. Patients who were treated by hypnotic 
suggestion were able to relive the traumatic experiences the 
repression of which had resulted in emotional tension, by 
this process "abreacted" or discharged within the therapeutic 
situation, the original repressed emotion. In order to 
relate these two observations to the aetiology of hysteria 
Freud and Breuer postulated the concept of repression which 
Freud was to make his own and which was decisive for the 
emergence of the concept of the unconscious. It is true 
that a dynamic hypothesis underlay the theory of trauma and 
abreaction but the dynamic view of the whole working of the 
mind was only attained when Freud shifted his attention from 
infantile trauma to infantile fantasies. He himself holds 
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that the theory of repression is the foundation stone upon 
which the structure of psychoanalysis rests, but it must be 
taken in conjunction with the other phenomenon he observed in 
hysterical patients, the active resistance they made to his 
therapeutic efforts, particularly as he noted that this was 
encountered despite the strongest evidence of motives towards 
the restoration of mental health and the fullest conscious 
co- operation on the patient's part. This was analogous to 
the situation of the sufferer from hysterical paralysis, for 
just as this appeared to be the result of the operation of 
subjective factors of which the patient was unaware, so in 
therapy resistance meant the presence of some kind of 
motivation not obviously related to the person's declared 
wishes or intentions. The introduction of the concept of 
the unconscious as a means to explaining these phenomena came 
from Freud rather than Breuer, although as we have noted the 
first published use of the term in the psychoanalytical sense 
was Breuer's in the case history of Anna O. 
Now that we have traced the progress of concept -formation 
which kept pace with Freud's growing clinical insight, it is 
useful to see the sources from which the concept of the 
unconscious derived as these had some influence in determining 
how the concept was used and how Freud visualised the workings 
of the mind. He probably acquired the term from his own 
teacher in philosophy, Brentano, who was a follower of the 
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Herbatian "psychology of ideas". The resemblance between 
Freud's concept and Herbart's is at a first examination 
striking but it does not stand up to further scrutiny as for 
Herbart unconscious mental activity was a simple inference 
from conscious states. The matter of derivation is not, 
however, of first importance. What is of greater interest 
is the nature of the concept itself and the reasons why 
Freud had thought it necessary to introduce it in explanation 
of the particular phenomena which he had been observing. For 
'the unconscious' first emerges as the realm of repressed 
memories and emotions which were of such importance in the 
aetiology of hysteria. Without understanding of the nature 
of repression, an active process quite unlike Janet's 
dissociation, there can be no understanding of the unconscious. 
This shows the close interdependence of concepts which is 
characteristic of Freudian theory. He was engaged not only 
in establishing a correlation between the occurrence of 
certain childhood traumatic experiences and adult 
psychoneurosis, but was concerned with a more general type of 
explanation in which a variety of normal and abnormal behaviour 
could be related to a number of antecedent conditions by means 
of a few simple theoretical concepts of which the unconscious 
was to be the central one. Such a close interdependence of 
concepts within the framework of a general theory is familiar 
in the history of science and the example of 'mass', 'velocity' 
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and 'force' in Newtonian mechanics is a close parallel. 
These explanatory concepts underwent development and 
modification as the clinical material accumulated and Freud 
became more interested in first one then another aspect of 
the complex of behaviour. In the first instance he had been 
concerned with dissociation phenomena and with the reformulation 
of Janet's conception into his own view of dynainic repression. 
Then he investigated the nature of the repressed and made the 
important discovery of its predominantly sexual character, - 
which was to provide a basis for development of instinct 
theory. The sexual life of infancy gives rise to a number 
of situations in which needs of a sexual nature are unsatisfied 
or come into conflict with the conventions of the environment 
and these are then pushed down into the unconscious and kept 
there by the process of repression. The unconscious is 
therefore a place, the repository of what is repressed and of 
what is kept dynamically repressed and it is only by postulating 
its existence that there is a direct causal effect of the 
infantile on the adult. In making this existential claim, 
however, Freud is passing from the extension of existing 
forms of usage of words to the creation of a new explanatory 
concept and moving from the describing of behaviour to 
explaining it. He is bringing to our attention a new entity 
which must be justified by logical means. 
He gives his own metapsychological account of the 
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unconscious (Freud, 1915E) when he says it is "the name of a 
system of mental acts". The justification for belief in such 
a system is two -fold: first, we are able to account for 
behaviour which cannot be accounted for in terms of 
conscious intentions; secondly, if we assume in 
psychoanalytic practice the existence of the unconscious we 
are able to bring into consciousness contents of which the 
patient was unaware and in so doing we help to bring about 
the healing of his mental disorder. He does on to describe 
what is in the unconscious. There are instincts and 
emotions, though the first are unconscious only in a very 
loose sense, as they could become conscious only in the form 
of something not themselves, that is in the form of ideas or 
emotions. The whole concept of unconscious ideas is closely 
linked with Herbartian psychology and underlies a good deal 
of Freud's thought, particularly in earlier years. The 
objection that wishes, motives and fears must be conscious 
because in ordinary language they describe inner mental 
events cannot be sustained, for it presupposes a dichotomy 
of mind and body which is unjustifiable on philosophic grounds 
and clinically is disproved by the kinds of material which 
had led Freud to these formulations in the first place. It 
is only in pathological conditions that the mind can be 
conceived as functioning separately and distinctly from the 
body. winnicot (1954) expresses this succinctly when he states 
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that if development is satisfactory the "mind is no more than 
a special case of the functioning of the psyche -soma." The 
view of the mind as a separate entity was derived from 
Descartes and has been dubbed by Ryle "the ghost in the 
machine ". Freud rejected this sort of view, but it is still 
clear that he retained sufficient of the Cartesian way of 
thought to envisage it as a place apart which could be 
inhabited by ideas. 
A decisive step in the development of Freudian theory 
was taken when he turned from consideration of the mechanisms 
of repression and the nature of the repressed to consider the 
agency responsible for the repression. This involved more 
than a change of direction, it involved also a change of 
emphasis: instead of considering repression purely in 
functional terms, he began to take into account what he called 
"the mental apparatus ", and distinguished three separate 
structures, the id, the ego and the super -ego. The id was 
conceived as representing the source of instinctive impulse, 
while the ego was concerned with the regulation of these 
impulses in a way compatible with the situation in outer 
reality. The super -ego, however, was described as "deposit 
left by the earliest object- choices of the Id" (Freud, 1923, 
P. 44). As the earliest object- choices of the child are the 
parents and as they at the same time constitute the main way 
in which the infant meets outer reality, they present as 
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authoritative figures who control his activities and who 
frustrate many of his instinctive impulses. The super -ego 
arises within the psyche as an internal representative of 
these figures and the instigator of repression. The super- 
ego therefore emerges as having the status of an internal 
object which has been incorporated within the psyche as the 
result of a need. Later work has shown that fantasies of 
incorporating loved and hated objects, persons and parts of 
persons into ourselves are among the earliest and most deeply 
unconscious fantasies, and to this process the term 
introjection has been given (Isaacs, 1943, p. 98). Because 
this internal representative of parental figures has an 
active relationship with the ego, Freud's theory of mental 
constitution implies that object- relationships exist within 
the personality itself as well as between the personality and 
external objects. The introjection of objects formed the 
basis of Melanie Klein's view on the structuring of a world 
of inner reality in which the ego participates in a 
multiplicity of relationships with internal objects and part - 
objects. As a result of this very important theoretical 
step, the original distinction which Freud pointed out between 
the conscious and unconscious now becomes less important than 
the distinction between the two worlds of inner and outer 
reality. 
The original definition of personality which we adopted 
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took a view of the person as manifesting his individuality in 
his relations with other objects. As a result of the concept 
of the unconscious we now see that these other objects include 
not only those within the material environment which can be 
pointed at, described or manipulated, but also those which 
belong to inner reality of which the person may be wholly 
unaware. Situations in outer reality will be met by the 
individual in ways which are influenced by the internal 
situation obtaining between the ego and its internal objects. 
The resistance which Freud noted in the therapeutic 
situation can be seen not as a defence against the revival 
of memories of traumatic experiences in the past but as part 
of an unconscious aim to prevent the emergence of situations 
in inner reality in the present. The apparent reversibility 
of psychic growth in which a person appears to be reverting 
to an earlier state is now seen in terms of an adaptation to 
outer reality of a temporary or permanent nature mediated by 
unconscious situations and relationships which, although they 
have their roots in past experience, belong to the world of 
inner reality in the present. This finally is in accordance 
with de Chardin' s view that the evolution of species must be 
considered not only in terms of the "without" but also of the 
"within". Man's world of inner reality is another way of 
expressing the quality which separates him from other species. 
The Freudian concept of the unconscious has undergone 
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changes and elaboration as the result of later clinical 
findings, particularly in the field of child analysis, and 
through the theoretical revisions and gradual changes in 
emphasis which have followed upon these. This is in 
accordance with Freud's own view of scientific advance and 
some of the greater steps forward are partly due to the 
emancipation of scientific thought from the atomistic outlook 
of Helmholtz which dominated the physics and science of his 
day. The important theoretical concepts which Freud 
formulated were repression and the unconscious, which are 
unobservables like the electron or the gene, but on the basis 
of which assumptions may be formulated from which observation 
statements can be deduced which are true and which could not 
be deduced from the theory unless such assumptions were 
included. Explanatory concepts of this sort have a legitimate 
function to perform and are a necessary and fame liar -cart of 
modern scientific progress. 
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CHAPTER 3. 
The Scientific Study of Personality. 
Acceptance of the broad principles of the mind's structure 
and function which Freud outlined would seem at first sight to 
increase the difficulties rather than clarify the issues. 
For now not only have we abandoned the hope of establishing a 
simple cause- and -effect relationship between stimulus and 
response and at the same time the expectation of an explanation 
in mechanical terms of the basis of human action, but also we 
are compelled to reconsider whether there is in fact any 
simple correspondence between an internal situation and 
particular external behaviour. The data of our investigation 
must relate not only to surface behaviour and external 
stimuli, both of which are observables and may be controlled 
to some extent by the classical forms of experimental design 
but also to the underlying processes by Which the one is 
transformed into the other. The explanations which may be 
formulated must take into account different kinds of stimuli 
which arise within the organism itself and must allow for the 
fact that similar external behaviour may arise from a 
multitude of combinations of external and internal factors. 
Objections to the psychoanalytical approach may be made on 
the ground that this is not a legitimate field of scientific . 
enquiry, that it is impossible to be investigated by a 
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scientific method or that the techniques of psychoanalysis 
do not in themselves constitute a scientific method. It is, 
however, possible to refute these objections on the grounds" 
of logic and in order to do this it is necessary first to 
recapitulate the premises which we have adopted as a result 
of the arguments of the first two chapters. 
The initial postulate is that we exist, both in a world 
of persisting material things which we can point to and refer 
to by means of language and of other persons like ourselves 
who have the same power of purposeful action as we have and 
with whom we are in communication. This social nature of 
man is taken to be evidence of his unique power of reflection 
which is not a mystical quality but the result of a natural 
process of evolution. It is the most imoortant fact about 
man's behaviour and makes the explanatory terminology of 
mechanics or animal behaviour inadequate in an application to 
human acts. Consciousness rather than behaviour might then 
be the proper field for a. study of personality, were it not 
for the fact that Freud has presented convincing evidence for 
the view that the data of consciousness are themselves 
defective and that not all human motives are available to the 
process of introspection. We therefore accept the explanatory 
concept of the unconscious and the associated concepts of 
repression and resistance which serve as the foundations of 
the Freudian theory of the mind. This leads us to extend the 
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range of our definition of personality in terms of relationship 
with other objects to include a system of internal relationships 
with introjected objects comprising an inner reality which is 
part of each individual and which modifies his way of dealing 
with outer reality. 
Freud claimed to have transformed metaphysics into 
metapsychology and in the same way as early behaviourists 
believed that all human actions could be reduced to the 
effects of the operation of a limited number of variables, 
psychoanalysis has lodged a rival claim to provide an 
explanation of all human activities in terms of the unconscious. 
To attempt a justification of psychoanalytical method and its 
approach to human experience upon the basis of any lesser 
claim is not only to evade a difficult task of logical 
analysis but also to neglect one of the most important sources 
of demonstration of the comprehensive explanatory power of its 
conceptual tools. 
The rigorist school of behaviourists would not only 
object to the definition of personality which we have adopted 
but also to the view that the specifically human behaviour we 
have outlined is a legitimate objective of scientific enquiry. 
Eysenck holds that the aim of scientific psychology is to 
"explain behaviours in terms of general laws, preferably 
stated in mathematical terms, and to control behaviour by 
varying the conditions which determine it." ( Eysenck, 1954). 
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In the passage already quoted in Chapter 1, he maintains that 
"understanding" human beings is not a scientific aim nor does 
it call for scientific method, nor does he believe that it 
has any connection with psychology. Here it is the definition 
of behaviour which is the difficulty as Eysenck seems to be 
adopting a narrow and exclusive definition while the dynamic 
schools offer no objection to describing psychology as a 
science of human behaviour provided behaviour is understood to 
include mental or endopsychic as well as motor activity. 
Indeed, such a comprehensive definition of behaviour is part 
of the dynamic approach and from the classical psychoanalytic 
viewpoint there can be no doubt that it was not only 
metaphysics that became transformed into metapsychology but 
also religion, morals, art and all human activities which 
embody the so-called 'higher' values (Fairbairn, 1956, p. 50) . 
In view of our initial definition of personality, we must 
take the wider view, though at the same time fully recognising 
the usefulness of the other type of approach in its correct 
applications. The way towards the universality of science 
lies through eclecticism, the toleration of open questions 
and efforts to understanding other people's ideas on their 
own premises. There are psychologists who make a comparison 
between the present state of their science and the condition 
of pre -Newtonian physics where a great many correlations had 
been established between diverse physical phenomena (MacIntyre, 
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1958, p. 2) without a unifying principle having been 
discovered, while there are others who maintain that 
psychology's need is a raison d'etre more than a series of 
objective descriptions. There are yet others who hold that 
both unifying description and raison d'etre are provided in 
the complex theoretical formulations of Freud and Jung and 
that in a sense psychology's Newton has already arrived. 
There does seem to be one premise which all these varied 
shades of opinion hold in common with one another and with. 
the other sciences which is a starting point for a consideration 
of what is the proper matter for scientific enquiry. It is 
worth quoting a passage from Whitehead (1926, p. 5) : 
"There can be no living science unless there is a 
widespread instinctive conviction in the existence of 
an Order of Things and in particular of an Order of 
Nature." 
Whitehead believes that this is an article of faith 
rather than of logic, that the justification of scientific 
procedure lies in its success in operation, and that the chief 
safeguard against the retention of unsound hypotheses lies in 
the scientist's exnnerimental habit of mind. It is not 
enough, however, that the scientist should assume the 
intelligibility of the existent world: two further conditions 
must be fulfilled before he can assume that his search for 
order is likely to be successful, first, that the laws which 
operate in nature are not too complex for us to unravel, and 
second that they are accessible to our investigations (Broad, 
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1949, p. 509 -10). These three postulates are essentially 
operational hypotheses, useful and adequate for any scientific 
enquiry, as there could be no science of any hind if 
everything was chaos. It is more difficult, however, to 
state a logical basis for such postulates. The uniformity 
of nature cannot justify induction, nor can invoking a 
principle of "limited independent variety" (Keynes, 1929, 
part III). As will be discussed in connection with the 
problem of induction, such arguments are circular. Ayer 
feels that the justification of scientific procedures lies 
in the success of the predictions to which they give rise, 
but holds philosophy and science to be in a special and 
interdependent relationship which ensures the constant 
examination of scientific procedure by the work of 
clarification and analysis which it is the function of 
philosophy to discharge. He writes of this relationship: 
"In saying that philosophy is concerned with each 
of the sciences in a manner which we shall indicate, we 
mean also to rule out the supposition that philosophy 
can be ranged alongside the existing sciences as a 
special department of speculative knowledge. Those 
who make this supposition cherish the belief that there 
are some things in the world which are possible objects 
of speculative knowledge and yet lie beyong the scope 
of empirical science. But this belief is a delusion. 
There is no field of experience which cannot, in 
principle, be brought under some form of scientific 
law and no type of speculative knowledge about the 
world which it is, in principle, beyond the power of 
science to give." (Ayer, 1958, p. 48). 
This view is opposed, as can be seen from the quotation 
already made, to that of Eysenck, who speaks elsewhere of 
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"the agreement of logicians and philosophers of scientific 
methodology concerning the definitions and standards of 
science" (1953). Here it emerges that he is basing his 
definition of science not upon the type of data with which it 
is concerned but rather upon the method which is used to 
investigate the data and the attitude of the observer towards 
them. The difference which at first sight appeared to be in 
the definition of behaviour now emerges as a more fundamental 
and important disagreement concerning the definition of 
science and the nature of the scientific method. The 
empirical sciences differ from pure sciences both in the 
nature of their subject matter and in their method. 
Nevertheless, both alike are sciences, by which we seek to 
order experience so as to render it intelligible. In all 
sciences there are two characteristics: the selection of a 
certain kind of fact and the use of a certain kind of 
method (Stebbing, 1946, p. 231). It is the facts which we 
require to investigate, however, which must determine the 
means which we adopt towards this end. It is implicit in 
all Eysenck's work, however, and he has on occasion made it 
explicit that he in fact defines behaviour as those aspects 
of experience which are amenable to a particular kind of 
mathematical analysis. Further than this, by reason of his 
generalisations from his own system to the field of all 
science, he defines all science in terms of methodology, which 
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is a logically untenable position. "Scientific truths ", he 
says, "tend to be correct because they have been arrived at by 
a particular method ", (1953). His argument therefore turns 
out to be that the data of experience which are ordered 
according to a particular method can therefore by that 
criterion be judged as true, while at the same time 
amenability to ordering by this method determines the 
selection of the data. This is circular and also contradicts 
the basic scientific postulate that everything that exists is 
discoverable and capable of ordering. It is a logically 
unsound view of science and more in accordance with 19th 
century mechanistic materialism than with modern scientific 
thought. Compare such a viewpoint with that of Julian 
Huxley and Waddington (1947, 1941) who look to the natural 
course of human evolution to find a guiding line for all 
human conduct. Waddington sees in the adoption of the 
scientific attitude towards human problems the best hope for 
modern man and in the development of this view a possible 
alternative to religion. Psychoanalysis has drawn upon 
philosophy for some of its concepts and its methods of 
evaluating them, but the traffic has not been in the one 
direction only. Scientific investigation of the unconscious 
has contributed to the sum of information at the disposal of 
philosophy and has offered direct help in the solving of 
problems once belonging to the speculative fields of ethics and 
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religion. We therefore reject a narrow or rigorist view of 
science and accept the wider one which Ayer has stated. 
The confusion between the standards of pure and empirical 
science which underlies many rigorist views of the study of 
human personality and behaviour has been dealt with at some 
length as it often presents considerable difficulties in the 
defence of propositions based upon one view of scientific 
enquiry against objections raised upon premises of quite 
another sort. This has resulted upon rather a detailed 
examination and criticism of the views of one author, which 
is the result more of the number of his publications and 
the range of his generalisations than of intrinsic objection 
to his methods. It is not the use of mathematical or 
statistical analysis to which objections are raised, but 
the restrictive selection of data on the grounds of 
quantifiability and the making of empirical generalisations 
from analytical propositions. It is also important to 
resist the view that only those sorts of enquiry which may 
be expressed in the form of mathematical terms are scientific 
in character. It does not follow from this, however, that 
the accumulation of a certain class of data without attempt 
at order or without reference to logic would satisfy a 
definition of science (Stebbing, 1946, p. 23). There must 
of course be a certain attitude towards the data and a 
certain kind of method. 
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Objectivity is invariably quoted as a prerequisite of 
scientific method yet there is a sense in which all forms of 
scientific enquiry are subjective in that they must ultimately 
be submitted to the evaluation of human intelligence. Each 
of the sciences has arisen from the study of a particular 
range of sense- perceptions, although in the highly technical 
language of the natural sciences, definitions are no longer 
related to immediate sense perceptions. The most highly 
advanced science of theoretical physics bears little apparent 
relationship to the facts of everyday experience and it 
makes the least possible reference to human interests and the 
standpoint of the observer. Einstein has been able to show 
physicists in their own mathematical language that physical 
phenomena are relative to the observer. The nature of s the 
relationship between them forms the matter of psychological 
investigation, though the techniques of investigation may 
vary. Material things remain a logical construction out of 
sense -contents and even the sophisticated bodies singled out 
by scientific description owe their status as bodies to 
their relationship with other bodies, by their powers, in 
Locke' s terminology, or by their reaction to the manipulation 
of the observer (Hampshire, 1959, D. 49). This remains the 
basis of all the natural sciences, however much we are aware 
of the gap between observation and basic concepts or laws, 
which Einstein maintains is increasing (Einstein, 1944). 
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Anthropomorphic tendencies and the remains of teleological 
interpretations of events are evidence in science of its 
ultimate dependence upon the sense- contents of observers and 
it is only through examination of descriptions and propositions 
in the light of this knowledge that understanding of the 
meaning of scientific propositions may be reached. Scientific 
descriptions of a certain sort are the least anthropocentric 
of all descriptions and the natural trend of science is 
towards objectivity and abstract thinking. It is easy, 
however, to fall into the error of reifying abstractions or 
to be misled by what Whitehead calls "the fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness" (1929). Objectivity is a personal commitment, 
an attempt to make all statements independent of the 
preoccupations or the momentary interests of individual 
persons. There can be no sense in which objectivity is 
synonymous with quantification nor can we define objectivity 
in terms of a particular methodology. To do this is to 
confuse again the nature of analytic and synthetic propositions 
and to mistake the functions of inductive and deductive 
reasoning. We cannot reduce human experience to mathematical 
terms as mathematical propositions differ from those of the 
natural sciences in that they are wholly independent of what 
actually exists in the world. Mathematics is a deductive, 
formal science capable of exact demonstration. Ayer refutes 
Mill's view that the truths of logic and mathematics are merely 
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inductive generalisations based upon an extremely large 
number of cases and adduces that logical and mathematical 
principles are universal simply because we never allow them 
to be anything else (1958, D. 77). If we come across an 
instance in which it would appear that a case has been 
encountered which confuted one of these principles, then we 
should take that not as an evidence of the invalidation of 
the proposition, but seek other explanations of the occurrence 
in faulty definitions, or in errors of the application of the 
principle as an empirical generalisation. Mill was thus 
wrong in supposing that a situation could arise which would 
overthrow such a principle, for the truths of logic and 
mathematics are analytic propositions, which is another way 
of saying that they are tautologies (Ayer - 1958, p. 74 -77) . 
We cannot, as Leibnitz attempted, put all true statements on 
a level with those of formal logic or pure mathematics, nor 
was the Cartesian attempt to base all knowledge upon analytic 
propositions a successful one, as the denial that nature is 
uniform is not self- contradictory in logic. This leads us 
to consider the status of induction and ways of assessing the 
probability of hypotheses. 
Mill defined induction as "the process by which we 
conclude that what is true of certain individuals of a class 
is true of the whole class, or that what is true at certain 
times will be true in similar circumstances at all times." 
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This covers all the cases in which we pass from a particular 
statement of fact to a factual conclusion which is not 
formally entailed. The problem of induction is that of 
finding a way to prove that certain empirical generalisations 
which are derived from past experience will hold good also 
in the future. Appeal to mathematical principles means 
falling into the error of supposing that from a tautology 
it is possible to deduce a proposition about a matter of fact, 
while appeal to an empirical principle means assuming what 
one is setting out to prove (Ayer, 1958, p. 49). This is 
why the postulate of the uniformity of nature is an act of 
faith rather than logic and Ayer believes that we must be 
willing to let inductive reasoning be the judge in its own 
case, as logically there can be no court of superior 
jurisdiction. An attempt to take as premises a set of 
a priori truths would not solve the problem as these are 
tautologies from which only other tautologies may be derived 
and to base all knowledge upon a set of tautologies would 
clearly be absurd. Also, attempts to base assessments of 
the probability of hypotheses upon an a priori theory of 
probability leads to circular argument. Any such theory is 
in fact a mathematical calculus of chances from which it is 
impossible to derive conclusions about what is likely to 
happen without empirical premises in justification of which 
there are the same difficulties which the a priori calculus 
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was designed to avoid. If empirical statements had the same 
certainty as a priori have, they would cease to be the 
description of anything that happens. 
These arguments are relevant to the opinion that in the 
behavioural sciences the criterion of successful theory is 
the ability to predict behaviour. The view is clearly 
implied in Eysenck's work that the sort of prediction which 
is based upon mathematical procedures has a particular sort 
of probability which other sorts of prediction do not, but 
that hypotheses may be established by speculation (Eysenck, 
1957, p. 323). Ayer, however, rejects the view that 
scientists are concerned only with testing the worth of 
hypotheses which may or may not be arrived at by inductive 
means by a process which is wholly deductive. There would 
be no reason for discarding a hypothesis which failed the 
test except on the grounds that having failed once it would 
be likely to fail again, which is once more a resort to 
inductive reasoning. In the field of human behaviour it can 
be held that in the same way as an empirical proposition 
can never have the same certainty as an a priori, the 
theoretical certainty of prediction which is implicit in 
behaviourism is logically impossible. To maintain that if 
all the antecedent circumstances of an act were known, then 
the nature of the act would be determined is to say that the 
act is not a human act, as it is of the nature of human acts 
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that they are modified by processes of thought and reflection 
which are continuous and which express themselves in a series 
of choices, all of which is part of our introductory 
definition of personality. 
It is misleading to make too sharp a distinction between 
philosophy and science: the crucial difference lies between 
the speculative and logical aspects of science (Ayer, 1958, 
p. 153). There is no qualitative difference between 
scientific thinking and that which reasonable men apply in 
their approach to their everyday affairs. Scientific 
thought is a. refinement of everyday thought processes, a 
sophisticated form of cognitive reality -testing. The concept 
of science is a changing one and it is a task for the 
philosophy of science to examine how far dynamic psychology 
and psycho -analysis require new criteria for the evaluation 
of results and observations and in what way these ought to be 
related to the overall structure of science (Foulkes, 1957, 
p. 328). Psychoanalytical theory is particularly full of 
metaphysical elements which philosophical elucidation of 
their symbols might go some way towards removing. Freud saw 
quite early that definitions had often to be operative ones 
which might require modification in the interests of practical 
application or logical consistency. Nowhere is the changing 
nature of science more clearly seen than in a comparison between 
Newtonian physics, which could be so easily verified by 
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observation and Einstein's general theory of relativity in 
which the description of the operations by which the 
quantities involved could be measured becomes such a serious 
and complex task that it becomes an essential part of the 
theory. It is not an accident that theoretical psychoanalysis 
has not taken the standard form of an experimental natural 
science, and it might even have been seen that this would have 
to be so, as the knowledge we may have of our own mental 
powers is reflexive in that the object of knowledge and the 
knowing subject change and extend their range together. Our 
original postulate was that the course of evolution should be 
considered in terms of relationship and our definition of 
personality was in terms of human relationship. Human 
relationship is in its essence in continual expansion, each 
moment of transaction between a person and another object 
gaining from the cumulative experience of past transactions and 
in a situation between two persons this process is two -fold. 
Thus it follows that instead of trying to contract the 
realities of experience within a confining methodology 
devised for static data, it is our task to find ways of 
devising methods to fit the dynamic and continuously 
multiplying data of relationship. It will be held that the 
psycho -analytic technique investigating as it does a 
particular type of interpersonal situation in a therapeutic 
setting is the genesis of such a method, and that in the 
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analysis of the transference are the beginnings of a scientific 
investigation of relationship. 
PART II 
TIE STUDY OF DEVELOPMENT . 
81. 
CHAPTER 4. 
Birth Experience and Early Infancy. 
In the same way as the hominisation of the species is 
the result of a culmination of a number of separate but 
interrelated threads of evolution, the hominisation of the 
individual proceeds by a series of regular waves of activity 
in a variety of different spheres of physical, physiological 
and psychological functioning. The observable nature of 
physical changes and the easily -drawn parallels with animals 
and other organisms make it difficult to avoid the error of 
neglecting the psychic factors which are themselves 
unobservables and which can be studied only by means of 
inference from observables. While we must single out 
particular changes of state for the purposes of study, it is 
essential to remember that individual growth is part of a 
continuous process from the fertilisation of the ovum through 
many different sorts of environment down to the dissolution 
of the body, and that this individual progress is part of the 
greater progress of life itself in which other individuals 
and other species are taking part. The essence of this 
progress is its continuity and its totality, to which the 
parts which are isolated for study play only a contributory 
part. For convenience the origin of the individual life is 
considered to be at birth, yet the child which emerges from 
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the womb continues to follow regular curves of growth which 
began in the foetal stage. If electroencephalograms are 
examined of children of different ages, the waves become 
larger and slower the younger the child, while records taken 
from the belly of a pregnant woman bear out the extrapolated 
child data in every way (Hill, 1950. Walter, 1953). There 
is nevertheless an important and obvious difference between 
the situation of the foetus and the new -born child, a 
difference marked by the cutting of the umbilical cord. The 
term symbiosis is often used to describe the relationship of 
mother and child and thus the relationship is compared with 
other examples in animal and plant life and reference is made 
to the fact that the mother is biologically conditioned for 
her special function of -providing for the needs of her 
dependent child. But the application of purely biological 
terminology to this relationship even in the intra- uterine 
period obscures the two -way psychological factor, which is 
the mother's identification with the infant and the infant' s 
dependence on the mother. It has not been generally accepted 
that the psychology of an individual exists before he is born 
and that his experiences at birth have any significance for 
his later emotional development, but some of the major 
difficulties in this area arise from a false antithesis of 
mind and body. It is permissible to oppose the terms mental 
and physical in ordinary usage, but in scientific discussion 
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it is a different matter, as the study of psychosomatic 
disorders and the histories of depressive psychotics go some 
way to establish. Freud recognised that the ego was first 
and foremost a body ego (1923, D. 33) and the narcissistic 
character of the baby's first few weeks has been described 
as a stage of primary identification in which painful 
stimuli from within and without are recorded in the psyche 
alongside the more continuous experience of satisfaction. 
The psyche and the soma are not to be distinguished except 
according to the way in which we look at the individual 
from outside: for him there is a long process of development 
in which those aspects of his person become interrelated and 
he wins a sense of self, localised in a body which has an 
inside and an outside. Birth does not signify the time 
when what has been considered physiologically can be 
considered psychologically. 
The head end of the foetus develops in general quicker 
than the tail end, and although there is little available 
information on the growth of various parts of the brain., 
particularly the subcortical structures and the various 
nuclei and tracts, it is reasonable to suppose that this 
follows a regular pattern comparable with that of the 
ossification centres. By three intra- uterine months the 
cells become organised into the layers of the cortex and 
about six intra- uterine months the layering and appearance 
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characteristic of the adult brain is present. The same 
individual differences in rates of maturation are seen in 
the intra- uterine state as can be seen post -natally, but the 
general regularity of the process is clearly discernible 
through these. At nine months gestation the infant is not 
only physically and physiologically ready for a change in 
environment and radical changes in body functioning, it is 
also prepared for emotional experience. It would, however, 
be contrary to all we know of natural processes of growth if 
this started up suddenly in response to an external stimulus. 
In fact the physical aliveness of the foetus developing 
inside the womb may be seen as a developing body or a 
developing psyche and the psyche may be defined as an 
imaginative elaboration of somatic parts, feelings and 
functions (Winnicot, 1954, P. 244). Its existence is 
dependent upon the degree of growth and the healthy functioning 
of the brain, which is subject to individual differences the 
same as those which may be seen in the state of all the other 
organs. When birth takes place, it is an intimate experience 
which involves for the mother a transformation of part of 
herself and for the child the possibility of a relationship 
with objects. In modern obstetrics the importance of 
promoting successful labour has caused more and more attention 
to be paid to the psychology of the mother and as a result 
some obstetricians are coming to the view that the psychology 
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of the child should be taken into account also. This is in 
accordance with the clinical findings of psychoanalysts who 
often find that material relative to the events of birth is 
significant and held as memory material, appearing in 
regression during analysis or in the play of child patients. 
This is perhaps most commonly found among psychotics where 
things are remembered which in more normal states are 
overlaid and unavailable to consciousness. T rinnicot sums 
up this clinical experience by saying: "the feeling one 
gets is, however, that the child's body knows about being 
born." (1949, p. 177). Readiness for being born involves 
not only physical preparedness for existence outside the 
womb, but also a state of receptiveness to emotional experience. 
This would seem to be established by observations of the new- 
born and by material arising from analysis of older patients. 
It is necessary as a result that birth should take place at 
the right moment both for the psyche and the soma, and 
complications which lead to post -maturity may have the effect 
that the infant has already reached the stage of maturation 
necessary for emotional experience before it is born. If, 
on the other hand, the infant is premature, then it may not 
experience much that is important until after it has been 
born for a few weeks and reaches the maturational age at which 
birth should in fact have taken place. 
The obstetric hazards of post -maturity are considerable, 
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as in addition to the increased size and weight of the baby, 
ossification of the head has progressed sufficiently to make 
delivery more difficult. The stillbirth rate in post- maturity 
is nearly twice that of babies born at term and this is partly 
due to the difficulties of delivery and partly to the risk of 
intra- partum asphyxia. Labour is likely to be prolonged and 
the operative delivery rate is very much increased to 
something in the region of 29% of all births. Maternal 
mortality is practically trebled. In addition to this hidden 
factor an indeterminate number of children are born with 
varying degrees of cerebral impairment due to hypoxia in 
labour. (Donald, 1959, p. 642). It can be seen therefore 
that in the post -mature child we have not only the conditions 
most likely to result in Drolonged, difficult labour and the 
use of instruments, but also a state of maturation sufficiently 
far advanced for these to be experienced as traumatic by the 
infant. 
The difficulties of pre -maturity on the other hand lie 
more in the inadequacy of the infant to meet the requirements 
of separate existence: more than 50% of neo -natal deaths are 
due to pre- maturity, but when the infant survives, the birth 
is less likely to have been experienced traumatically because 
of the immaturity of the infant's nervous system. The 
hazards of the treatment of the premature neonate include 
many physical dangers such as those attendant upon the 
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administration of oxygen or vitamin K, but special arrangements 
for the care of premature babies may also result in 
disturbance of emotional development. This may arise 
through defective early object -relations originating in 
deficiencies in good mothering or -.prolonged separations due 
to hospital routines of various kinds. 
Freud recognised the importance of the birth trauma, but 
he held that it could not be experienced as a separation from 
the mother since the foetus is completely narcissistic and 
unaware of her existence as an object (1926), but Otto Rank 
came to regard the processes of development as a series of 
ways of overcoming the original birth anxiety or dyspnoea 
(Rank, 1924). The relationship between the mother and child, 
however, begins before the infant is born and continues 
through the birth process and after, and it is against this 
background that the importance of the birth experience in 
emotional development must be assessed. It is primarily a 
change in the quality of relationships, a time when the 
infant exchanges a physiological environment in which his 
needs are niet by automatic processes for a world in which his 
needs are met by interaction with objects. To to this time 
foetal movement has brought about a sense of the environment 
through the opposition it presents to movement, a beginning 
of the sense of the not -me world. The natural birth 
experience is therefore in the pattern of something already 
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experienced, an intercourse with the environment in which it 
is sometimes the environment which is dominant and sometimes 
the infant. During birth the infant plays the minor part 
and immediately after there is a return to the state in 
which he is important. In prolonged labour the child's 
relating with the environment in this rhythm of impulse and 
reaction is uneven and made significant for him by prolonged 
impingements which interrupt the even flow and which will 
have a varied effect upon later emotional development 
depending upon the way the impingements are sensed and the 
degree of trauma (Winnicot, 1949, p. 189). In a situation 
where there is established a pattern of reaction instead of 
impulse, owing to the prolonged impingement of the 
environment which is likely to occur in post- maturity, the 
sense of the 'me' is impaired and may in extreme cases never 
be established. It would seem that birth experience must 
be smooth, occurring at the right stage of maturation of 
the psyche -soma and following upon a history of impulsive 
foetal movement for the optimum conditions for healthy 
emotional development in later life to be attained. The 
child arrives in the external world of objects with a 
primitive experience of relationship, a predisposition 
towards a certain way of relating and perhaps an emotional 
or traumatic experience of the birth itself. 
In infancy and childhood the regular processes of growth 
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continue, with variations in the growth rate of different 
organs and parts and the usual evidence of individual 
variations. Although the anatomical development of the 
human brain is a subject about which little is known, its 
external growth approaches completion earlier than any other 
bodily organ. By nine months after birth it is 50L of its 
adult weight and by two years it is 75íL. Immediately after 
birth, the legs, which were less advanced in intra- uterine 
growth, begin to catch up as the infant gets ready to walk 
about. 
In animals these differences in growth rates in normal 
conditions have been studied along with the effect of 
special circumstances such as malnutrition, and there have 
been a number of experiments on localisation and maturational 
levels of a kind which it would be impossible to conduct with 
human beings. A young goose in the middle stage of growth 
slows down its general rate of growth if malnourished, and 
when it is fed again it grows fast and develops into a 
normal bird. The wings of waterfowl grow quite slowly until 
suddenly there is a spurt and they catch up with the rest of 
the bird. halnutrition during this period of accelerated 
growth has the effect that the wing goes on growing while the 
bird gets thinner and thinner and usually dies of tuberculosis. 
Some similar examples may be found among human beings, for 
instance among concentration camp inmates who had been for 
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long periods subjected to malnutrition, inanition and stress. 
In them the association, temporal and frontal regions retained 
most of their normal structure, while the primary motor and 
sensory regions tended to be relatively under -nourished and 
dystrophic (Tanner and Inhelder, 1956, p. 49) . It seems that 
those characters which are _p hylogenetically most recently 
acquired are the most favoured in time of stress or emergency, 
but this is descriptive rather than explanatory. In terms 
of relationship, all these phenomena can be accommodated 
under the single principle that when an animal or person is 
in the process of or in preparation for a change in their 
system of relationships, those organs which are required to 
facilitate the new system will receive precedence. Evolution 
has meant the development of more elaborate nervous systems, 
culminating in the human cerebral cortex. It may be true to 
say that the most recently acquired characters are favoured, 
but it is more in accordance with the view of evolution set 
down in the introduction to see this as an expression of the 
forward movement of life which progresses by evolving more 
and more complex systems of relationship. The concentration 
camp victims required the higher centres of the cortex for 
memory, association and fantasy which were required to 
preserve their human personality in circumstances of gross 
physical and mental stress. The patterns of relationship 
required in these circumstances were largely of a passive kind 
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and were heavily dependent upon the inner world. At a much 
simpler level, the young goose in the mid period of growth is 
not approaching any major change, while the fledgling waterfowl 
is about to leave the nest and needs his wings to do it. 
In the light of this single principle the growth curves 
of human infants may be seen as a series of preparations for 
and realisations of different sorts of relationship within 
the framework of a general phylogenetic pattern with wide 
individual differences. The nearer the environment is to 
the optimum the more each dimension will follow a completely 
regular rate-of-growth curve without breaks or spurts, but 
malnutrition, environmental influences or interferences may 
disturb their regularity. The development of the foetus 
brings the head to such a state of growth in the intra- uterine 
state that it makes the time of delivery critical and the 
delay of onset of labour by even one week may mean that 
ossification of the head will have advanced so far as to make 
it impossible to deliver the child normally. There would be 
no object in the head reaching this advanced state of 
development and complicating the process of birth were it 
not that the cranial capacity was needed to deal with the 
change in the infant's system of relationships brought about 
by the movement from narcissistic self -sufficiency of the womb 
to the world of objects. Once it is there it needs its legs and 
motor organs and so they begin to catch up in speed of growth. 
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The development of the brain seems to bear out the 
hypothesis that there is a regular development of parts in a 
sequence connected with the child's relationship to objects. 
Conel (1952) has noted that post- natally up to six months of 
age the primary motor area is the most advanced, the primary 
sensory areas next and the primary auditory and visual areas 
follow them. This is at a time when the child is most 
concerned with the formation of motor habits and his perceptions 
are directed towards displacement of objects in space. It 
is only towards the end of this period that there is a gradual 
extension and increasing mobility of what Piaget calls the 
'schemata' of behaviour. Receptive areas are more advanced 
than association areas in the case of each sensation and the 
cingulate gyrus, the hippocampus and the insula, which are 
thought to be concerned in circuits which include subcortical 
structures, are developmentally behind at that time. Conel 
takes nine points as the criteria of advance and notes that 
any particular part of the cortex changes in several ways as 
time goes on. When he says that one area is more advanced 
than another, he means that the changes are further along 
in time. The information which is available about the way 
in which the brain and central nervous system operates and 
how functions are localised is however scanty. For this 
reason the findings of studies such as Conel' s are best seen 
in conjunction with information from other sources which are 
93. 
more concerned with the operation of structures as a whole 
and the development of organised functions. One such source 
is electroencephalography, which in spite of the technical 
imperfections in the methods used, has yielded a great deal of 
valuable data about the brain's electrical activity at various 
ages. 
The slow, irregular and poorly synchronised rhythms 
characteristic of the foetal brain persist into infancy, 
where they seem to be associated with repose and inactivity. 
These delta waves decline and become more intermittent as the 
child spends more time awake and becomes more active in the 
exploration of its environment. Between the second and the 
tenth year delta activity becomes scarcely perceptible. 
Exceptionally it may persist until the age of eighteen or 
twenty and work has been done which suggests a connection 
between this factor and certain personality patterns in 
adolescent delinquents, to which later reference will be made. 
(Hodge, Walter & Walter, 1953) . With the decline of delta 
rhythms, there is a sharp increase in theta activity which 
climbs very steeply in the infant population and then declines 
at much the same rate as the delta waves, which it also 
resembles in that it can be evoked and repressed by external 
stimuli. There is a correspondence between the frequency of 
temper outbursts in children. and the appearance of theta 
activity. According to Goodenough (1931) the frequency of 
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temper outbursts per hour of observation rises to a peak 
about two years of age and then declines in a regular curve 
with a slight increase again after five. A record from a 
child of two or three showing little or no theta activity 
will usually show a burst of it when the child is annoyed, 
and the theta rhythm may persist for hours or even days after 
the disagreeable stimulus has been withdrawn. Iñ older 
children and adults, theta activity may be invoked by the 
same means, though it may often be inhibited by conscious 
effort shortly after it makes its appearance. Theta 
rhythms seem to be associated with frustrating situations, 
although the period of the most likely temper outbursts is 
not the period of maximum height of theta activity, but the 
time of maximum change when the theta rhythms are dominant over 
the declining delta waves and the beginnings of the more adult 
patterns are not yet clearly marked. These adult patterns 
take the form of alpha waves which are more complex and 
difficult to study as they are completely absent from the 
records of some people, while in others they are persistent 
in all their waking activities. These rhythms may make 
their appearance as early as the first year of life, but it 
is not until about the age of nine to eleven that distribution 
in an adult pattern is first seen. They become more 
prominent as delta and theta activity decline. 
Information from various sources thus coincides to present 
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a consistent view of development in terms of relationships. 
After nine months of rapid intra- uterine growth in which the 
head is developed more rapidly than the rest of the body, the 
infant is born into a world of objects and the rate of growth 
slows down. The curves of growth do not all slow down to 
the same extent for as we have seen other parts and organs 
begin to catch up with the brain as they are now required for 
the exploration and manipulation through which the child will 
experience his environment and enlarge it. Piaget has studied 
the evolving of different sorts of behaviour and types of 
thinking in infancy and childhood and he describes three 
stages in tennis of structural wholes rather than isolated 
pieces of behaviour. The first stage, extending from birth 
to about 1 years of age is characterised by a system or 
group of reversible actions such as displacement in space. 
These pass from the formation of motor habits and perceptions 
to the formation of intentional acts and prehensions, the 
co- ordination of ends and means, the investigation of new 
means and the achievement of ends by detours and displacements. 
These take place against the background of the more numerous 
bursts of rage and the accompanying theta activity which was 
noted in the encephalograms. The growth pattern at this time 
shows that the general body dimensions, the genitals and the 
lymphoid structures have a much higher velocity than the 
neural structures. The infant is becoming bigger, more 
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powerful and more able to make use of the intricate 
sensory -motor system which has developed so early. He 
evolves ways of manipulating the environment much more quickly 
than he evolves ways of dealing with his frustration as his 
association areas are still behind in development and his 
constant experiments and increased motor activity bring him 
more and more into conflict with objects in outer reality. 
He is longer awake each day and kept much more in contact 
with objects by the increasing continuity of his waking self 
and his sleeping self: he does not so often relapse into 
the state of passive 'going along' characteristic of much of 
his foetal life and of long periods of his early infancy, and 
the slow, irregular rhythms become rarer and rarer on the 
encephalograms. His ways of relating to objects still have 
the primitive, predatory and devouring quality which characterised 
his early approaches to the breast. His reaction to frustration 
is primitive rage, and frustration is most often felt through 
the denial of a needed object or the interruption of a 
relationship with a satisfying object. In studying theta 
activity in both children and adults it was found experimentally 
that the surest way of reproducing annoyance was to deprive the 
subject suddenly of an object with which they had formed a 
satisfying relationship. The child has by this time 
experienced the prototype of all these frustrating situations 
in the privation and disillusion experienced at weaning when 
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he loses his first satisfying object, the breast. 
These experiences with objects and persons help to 
establish the 'me' and the 'not rae' by a range of active 
experiments and by a variety of reactions to what is happening 
round about, and they are multiplied by the increasing 
capacities and powers of the psyche -soma through the processes 
of normal growth. 
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CHAPTER 5. 
Childhood and Adolescence. 
In_ ordinary usage it is said of a child that he is 
'growing up' when his systems of relationships are in process 
of change, and the reference is always more to behaviour than 
to physical maturation. The process of growing up involves 
abandoning the state of infantile dependence and through a 
process of continuous transition arriving at an adult system 
of relationships based upon mutual giving and taking, a 
genital attitude and an appropriate place in the social 
system in which the individual lives. The goal of successful 
development through childhood and adolescence is the emergence 
of a person with a sense of self and reality which results in 
a satisfactory system of relationships at the personal level. 
This is affected by a number of interconnected factors, some 
of which are physical and some emotional and in developmental 
studies it is common to consider certain parts of an individual 
history in terms of the one or the other. The opposition of 
psyche and soma in this way is permissible for purposes of 
scientific analysis but health and development are in fact 
based upon integrated psyche -soma growth. It is less 
satisfactory to oppose mind and body, as acceptance of the 
concept of the unconscious leads to the suggestion that the 
mind does not in fact exist as an entity and "when we talk of 
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the mind influencing the body or the body influencing the 
mind, we are merely using a convenient shorthand for a more 
cumbrous phrase" (Scott, 1949). Consideration of the mind 
of an individual involves consideration of the whole 
individual and development of the mind as a separately 
functioning entity is a pathological condition. Intact 
brain and other bodily functions are a prerequisite for the 
health of the psyche as well as for the health of the body, 
and unless the psyche is in a healthy relationship with the 
soma, bodily functions may be affected. These considerations 
are particularly important in childhood and adolescence as it 
is in the years before puberty that the functions of the mind 
become developed and its systems of relationships within the 
psyche -soma are established. 
Physical growth decreases in velocity after infancy and 
this decrease is constant except for two periods of accelerated 
growth, one of which is not fully established and the other of 
which is quite definite. Tanner (1947) found evidence of a 
growth spurt between 51 and 72 years although this was confined 
to females and was in breadth dimensions only, the leg, trunk 
and arm lengths remaining unaffected. It is likely that 
this is not of great significance and may in fact be caused 
by a sampling error. The second growth spurt is well 
documented, is associated with the onset of puberty and seems 
to be in some way initiated by the hypothalamus or the higher 
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centres in the brain. It may be that this hypothalamic 
centre is the very last part of the brain to become mature 
and functional or that the beginning of adolescehce depends 
upon the whole brain reaching e. certain stage of maturation 
over all, but little is known about this. The electro- 
:encephalograms of children show that there is a general 
change in the patterns of brain activity somewhere between 
the ages of nine and twelve, when the delta rhythms are no 
longer of significant incidence, the theta. rhythms are no 
longer dominant and the alpha rhythms are on the increase. 
These alpha rhythms seem to be associated with vivid imagery 
and are present in those children who are visualisers. It 
is about nine or ten that the adult patterns of alpha 
activity are becoming clearly distinguishable and it becomes 
Possible to divide the juvenile population into two groups on 
the basis of the appearance of this visualising quality. 
This is also the age at which there is an increase in reading 
ability and the gap between good and had readers becomes much 
wider. 
The work of Piaget shows that after early infancy there 
is a. stage from two to eleven years marked by the formation and 
equilibration of representative intelligence. The change 
from sensory -motor function in the infant to mental representation 
in the child is due to the symbolic function which is expressed 
first in play and then in the more sophisticated forms of 
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language and drawing. Up to eleven years there develops a 
system of concrete operations which will later serve as the 
basis for formal operations and this is facilitated by the 
discovery of the reversibility of mental actions which may 
take place somewhere around six years. Up till then the 
whole intellectual behaviour of the child is determined by 
the irreversibility of mental actions, and it is only about 
eleven years old that reasoning frees itself from the 
concrete. 
In almost every country there is a pre -school stage in 
the years from three to six, ,then from six to twelve there is 
primary schooling in which the basis automatisms are learned. 
At twelve the child passes to secondary schooling by which 
all the fundamental perceptive -intellectual mechanisms have 
been acquired. Thus in most educational systems the ages of 
three, six and twelve are marked out as the beginning or end 
of stages, with small variations within'a year or so. These 
stages are reproduced with minor variations in all cultures 
and ethnic groups and appear to be related to other than 
purely social factors. For instance, drawing tests applied 
to children up to ten years of age of different ethnic groups 
show the same stages present in the same chronological order 
(Prudhommeau, 1947). 
The most diverse psychological methods combine to the 
conclusion that the age of twelve marks a culmination of a 
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certain kind of development and from this year onwards 
individual and cultural factors play a much larger part than 
before in the determination of the pattern of intellectual 
activity and behaviour. The child passes from close 
dependence upon the mother to the development of relationships 
of his own with objects and people in his environment. First 
these are confined to his home and the people he lives with, 
where he has to learn to share his mother first with his 
father and then with siblings or even with a new, very 
demanding baby. All these persons have needs and 
preoccupations of their own by which their actions with 
reference to him will be partly determined. In his 
explorations he learns what can and what cannot be controlled 
and manipulated by him, against the background of a situation 
in which his powers are changing every day and he is 
experiencing what other people want him to do and will not 
allow him to do. These processes may be described as the 
'socialisation' of the child, and cover the consolidation of 
the 'me' and 'not me', the exploration of the possibilities 
and limitations of reality and the beginnings of application 
of intellect to the problems which the child encounters. 
These changes are reflected in the electroencephalogram as 
the delta and theta activity declines and the alpha rhythms 
become more frequent and regular. 
The culmination of this phase comes when he goes to school 
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and, if his development has been normal, experiences for the 
first time the certainty of acceptance on the basis of 
intellectual performance. At the same time new sorts of 
relationship are possible with others like himself and the 
result is that after an initial short period of frequent 
frustration at which infantile temper tantrums may reappear, 
there begins a period of behavioural stability in which his 
interests become more objective and the alpha waves in the 
electroencephalograms become dominant. He begins to function 
simultaneously in two different environments, the school and 
the home, and if the values and standards of behaviour in 
both happen to coincide, his learning is facilitated and the 
progress of development is smooth. Where the two are in 
opposition the child is in conflict from the beginning and 
as he becomes stronger and more individual this opposition 
may interfere with his learning and make it difficult for him 
to arrive at standards of conduct for himself. Conflicts 
between home and school may arise when the child transfers to 
the teachers conscious attitudes towards his parents and ways 
of relating to other children which are the result of 
experiences with brothers and sisters. These superficial 
aspects of behaviour may be brief and changeable and in a 
direction possibly contrary to his general unconscious trends. 
They are in the nature of experimental reality- testing. 
The impact of the child's going to school is also felt 
104. 
by the parents, whose relationship with him is affected by 
what they see happening to him and by reactions to the changes 
in his behaviour. All these external aspects of behaviour 
are determined to a large extent by the already existing 
inner world of unconscious object- relations, but the way in 
which these alter his perception of outer reality and evolve 
into a system of action is affected by his early experiences. 
The child is exposed to a series of situations from which he 
learns how his view of things fits in with the society in 
which he lives and he finds out the limitations which it will 
place upon his activities. In school the child feels the 
pressure of group demands, learns the possibilities of 
identification with the group and of participation in group 
action. The ' culture pattern' school of social psychology 
emphasises this aspect of child development while under- 
estimating the importance of the basic unconscious situation, 
upon which the external relationships are superimposed. 
Erich Fromm regards human relationships as arising out of 
"the specific kind of relatedness of the individual towards 
the world and to himself" (Mullahy, 1948, p. 241). Sullivan 
confines himself solely to what goes on between people in his 
"theory of interpersonal relations ", holding that the human 
being is the product of personal and social forces acting 
upon the individual from the day of his birth (Sullivan, 
1947, 1953). The sociological aspects of character formation 
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are seen by Karen Horney as the most important factors in a 
process by which trends in parent -child relationships are 
consolidated under social pressures. The culture- pattern 
school are in the tradition of Adler in that they confine 
themselves to the everyday ego, the outside appearance of the 
individual, which Freud calls the "reality ego" and Winnicot 
the "false self ". Their emphasis upon human relations 
rather than innate determining factors was an important one, 
but their neglect of the deeper relationships in the inner 
world confined them to the description of the impact of 
social forces upon the superficial self rather than led them 
to an investigation of the total psyche. The limitations 
of this approach are perhaps most clearly seen when the 
changes which take place at adolescence are considered. 
The years of puberty and adolescence are notable for the 
growth of external dimensions and some striking changes in 
internal organisation. The growth spurt is liable to the 
usual individual variations but the velocity curves show an 
increase in body weight beginning about eight years and 
reaching a peak around eleven to thirteen years. The growth 
of the testes increases much more rapidly from about eight 
years to a period of very rapid growth at twelve but the high 
velocity is maintained over a longer interval until somewhere 
between sixteen and twenty years. Some parts of the pituitary 
and the adrenal cortex begin to function for the first time. 
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The gonads come into action and other hormones seem to be 
secreted in proportion to the size of the growing child. As 
well as the individual variations, there is evidence that 
malnutrition can postpone puberty but there are few differences 
due to environmental factors such as climate or social class 
as was once thought to be the case. The course of puberty 
in girls is well documented: first an increase in growth 
velocity for all external dimensions, then as this slackens 
to zero, first menstruation occurs. It is not easy to make 
a similar comparison for boys as in their case there exists 
no single easily identifiable event comparable to first 
menstruation, but it is clearly established that girls enter 
the period of accelerated growth on the average about two 
years earlier than boys, though despite the uterus beginning 
to bleed, the earlier cycles may be anovulatory and this may 
go on for up to two years before the regular cycle is 
established and full reproductive maturity attained. The 
delay of puberty is found only in primates and such comparative 
studies as have been done for example with rats shows the 
whole sequence, timing and effect to be quite different. 
Studies of adolescence have emphasised the stresses and 
upheavals and the difficult social adjustments of this stage 
of development and there can be no doubt that the physiological 
and intellectual changes are accompanied by shifts in attitudes 
and in status. It is not permissible to assume, however, 
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that because the physiological events are so marked and so 
important it follows that they are causal. Development 
continues beyond puberty, and although it may be considered 
as the culmination of a certain stage, it is at the same time 
the beginnings of another. An approach which places too 
much emphasis upon one particular aspect of the child' s 
changing situation at puberty, such as his physical growth, 
the physiological changes or the changes in his intellectual 
powers is likely to fail to obtain a balanced picture. From 
the viewpoint of relationship, however, these changes may be 
seen in perspective. 
The association of accelerated growth with sexual 
maturity has perhaps caused too little attention to be paid 
to the fact that the increasing growth and strength of the 
pubescent child is first demonstrated by rapid changes in his 
relationships with objects and with other persons. He can 
manipulate more things and is more able to play an adult part 
in purely physical activities. In dealings with other 
people he is less liable to physical coercion or force and 
the consequences of his own destructive acts are much more 
considerable. Needs are multiplied:, both boys and girls 
need more room, more food and more clothes. These are the 
direct consequence of getting bigger and stronger and they 
bring changes in the attitudes and relations of those around 
them before any further facts are taken into consideration. 
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Girls reach maturity before boys and changes in their 
appearance make apparent to others their potentiality for 
adult -genital relationships which makes it necessary for them 
to make their own readjustments not only to the changes 
within themselves but to the changed attitudes of others. It 
is not the fact of growth or change which produces stress, 
but attitudes towards it of the child or others. Growth 
in itself is a familiar experience to children and they have 
been accustomed since infancy to comments by adults upon 
their increasing size. Individual differences have also 
been marked in the early years but accepted with much less 
anxiety than is usually the case in adolescence. The 
difference must lie in the social significance which is 
attached to these factors at puberty, and this seems to be 
borne out by studies such as those carried out by Margaret 
Mead within different cultures (1928, 1930). Adolescents 
may be recognisably different from their own contemporaries 
and this may generate or intensify anxieties arising from 
feelings of insecurity or inadequacy. It is at this time 
also that children are exposed to heavy pressures in 
competition with contemporaries in educational fields and to 
demands from parents and friends who want them to excel. This 
may occur at a time when the individual is turning away from 
his home or school and create further conflicts and difficulties. 
Increased physical capacities are matched by similar 
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extensions of intellectual activity. The reasoning of the 
pre -adolescent has already begun to free itself from the 
concrete, and intelligence is in the process of attaining a 
balanced structure of deduction by means of hypotheses and 
governed by what Piaget calls "groups and lattices of formal 
thought". By this means kinds of relationship are made 
possible through new kinds of intellectual exploration which 
parallel the sensory -motor explorations of the earlier years. 
This also leads to changes in relationships with adults, 
particularly parents and teachers. The child has not only 
the means to resist being forced by physical sanctions but 
may be able to detect logical inconsistencies in the 
behaviour and attitudes of adults. His own powers of 
argument may not always gain him what he wants, however, as 
they are still developing and may be erratic, or he may 
successfully prove his point only to have authoritarian figures 
refuse to be bound by logic. It is the application of mind 
to these problems of transition more than the appearance of 
new problems which makes adolescence a time of stress. 
Melanie Tul ein (1932, p. 122) holds that the age of 
puberty has more in common with infancy than with the latency 
period in that there is a greater dominance of the emotions 
and the unconscious and a much richer life of the imagination 
together with increased manifestations of anxiety and affect. 
It would seem, however, that it is the changes in the 
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relationships between reality and the person which. bring about 
these features, rather than changes in the person himself. At 
puberty and after, fantasy is much less able to supply 
substitute satisfactions or always to satisfy the demands of 
intellectual reality- testing and magic thinking is less able 
to rationalise conflicts between inner and outer worlds. 
Where adequate techniques of relating the two worlds have 
evolved in the latency period, adolescence should proceed as 
a smooth transition continuous with the earlier stages. 
Sexual maturation does bring problems through the anxiety 
aroused by the revival of conflicts still unresolved since 
infancy and by the possibility of relationships previously 
possible only in fantasy. The test is of the ways of 
relating which. have already been evolved, just as the 
possibility of satisfying sexual acts is a test for the ways 
of expression already established. The adolescent may be 
unsuccessful in modifying his systems and techniques and 
continue to emiDloy patterns of relationship appropriate to 
earlier stages of development, a fact which is often 
strikingly illustrated in the brain's electrical activity. 
An electroencephalogram of a schoolgirl of sixteen presented 
with a frustrating task shows the interruption of alpha waves 
as she applies herself to manipulation, the appearance of 
theta waves as the frustrating nature of the task is comprehended, 
then their subsidence under the pressure of her own persistence 
and perseverance towards a solution. This may be compared 
with. the record of a juvenile delinquent of the same age who 
was two years later convicted of a capital offence (Walter, 
1956). Although he was normal in neurological terms, a simple 
stimulus such as a flickering light was sufficient to excite 
the whole brain into an almost convulsive state similar to 
the activity of very young children. In the first case the 
temporary impulsive reaction is inhibited by conscious effort 
as the girl employs more mature technique for solving her 
difficulty. In the second, however, the disordered activity 
is not inhibited in any way. This kind of record seems to 
be associated with emotional instability and is found in only 
3% of the normal population, occurring often in persons who 
are guilty of crimes of impulsive violence for trivial 
reasons. This backward movement to an earlier mode of 
behaviour is really a return to earlier relationship systems, 
or rather to still existent inner relationship systems which 
were dominant at an earlier period of development. Freud 
showed that it was frustration which initiated this 'regression' 
and he classed it as a defence. The function of regression 
in the aetiology of nervous disorders has been widely discussed 
and Winnicot has pointed out that it may be a healing 
mechanism, allowing a return to a situation for the correction 
of an original adaptive failure (Winnicot, 1955, p. 293) . In 
the normal course of development the opposing tendencies of 
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regression and progression are at work all the time. The 
various stresses of puberty make the swings between them more 
marked than at other ages and this goes a long way to explain 
the inconsistencies and mood swings of adolescent behaviour. 
Social demands may check the regressive tendencies which are 
necessary for healthy development and adult demands upon 
immature adolescents may at times be impossible to meet. 
Adolescence is a time at which the adequacy of methods 
of dealing with persons and objects in a limited environment 
is tested in the whole adult world and various degrees of 
modification are required so that conflicts vary in intensity 
between individuals. The important feature of adolescent 
development is that the personal reactions of young people 
and the difficulties they experience in adaptation are directly 
related to the treatment they have received in earlier years. 
The changes which take place are changes in ways of relating 
and the events of physical and physiological maturation have 
importance only as factors in the changing of relationships. 
Sexual maturity is an important factor in the change and 
has had a disproportionately large share of attention in 
studies of adolescent problems and conflicts. This may 
result from the influence of Stanley Hall's study (1904), 
which was for a long time the accepted authority and which 
provided a comprehensive review of 19th Century research 
findings on adolescence in many diverse fields. Freud's 
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discoveries concerning the sexual life of infancy, however, 
have tended to restore a more even balance between sexual 
maturation and other factors in adolescent development. 
"That children should have no sexual life - sexual 
excitement, needs and gratifications of a sort - but 
that they suddenly acquire these things in the years 
between 12 and 14 would be, apart from any observation 
at all, biologically just as improbable, indeed, 
nonsensical, as to suppose that they are born without 
genital organs which first begin to sprout at the age 
of puberty." (Freud, 1922) 
Evidence has shown that there is an intensification of 
sexual activity at puberty leading to auto -erotic activities 
and homosexual and heterosexual experimentations (Kinsey, 1951). 
An important feature of this is that the occurrence of the 
first ejaculation in the boy usually begins a history of 
regular sexual outlet conforming to a particular individual 
pattern. Autoerotic activities are by no means confined to 
adolescence and it is now known that masturbation occurs 
in general in the sucking stage and it is very commonly 
prolonged up to the latency period. During the latency 
period, Freud held that the energies of the child seem to be 
mainly taken up with the task of resisting the temptation to 
masturbate (Freud, 1926) . This relating of masturbation to 
the state of infantile dependence is of importance for an 
understanding of the changes at adolescence, as it can then 
be seen to represent a form of behaviour originating in an 
earlier phase of development to which a return is made when 
a genital relationship cannot be established. 
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In earlier and simpler societies in Europe increase in 
physical strength and powers meant an immediate absorption 
of the individual within the adult group and adult status 
brought adult sexual relationships. Life was short and 
early marriage was the custom (Landis, 1945). Ethnological 
studies such as those by Margaret Mead have shown that the 
storm, stress and conflict of adolescence are closely 
associated with the sort of society in which the young person 
is growing up. They are not the result of the operation of 
a specific factor such as delay in obtaining sexual gratification. 
Cultural factors producing stress may be subsumed under the 
single heading of postponement of adult status and consequent 
lengthening of the period of dependence, which are not 
exclusive to present -day societies but are nevertheless an 
inevitable concomitant of the extended programmes of education 
which form part of the complexities of modern civilisation. 
This is borne out by the fact that there is a difference 
between the attitudes of boys and girls who stay at school 
till eighteen and those who go to work early: the important 
difference between these groups seems to lie in the fact of 
earning money rather than'the possession of it. Schoolboys 
tend to develop a hostile attitude towards the family while 
a young worker does not, a fact which is not affected in the 
many cases in which the schoolboy may have more money to 
spend than the young worker. In terms of status and 
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relationships the schoolboy is still being kept in the 
intermediate, partially dependent stage while the young worker 
has already entered a social life and is relating in an adult 
way. 
These group problems which are over and above the 
individual problems attending the passage to adult life, vary 
between societies and with socio- economic statùs. The 
intermediate stage of development is always characterised, 
however, by the emergence of ways of facilitating this 
transition. Development is a continuous process and the 
earlier phases of any particular stage are always marked by 
the persistence of features inherited from the previous stage, 
in a way which is analogous to Piaget's description of processes 
of formation or genesis in intellectual function which pass 
into the complete form or final equilibrium which is, however, 
the formation or genesis of the next stage. Anna Freud 
(1945) states a similar view when she notes that the latency 
period is usually in existence for one or two years before 
the tendencies of the first infantile period fade into the 
background. The importance of the intermediate transitional 
stage of development lies in the transformation of early 
object -relations into patterns of transaction between inner 
and outer reality which are in adolescence tested by their 
ability to withstand the pressures encountered in that period 
of development and the conflicts resulting from the 
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prolongation of the state of dependence which is a purely 
cultural and variable phenomenon. 
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CHAPTER 6. 
The Theory of Instinct. 
The newly born child stands in the same relation to the 
mature adult as primitive peoples stand in relation to modern 
man. The reflective quality of man forms as much a part of 
the biological heritage of the human infant as his primitive 
behaviour. The development of an animal involves participation 
in a limited number of relationships determined by the pattern 
of its species, but the development of a person is through a 
series of changes which increase his difference from other 
persons while at the same time multiplying his systems of 
relationship with them. No other species follows this 
pattern, and because of this direct comparisons between 
animal and human behaviour are never legitimate unless they 
are seen as ways of throwing light upon a single component of 
a complex whole in the same way as neurology, physiology or 
experimental studies of behaviour may do. Fairbairn holds 
that it is legitimate to draw an analogy between the behaviour 
of animals because "social (viz. object- seeking) behaviour is 
in general exhibited from birth" (1956, p. 52) but he 
recognises that the behaviour of animals may become completely 
unrealistic in the face of changes in the environmental 
conditions to which they have become adapted. To illustrate 
his point, he has mentioned the phenomenon of 'imprinting' in 
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young animals, which would seem to imply an inherent 
orientation towards objects of a certain sort. Biologically 
the bird is oriented towards these objects because it is 
through them that its needs are satisfied. The evidence of 
ethnologists is, however, that the orientation towards these 
objects may persist although the need is no longer satisfied 
or is being satisfied more fully in another fashion (Tanner 
& Inhelder, 1956, p. 130) . They have also found that a 
particular reaction such as the begging reaction in young 
birds may actually prevent them from feeding themselves even 
when food is available and they have learned to feed on their 
own. Human infants quickly develop adaptibility, the 
ability to vary their behaviour or to seek alternative routes 
to the same goal. Piaget has demonstrated that this may 
begin to show itself in the first year of infancy. Because 
this important difference shows so early it is perhaps more 
useful to consider those primitive forms.of behaviour which 
are common to animals and men as relationship seeking rather 
than object seeking. For the animal it is the relationship 
with the object, not the object itself which is sought, and 
this is on the basis of a direct satisfaction of a biological 
need arising from membership of a particular species. The 
object sought is more a key- stimulus to a relationship than 
an object in the way that a human being conceives it. There 
is a sense in which certain forms of infant behaviour may be 
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considered in the same way, but the infant has within him the 
potentiality to vary his needs and to choose his relationships. 
Fairbairn is correct in his view that the basic behaviour of 
human beings and animals is fundamentally alike, in much the 
same way as certain of their organs and functions are alike, 
but he has failed to emphasise that it is the higher centres 
of the human cortex which make man's objects, his object - 
seeking and his object -relations into concepts outwith the 
possible experience of animals. Both human beings and 
animals can be said to have the same basic orientation towards 
relationships, but only man has objects. Fairbairn does say 
that the appreciation of reality of animals may be limited: 
this might be even more strongly stated, that in a sense 
animals have no sense of reality at all, only a system of 
relationships based upon needs, which is maintained by 
responses to certain combinations of stimuli which may be 
simple or complex, depending upon the position of the animal 
on the evolutionary ladder. Such combinations may take the 
form of an object as we know it, but for the animal it can 
have no significance of this sort, as it cannot consider such 
a combination in terms of its possibilities for satisfaction 
or its amenability to manipulation: it cannot refer to it, 
remember it in its absence or hallucinate it. Nevertheless, 
infants do share with animals certain innate qualities which 
are as important for their development as those more complex 
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forms of behaviour which more clearly differentiate between 
man and animal. 
In the intra- uterine life needs are supplied by the 
operation of automatic physiological processes, and there is 
a state of even flow of impulse and reaction maintaining a 
balance between the relative importance of the individual 
and the environment which undergoes a- number of changes at 
the time of birth. The child is born with certain attributes 
into a particular setting which Winnicot has related to the 
very special psychiatric condition of the mother, a state 
which he calls "primary maternal preoccupation" (Winnicot, 
1956). These attributes are listed as his constitution, 
his innate developmental tendencies, his mobility and 
sensitivity and the instincts, which are themselves involved 
in the developmental tendency. At birth a number of 
adjustments are required for successful functioning under the 
new conditions. Breathing starts, cries are uttered, 
movements are made. Observation has shown that in addition 
to automatic adaptations on the part of certain organs, there 
exist from the beginning a number of complete patterns of 
behaviour directed to specific ends similar to those seen in 
young animals of other species. There is within the infant 
something which impels him to take the breast, a movement 
towards feeding which is there from the start. These 
patterns vary very little between individuals and between 
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cultures, though individual and cultural differences soon make 
their appearance. In animals, all behaviour largely depends 
on these instincts which rest upon a specific neurological 
structure and are set in motion by particular stimuli. The 
pecking of new -born chicks or the nest -building of birds are 
examples of this sort of behaviour, which show how these may 
be elaborate and well -co- ordinated sequences of movements well 
adapted to the purposes which they are intended to serve and 
may be distinguished from purely reflex action or autorhythhmia, 
both of which are simpler types of central nervous activity. 
Pure reflexes are rare in the animal kingdom and have in many 
cases superseded autorhythmia which is the incessant generation 
of complicated and highly co- ordinated rhythmical series of 
motor impulses such as are concerned in locomotion. It seems 
clear that this kind of activity is behind the typical 
spontaneity of all instinctive activity and that an explanation 
on this basis explains much that is unintelligible when 
considered in terms of reflexes. As yet no complex instinctive 
activity has been analysed into its neurological components, 
but as long as it was regarded as a chain of reflexes the 
question of how it began did not present a problem. When the 
autorhythmic basis of spontaneous instinctive activity became 
apparent, however, the problem did emerge of what inhibits the 
behaviour and in turn removes the inhibition in the biologically 
adequate situation and at the right moment. Studies have been 
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made of this 'innate releasing mechanism' (I.R.M.) which have 
yielded considerable information about its operation, though 
its exact nature still remains in doubt. 
An autorhythmic activity common to young mammals and 
human babies is the movement to and fro of the head in search 
of the nipple. This is inhibited by the I.R.M. responding 
to the nipple, which puts a block on the autorhythmic movement 
when it is found. It has been demonstrated that the 
'prehensile reflex' in the human baby has developed 
ontogenetically out of this ' search mechanism' . This 
demonstrates very effectively how there are operating in the 
human being innate patterns of behaviour as in other species. 
It is, however, impossible to base a psychological theory of 
human behaviour entirely on such patterns as it can be seen 
even in this example that however the I.R.M. which responds 
to the nipple operated in the first instance, for a human 
child the second occasion cannot be a repetition of the first, 
as his experience of the first situation is now a part of his 
approach to the second, and this faculty of associating and 
remembering makes the forces which modify pure instinctive 
reaction in human beings more important than the instincts 
themselves. McDougall ultimately replaced the concept of 
instinct in his psychological theory by the more general term 
of 'propensity', and academic psychologists now prefer to 
accept some framework of innate motivational factors rather 
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than a simple instinct theory. Thouless (1951, p. 41) 
doubts whether the concept of instinct or propensity is of 
much use in explaining differences between individuals or 
societies, though he believes that some innate forces behind 
behaviour must exist. In the opinion of Allport (1949, p. 
194 -5), the original drives become transformed in the course 
of growth into what we understand as 'motives' and psychology 
should be concerned with the study of post- instinctive 
behaviour. The views of both these writers perhaps incline 
too much in the opposite direction from those who regard 
instinct as the basis of all behaviour. The aim of a study 
of the psyche must be to strike a balance between the 
various contributory factors which comprise the complex of 
behaviour, neither confining attention to the somatic 
aspects nor taking an existentialist standpoint. Thouless 
perhaps fails to allow enough weight to the presence of 
individual differences in the 'innate forces behind behaviour' 
and Allport places too much emphasis upon the process of 
transformation into motives, which has the effect of attaching 
undue importance to intellectual functions. Post -instinctive 
behaviour in human beings is, however, marked by the increasing 
participation of the intellect and concentration upon this 
aspect of the personality at the expense of other aspects may 
cause a false division of mental and the physical, or to use 
Winnicot's terms, mind and psyche -soma (``linnicot, 1954) . 
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Freud used the terra 'reality ego', Jung 'persona' and Winnicot 
'false self' to describe the external presentment of the 
personality which is the result of post -instinctive behaviour 
modified by the pressures of society. These are descriptions 
of pathological entities, evolved as defences against 
failures in development. For the study of the total 
personality, full weight must be given to both innate and 
acquired factors, the ways in which the two are connected 
and their relative importance at various stages of growth. 
In his studies of the nature of the repressed Freud 
borrowed the concept of instinct which was familiar in both 
biological and general thought before his time, and which 
McDougall had already made the basis of a psychological 
theory. Freud's view of instincts, however, underwent a 
number of changes as his scientific viewpoints altered and his 
clinical experience became more extensive. The 
"Interpretation of Dreams" was published at a time when he 
was still seeking an explanation of behaviour on an organic 
basis and he describes the psyche in that work as "an 
apparatus for the regulation of instinct tension" (Freud, 
1932, p. 520). The tension Toroduced by need of instinctive 
origin is felt by the psyche as pain or unpleasure ( Unlust) 
and it must be reduced by gratification or 'bound' by 
intrapsychic mechanisms directed to the avoidance of pain 
(1899, p. 520). Fairbairn has drawn a parallel between the 
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progress in Mill's thought from the psychological principle 
of pleasure- seeking to the ethical principle of "the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number" and the transition in 
Freud's system from libido theory to super -ego theory, which 
is designed to explain. how pleasure -seeking becomes a 
principle of action under the pressure of obect -relationships. 
(Fairbairn, 1949). Libido theory was developed to explain 
Freud's findings of conflict between the ego and psychic 
sexual drives from the material of dreams and the analysis of 
psychoneurotics and arose from his studies of the nature of 
the repressed material. His classification of ego 
instincts and sex instincts (Freud, 1915) was an adaptation 
of the current biological distinction between self- preservation 
and race -preservation. In his early papers 'instinct' is a 
concept with. both a phys io- chemical aspect and a mental 
aspect. He conceived it as having a source in somatic 
process, an impetus or force, an aim, that of "abolishing the 
conditi -n of stimulation in the source of the instinct" and 
an object "that in and through which it can achieve its aim." 
(Freud, 1915). 
The investigation of the source of instinct tension 
led to the formulation of a theory of infantile sexuality 
composed of a number of relatively independent components or 
partial impulses, related to particular erotogenic zones which 
passed through periods of dominance related to stages in the 
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development of the individual. Impulses first centred in 
the mouth interests, giving rise to oral primacy and later 
in the anus and excretory processes giving rise to an 
anal -sadistic primacy (Freud, 1905). These primacies were 
subdivided and elaborated by Abraham into a system in which . 
each zone was allotted a special place in psychogenetic 
development, dominating in turn successive phases (Abraham, 
1924a, 1924b). Fairbairn has pointed out, however, that 
erotogenic zones are simply channels through which libido 
flows and that a zone is only erotogenic when libido flows 
through it. He holds that in infancy the path of least 
resistance to the object happens to be through the mouth, 
hence the mouth becomes the dominant libidinal organ. In 
the mature adult, however, the genital organs provide a 
path of least resistance to the object, but Fairbairn makes 
the very important point that this is only one of a number 
of parallel paths. In the infant the path to the object 
is necessarily oral, but in the mature individual the path 
to the object is not necessarily genital. His view is that 
it is not the libidinal attitude which determines the 
object -relationship but the object -relationship which 
determines the libidinal attitude (Fairbairn, 1941, p. 34). 
This has the virtue of simplicity, for while Freud soon 
abandoned his initial conception of an objectless or auto - 
erotic chaos of infantile impulses of a 'polymorphous perverse' 
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character, it was still necessary to invoke two principles 
of explanation, psychological and physiological, in order to 
explain the pleasure -seeking aim of libido. Fairbairn's 
view gets round the difficulty that the ego as a psychic 
structure should be thought of as arising from the mutual 
friction of two different sets of energy, biochemical 
energies arising within the organism and environmental 
énergies arising without (Fairbairn, 1957b). 
The theory of narcissism was an important step forward 
in the development of Freud's views on instinct. Study of 
the loss of interest in the outside world characteristic of 
paraphrenics led him to the view that "the libido drawn from 
the outer world has been directed on to the ego, giving rise 
to a state which we may call narcissism" (Freud, 1914 b). 
This recognised the existence of libidinal or sexual 
instincts in the ego and with this recognition the simple 
antithesis between ego instincts and libidinal instincts 
was abandoned. Further than this, as it was possible for 
the ego to be itself cathected with libido, a state is 
conceived in which the e:o could be identified with ob'ects. 
Freud also thought that infantile narcissism or self -love was 
later trasmuted by the formation of an ego -ideal into love of 
this ideal and in this conception the possibility of a 
differentiating grade in the ego is suggested, a view which 
was to be developed into the later concept of the super -ego. 
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"The super -ego, however, is not merely a deposit 
left by the earliest object choices of the id; it 
also represents an energetic reaction -formation against 
these choices." (Freud, 1923, p. 44 -5). 
The super -ego was not only concerned with object- seeking, 
but also with repression and this is a process which involves 
the direction of aggression inwards. At first hatred and 
aggression were considered secondary phenomena, the result of 
infantile frustrations, but in time Freud came to relate them 
to the compulsion to repetition which he had noted was a 
tendency older and more fundamental than either the pursuit 
of pleasure or the avoidance of pain and which he considered 
to be an expression of a 'conservative' character of instinct, 
"a tendency innate in every living organic matter impelling 
it towards a reinstatement of an earlier condition, the 
inorganic or death." (Freud, 1920, p. 44). This last 
development of Freud's instinct theory therefore places in 
opposition libido and aggression in the form of Eros and 
Thanatos, the life and death instincts, and aggression is the 
manifestation of the death impulses which have become 
externalised. Melanie Klein holds that the main source of 
anxiety lies in the threatened danger to the organism which 
arises from the destructive impulses which are the external 
results of the death instinct and she describes development 
in terms of the fluctuating amounts of anxiety which are 
generated by the interplay of the primary life and death 
instincts (Klein, 1952, Ch. VIII, p. 183 -4). Fairbairn 
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prefers to interpret aggression as the counterpart of libido 
and to see the death- seeking tendency as a manifestation of 
inturned aggression (Fairbairn, 1956, p. 56). 
In his early paper, "Civilised sexual morality and modern 
nervousness ", (1908), Freud takes a view of biochemically 
determined drives which exist prior to experience and which 
it is the task of the human being to try to master through 
sublimation. Civilisation is founded upon the success of 
this process. He takes the pessimistic view that only a 
few individuals succeed in achieving this sublimation, the 
rest being likely to become neurotic or at least failing to 
lead satisfactory lives. This basic pattern from which he 
never really departed despite the changes of emphasis and the 
development of so many of his other views presents the 
difficulty that it at one and the same time states that 
culture and civilisation rest upon the mastery of instinct, 
and also that the gratification of instinct is necessary for the 
maintenance of mental health. He did go some way towards 
resolving this apparent contradiction as he devoted more and 
more time to the analysis of the ego and the development of 
his theory of psychic structure, but this did not lead him to 
a revision of his instinct theory which remained greatly 
influenced by 'impulse' psychology, retaining a view of culture 
which was negative, and of a 'state of nature' more brutish 
than that which Hobbes described. 
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In his theory of Object- relations, Fairbairn has stated 
a view of instinct in terms of a single principle. 
"The ultimate goal of libido is the object; and 
in its search for the object libido is determined by 
similar laws which determine the flow of electrical 
energy: i.e. it seeks the path. of least resistance." 
(Fairbairn, 1941, p. 31) . 
It can be held that this marks the final step in the 
transition of psychoanalysis from a theory of the organism 
to a theory of the person, and makes it possible to consider 
the unconscious itself as fully personal, an inner world in 
which ego- object relations formed early in development are in 
the present the foundations of the emotional and dynamic 
life of the whole person. The philosophic conceptions of 
the -life and death instincts Fairbairn would replace by the 
libidinal and anti -libidinal factors in the psyche. In 
order to avoid hypostasising instincts, Fairbairn refers to 
'libido' and not 'the libido' as if it had a separate psychic 
existence. The basic libidinal strivings of the infant which 
he considers as strivings for good object relations are the 
expression of the primary nature of the human being without 
which no true development as a person is possible. 
The chief disadvantage of the term 'instinct' in 
psychoanalytical theory has been its use to denote not only 
predispositions or tendencies but also the biological 
constructs of unlearned total action patterns. It has already 
been demonstrated that an attempt to explain all human action 
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in terms of such biological constructs is bound to fail, and 
yet man takes his place at the end of the evolutionary continuum 
and all that he possesses as attributes are transformations of 
what has gone before. It is in man that biogenesis became 
psychogenesis and this means that the energy which provided 
the means for the advancement of biological evolution must 
either still be supplying the means of psychic progress or 
must itself have undergone a transformation into a new form 
of energy suitable to its new purpose. Whichever of these 
may be correct, it is apparent that the forces of evolution 
and of individual development must be in some way related if 
a consistent scheme is to be presented. It is as well 
initially to recall that there are in reality no instincts 
or drives as immediate observables: they are in fact 
hypothetico- deductive constructs to aid understanding of 
certain observables (Colby, 1955, p. 38). In the diversity 
of animal behaviour, de Chardin suggests there is evidence 
that instinct is not an epiphenomenon, but translates by 
its different expressions the central phenomenon of life, 
and that it consequently represents a. variable dimension 
(de Chardin, 1955, p. 167). Viewing the course of evolution 
as a psychical phenomenon it can be seen that the instincts 
create a growing system: the 'psychical' make up of a dog 
would be more complicated than that of a mole or fish. Man 
represents for a variety of reasons the culmination of the 
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evolutionary process, in whom the transformation of instinct 
into thought has been accomplished. There still remain at 
various points along the continuum a variety of rudimentary 
systems of consciousness which are difficult to comprehend 
because they work so differently from our own. De Chardin 
considers the threshold of reflection represents a critical 
phase in the transformation of varied instincts into a whole 
which is very much greater than the sum of its parts. 
"In man, considered as a zoological group, 
everything is extended simultaneously - sexual attraction, 
with the laws of reproduction; the inclination to struggle 
for survival, with the competition it involves; the need 
for nourishment, with the accompanying taste for seizing 
and devouring; curiosity to see, with its delight in 
investigation; the attraction for joining others to 
live in society. Each of these fibres traverses each 
one of us, coming up from far below and stretching 
beyond and above us. And each one of them has its story 
(no less true than any other) to tell of the whole course 
of evolution - evolution of love, evolution of war, 
evolution of research, evolution of social sense. But 
each one, just because it is evolutionary, undergoes a 
metamorphosis as it crosses the threshold of reflection. 
Beyond this point it is enriched by new possibilities, 
new colours, new fecundation. It is the same thing, if 
you like, but it is something quite different also - a 
figure that has become transformed by a change of space 
and dimension, discontinuity superimposed upon continuity, 
mutation upon evolution." (de Chardin, 1955, p. 180). 
Colby holds that to postulate a single drive only is to 
over -simplify the problem of instinct to a grotesque extent, 
and he suggests two broad categories of drive which he calls 
Maintenance and Reproductive 'drive schemas', (Colby, 1955, 
Ch. 3) . It can be seen that these formulations while they 
are useful classifications referring to purpose viewed from 
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the standpoint of the individual, they resolve themselves 
into two separate expressions of the drive towards 
relationship viewed from the standpoint of evolution. Colby' s 
position is weakened by an atomistic view of child development 
which is exemplified by his explanation of the connection 
between infantile thumb sucking and adult genital union in 
terms of the drive maturation of fractional aims into full 
aims. He continues to support the Freudian view of 
erotogenic zones and holds that drives may be classified in 
terms of consummatory actions in the environment which 
fulfil physiological requirements of the organism. Such 
consummatory actions in fact involve the establishment of 
relationship systems, and transition theory postulates that 
life goes forward under the single principle of a drive 
towards the establishment and maintenance of such systems. 
The replacement of instinct by thought as the main 
principle of action in human behaviour does not mean that 
instinct ceases to be a factor in human action. The course 
of evolution itself may be considered as a successive 
elaboration of relationship systems from the simple uni- 
cellular organism to the complexities of human individuals 
and societies. The principle which regulates the onward 
movement of life is the establishment of relationships without 
which organisms cannot survive. In_ the most basic form of 
life these take the forni of simple systems for the fulfilment 
134. 
of biological necessities. As more complex forms of life 
emerge, systems become more complex and more dependent upon 
elaborate patterns of behaviour initiated only by a special 
stimulus or group of stimuli which become differentiated 
into the specific instincts upon which all animal behaviour 
rests. The higher the animal on the scale of evolution, 
the more complicated the relationships upon which the 
satisfaction of its biological needs depend, until in 
reflective man there exists systems so complex that they 
create their own needs. The onward movement of life is not 
only by the differentiation of species but also by the 
continuous reproduction of individuals, which also becomes 
a process of greater complication in the course of 
evolution. In this way the functions of reproduction come 
to be closely associated with the basic drive to relationship 
which is the movement of life itself. The hominisation of 
the species means that the human infant is born not only with 
certain innate schemas of behaviour by which its actions in 
the environment are facilitated, but also with potentialities 
for mental acts which make it possible for it to develop in 
terms of relationships with objects. These objects are 
remembered, they can be hallucinated and they will be 
described and referred to when language is acquired. Before 
even language, the infant can make an act of intentional 
pointing towards them. These objects are not only the basis 
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of a structure of outer reality but also of an unconscious 
inner reality in terms of which the outer world comes to be 
perceived. In time the perception of the self as an object 
completes the process by which the child passes into the 
phase of personal object- relations which is the basis of the 
social nature of man. 
This view of instinct is similar to that which Fairbairn 
has adopted and is closer to Freud's original formulation in 
which hatred and aggression are secondary phenomena resulting 
from infantile frustrations. Sexual functions are part of 
the human expression of the forward movement of life, while 
the death instinct is not the internal instigator of 
aggression but rather an internalisation of aggression 
itself, arising from frustrations in early object- relations. 
Winnicot notes: 
" that confusion exists through our using the 
term aggression sometimes when we mean spontaneity. 
The impulsive gesture reaches out and becomes 
aggressive when opposition is reached. There is 
reality in this experience and it very easily fuses 
into the erotic experiences that await the new -born 
infant. I am suggesting: it is this impulsiveness, 
and the aggression that develops out of it, that makes 
the infant need an external object, and not merely 
a satisfying object." (Winnicot, 1955, p. 217). 
This account of infant behaviour against the background 
of extensive clinical observation serves to confirm the 
presence from the beginning of actions directed outwards 
towards the environment. From early in its life the child 
reaches out and the need for relationships is manifested in 
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every aspect of its behaviour. It is a postulate of 
transition theory that this represents the expression of the 
only innate human drive which is towards relationships with 
objects. This is the transformation of the animal instinct 
towards the completion of relationships on the basis of 
specific biological needs and both of these are specialised 
forms of the movement of all matter towards connection into 
systems which is the way in which life advances. 
PART III 
A THEORY OF TRANSITION. 
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CHAPTER 7. 
Outlines of a Transitional Theory of Development. 
Everything is ultimately in relationship with everything 
else and the course of evolution has been marked by the 
ramification and transmutation of systems of relationship. 
Only man has objects and lives in a self -constructed world of 
object- relationships: he is the result but not the termination 
of an evolutionary process and as life goes on he continues to 
evolve with it. There is no reason for thinking that 
biological and social concepts are incompatible or that the 
explanation of behaviour in psychological terms precludes 
taking account of the origins of species. "What is valid 
in one frame of reference does not become invalid and useless 
with the introduction of a new or different frame of reference." 
(Szasz, 1955). One cannot draw a sharp dividing line between 
instinct and thought as it must be the ultimate aim of science 
to resolve both into the same terms. The driving force 
behindthe onward movement of life is towards multiplication 
through the formation of systems and in the most highly 
developed species this takes the form of a drive towards 
relationships, which man's highly sophisticated powers of 
perception, communication and symbolic behaviour transform into 
systems of relationships with objects. It is through 
relationships that the propagation of the species is achieved 
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by the fusion of the basic drive with the bio- physical 
mechanisms of reproduction and it is through highly abstract 
relationship systems that man has transcended so many of the 
limitations of his physical situation and extended the 
dimensions of his environment. Fairbairn emphasises that 
it is the inherent aim of psychology to explain human 
behaviour and experience in strictly mental terms and holds 
that it must be assumed that psychical energy is inherent 
in the psyche if psychology is to be taken seriously as an 
explanatory system (Fairbairn, 1957b). A metapsychological 
explanation of human behaviour systems must go further than 
this, however, to demonstrate how human behaviour issued from 
animal behaviour and from what ultimate source psychic 
energy is derived. The proper field of psychological 
investigation includes more than the person: it is the 
origins of the personal system and the nature of the processes 
by which the organismic becomes the personal. Perhaps also 
it must concern itself with the ultimate destination of the 
personal system, for the self is a construct and it is 
illogical to assert that this may survive the annihilation of 
the body (Ayer, 1958, p. 127). De Chardin has proposed that 
man may be on the verge of a new era of psychical expansion 
in which a new organisation will arise which transcends the 
ego -centric personal systems in the same way as the open 
object- systems of human beings superseded the closed instinct- 
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systems of animals. This 'mega -synthesis', as he calls it, 
involves a rejection of doctrines of isolation and of 
psychological or social theories centred in the person and 
requires the hypothesis of a state of hyper- personality. 
(de Chardin, 1959 Bk. IV). Some such solution must 
ultimately be found, as the destination of the expanding 
object-system is at present obscured by the fact of 
individual death. In animals, where each can more or less 
take the place of any of the others, the movement forward of 
the species is unaffected by the dissolution of individuals, 
but this is not so in man, where the uniqueness of individuals 
is the outward sign of the expansion of the object- system. 
In the same way as the onward movement of life may be seen as 
an ascent of consciousness which could not indefinitely pursue 
a linear course without transforming itself in depth, the 
development of the person is a process in which each step 
forward is a transformation of what has gone before as 
successive systems become incorporated in the individual system. 
This ability to assimilate other systems was the means by which 
the primates escaped the specialisation which paralyses or the 
ultra -specialisation which kills and avoided ending up in the 
evolutionary dead -ends of monstrosity or fragility, (de Chardin, 
1959, p. 159). While the nervous system and behaviour 
patterns of other mammals became highly developed and diffused 
into diverse channels of accessory differentiation, in primates 
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the work of evolution took place almost exclusively in the 
brain. 
"In this singular and privileged case, the particular 
orthogenesis of the phylum happened to coincide exactly 
with the principal orthogenesis of life itself" (de 
Chardin, 1959, p. 159). 
Evolution is a psychic process having its culmination in 
the imaginatively- perceived object -world of persons, and in 
personal development there are transformations which are 
analogous to those which occurred during the course of evolution. 
There are differences also, however, for the emergence of the 
human psyche has altered the significance and perspective of 
all the preceding stages of evolution, and all successive 
changes are three-dimensional. While each individual moves 
along the separate pathway of his own psychical relationship 
system, the general stream of life is still moving forward. 
Transition theory suggests that both processes are energised 
by the same force and that their movements are of the same 
sort, always in the same direction and through a process of 
controlled complication of relationship systems which may 
be simplified into successive waves of transformation. Thus 
the development of the individual is seen not as a series of 
parallel nor of converging lines but as a series of expanding 
circles, the circumferencesof which form the loci of an 
infinite number of points of radiation outwards from the 
previous system. The radiations are the aspects of the 
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positive relationship -seeking drive of the individual system 
in which. the basic force of evolution is expressed. Psychic 
factors have long outweighed or rather embraced and 
incorporated the physiological and biological factors in the 
onward movement. With the advent of man, psychogenesis 
supplanted biogenesis which had in its turn supplanted 
geogenesis as the framework within which life advanced. 
Biology sees man at the end of a continuum which extends to 
the simplest uni- cellular form of life: psychology has the 
task of presenting a view of man not only in human and 
personal terms but also in terms of that continuum to which 
the emergence of the psyche added another dimension in depth. 
The Initial Situation: The non -significant state. 
The initial situationfor the human individual is not 
non -existence but non -significance. The elements of personal 
existence are all present and active but still proceeding 
towards what will be a sudden emergence of significance, which 
will alter not only everything which is to come but also what 
has gone before. In the course of evolution there must have 
been an instant of transformation in which. man crossed the 
threshold of reflection and self- consciousness but had there 
been an observer present there would have been nothing to 
isolate this instant other than his perception that a new 
state was in existence: the perception does not coincide with 
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the instant of change. De Chardin has used a geometrical 
example to illustrate this: a series of sections made of a 
cone would show a succession of diminishing areas of surface 
until there was no longer a surface, but a point. It is only 
in retrospect that the significant instant may be seen and 
perhaps not even then. The important thing is that it has a 
theoretical existence: all we can say is that the initial 
state has been replaced by a different one in our perception. 
The beginnings of the human individual lie in the 
relationship systems of others, for first there is a state in 
which no individual may be referred to or named or can provide 
the basis of a relationship system. There is only a situation 
in which the basic instinct brings two human beings into a 
relationship which is sexual because they are human and adult 
and this is the appropriate way in which their drive is 
translated into behaviour. The area formed by the 
intersection of the circumferences of their personal 
relationship systems contains the elements of a new individual 
system which coalesce to form a nucleus only when the various 
elements have combined to form their own relationships under 
the ordering of biological laws. The changes which are 
taking place in the situation are within the mother's body 
and at first outwith her conscious perception, yet they are 
none the less changes in her systems of relationship which 
bring about alterations in the balance of her transactions 
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with internal and external objects. 
In geometrical terms, the nucleus of an individual 
system lies within the area of intersection of the circumference 
of two circles which form the boundaries of two relationship 
systems which are objectively perceived as two separate 
persons, a man and a woman. Relationship systems have a 
third dimension, however, and may be seen as expanding cones 
originating in a theoretical fixed point. The dimensions 
of these circumferences are infinity, as human relationship 
systems are limited only by the description of the things 
which exist, which is theoretically limitless. As a result, 
each system contains the other, when the area of intersection 
is replaced by a point of contact of the circumferences which 
represents the theoretical origin of the individual relationship 
system. 
This scheme, which is a representation of processes and 
has no fixed space -time dimensions, may go some way towards 
explaining the difficulty which Fairbairn mentions in the 
simultaneity of the processes of identification and 
incorporation so that "the object in which the individual is 
incorporated is incorporated in the individual" (Fairbairn, 
1941, p. 43) and the dream material which he quotes to show 
many examples of equivalence between being inside an object 
and having an object inside. From the beginning, the 
individual system is simultaneously inside a multiplicity of 
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systems and the course of development is marked by the 
incorporation of other systems within his own. 
1st Relationship System. The non -individual focus. 
The imperceptible changes which took place when the 
nucleus was formed have significance only when something 
emerges which can be perceived and referred to, but emergence 
and the perception by others which is necessary for 
significance are not necessarily simultaneous. The transformation 
of the initial state into a significant situation is achieved 
not through the appearance of anything new but through the 
direction of exploratory communications in the direction of a 
hypothetical individual; a situation which has been called the 
non- individual focus. Awareness of the possibility of an 
individual initiates a process of relating to him on the part 
of the mother and through her of other people which results 
in the rearrangement of their systems in anticipation of his 
existence and the making of a niche for him which will be 
filled only when he can be perceived as a part of objective 
reality. This is taken arbitrarily to mark the beginnings 
of the individual system, though this is in fact continuous 
with all other systems and becomes differentiated from them 
initially through their readjustments and re- orientations. 
Before there is an individual which can be perceived 
there develops an undifferentiated individual- environment unit 
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in which relationship systems are based upon physiological 
needs. There is nothing yet in this situation which is 
specifically human except that the potentiality of the 
situation for the production of a human individual creates 
this anticipatory re- alignment in the systems of others 
which is possible only in the human species. At the same 
time there is a growing significance of the situation for 
others which antedates the individual's first transactions 
with other systems and which will modify these when in fact 
they do begin. The culmination of this process is the 
existence of a rudimentary individual, still poorly and 
impermanently differentiated from the environment, but 
having not only the elements of a relationship system with 
others through their awareness of his potentialities as an 
individual, but also the beginnings of his own systems of 
transaction in his increasing movement towards the 
environment. As yet these do not coincide. 
2nd Relationship System. The embryonic system. 
In the motility of the foetus begins the first sensing 
of the ' me' and 'not -me' worlds through the resistance of 
the environment to movement and the reaction of the foetus 
to impingement. This initiates a process of personalisation 
in which the psyche -soma begins to lay the foundations for 
the construction of reality and the self which is important 
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to later development but may not affect the embryonic system 
except in its later stages. The experience of birth is an 
important event in the process of personalisation, but it 
does not mark a further system change as the processes of 
personalisation are continuous within the embryonic system 
and early object- relations are extensions of the primitive 
explorations of the intra- uterine life and the birth 
experience. Thus the embryonic system and the object - 
system alternate until the third system change is complete. 
In premature babies the embryonic system may continue for a 
long period, and in all babies there are long periods of 
regression in sleep. The birth experience is thus important 
only as a factor in a system change: it does not initiate 
a process nor put an end to one. The child's appearance as 
an individual within the range of perception of others may 
modify their relationships towards him but it does not issue 
in a new system as from the beginnings of significance he 
has had such a place in anticipation of his being able to 
fill it. Similarly, from the foetal viewpoint, the 
embryonic system is maintained although the physiological 
needs which require to be satisfied have altered. In his 
rudimentary perception, it is the mother who moves, and 
although he has not yet constructed the mother, there has 
been substituted for the confining but holding environment in 
which his needs are supplied instantly and automatically a 
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wider and expanding environment which is still sensitively 
oriented towards the satisfaction of the infant's needs by 
reason of the mother's special condition which exists for the 
protective perpetuation of the embryonic system. There is 
now the possibility of a mother, and this represents the 
culmination of the process of personalisation in which all 
the elements are present for relating in uniquely human 
fashion. The infant is now able to transact with objects 
and through his perception can begin the construction of the 
inner and outer worlds in relationship with which his 
personality will be dynamically maintained. 
The state of the individual on the threshold of the 
object -system may be compared with the state of the human 
species on the eve of the emergence of reflective man. A 
number of threads of maturation have come together and the 
critical transformation which follows is in the nature of a 
metamorphosis which affects the whole being. Once it has 
been effected the human infant moves outside the phyletic 
boundaries and enters into the heritage of personality. 
3rd Relationship System. The Object -System. 
Early infancy is marked by oscillations between the 
lingering embryonic system and the growing object-system and 
the stage during which there is still, a predominance of the 
embryonic system affecting the nature of early object -relations 
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corresponds to Fairbairn' s "Stage of Infantile Dependence". 
(Fairbairn, 1941). In this period the child constructs the 
inner and outer worlds in the way which is more fully described 
in Chapter 8. As the infant in the course of normal 
development builds the object- system for himself around the 
nucleus of the preceding systems, there succeeds a prolonged 
stage of development which Fairbairn has described as "The 
Stage of Transition or Quasi- Independence ". In order to 
avoid confusion with the view of development and evolution 
presented here which sees all progress in terms of transition 
from one system to another, this stage is described as "the 
stage of transactional patterns" as it is in this period that 
ways of transaction between systems in the inner and outer 
worlds are established. These modify the individual's way of 
thinking and acting and are the basis of his external character. 
The dichotomy and exteriorisation of the incorporated object 
which Fairbairn describes as characterising the stage of 
transition is an example of such a transactional pattern. In 
transition theory this is the first stage of development which 
can be considered in terms of object- relations, as although 
the processes of relationship are in genetic continuity with 
earlier and more primitive systems it is only with the 
successful completion of personalisation that the individual 
has the means to structure objects and to develop systems of 
relationship based upon his perception of them. The 
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development of transactional patterns is marked by an 
increasing exercise of powers of choice which may be made 
consciously or unconsciously: the child acquires the means 
of varying his relationships to satisfy his needs in 
alternative ways. The transactional patterns may themselves 
generate needs. The participation of mind becomes the 
dominant feature and this makes possible even greater expansion 
of the personal system through the movement from affective to 
cognitive discrimination. Abstraction and highly sophisticated 
symbolic processes widen the relationship systems still 
further but there may be contraction here and there or the 
development of special transactional patterns as a result of 
unsatisfying relationships with objects. There may also be 
temporary or permanent reversion to earlier systems in order 
to protect the precariously maintained ego from threatening 
objects in the inner and outer worlds. 
Successful development of the object system through the 
stage of transactional patterns leads to a theoretically 
perfect state in which systems of relationship are established 
between mature persons based upon a perfect balance of mutual 
participation in giving and taking. Such a state is never 
reached in practice as no one passes through all system changes 
under optimum conditions. This final state corresponds to 
Fairbairn's "Stage of Mature Dependence" and in transition 
theory is called the "state of mature sociality ". The 
150. 
nearness or otherwise of the individual to the theoretical 
goal of perfection is determined by the efficiency or 
otherwise of the transactional patterns which he has 
developed in the enlargement of his object system and which 
may go some considerable way towards overcoming deficiencies 
in earlier systems. Oneof the most important of these 
groups of transactional patterns is concerned with the 
ways in which his reproductive powers are employed in a 
sexual relationship through which new personal systems are 
formed and life is again carried forward through the 
multiplication of individuals. 
151. 
Summary of the Transitional Theory of Development. 
The Initial Situation: Non -significance. 
1st Relationship System. The Non -individual Focus. 
Differentiation. 
2nd Relationship System. The Embryonic System. 
Personalisation. 
3rd Relationship System. The Object System. 
Transactional Patterns. 
State of Mature Sociality. 
Dissolution of the Soma. 
Concentric Expansion. 
In normal processes of development relationship systems 
will evolve in an expanding pattern of concentric circles in 
which the centre is formed by the unconscious inner world 
surrounded by the objects in the environment which the 
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individual has constructed. Somewhere between the two, 
maintained by the continuous interaction of transactional 
patterns, the self is supported. Systems of relationship 
which become transformed in the course of development are not 
discarded but become encircled and transformed by the systems 
which succeed them. In the intra- uterine life, the foetus 
is surrounded by a tiny environment and has limited 
relationship systems. With the experience of birth this 
expands outwards to include the possibility of relations with 
objects, though at first the patterns of transaction are 
similar to the early ones. As a result of the first 
transaction with objects, however, there is a triple 
expansion which should again be concentric in form. Around 
the nipple the breast is structured, then the mother, the 
family and the world. At the same time the inner world is 
expanding and the inside and outside boundaries of the self 
are becoming clearly established through the operation of 
reality -testing and the growth of experience. At first the 
sense of self is inconstant and variable but it becomes more 
permanent as an increasing number of satisfactory transactions 
take place. It is only theoretically possible by postulating 
a non -existent perfect environment and unattainable optimum 
conditions for development that such concentric expansion 
could in fact take place. 
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Tangential Expansion. 
Early Object -relations and continuous interaction 
between processes of introjection and projection form the 
foundations of the ego -system of the developing person. The 
need for a perfect environment which is absolute at first 
rapidly becomes relative and in reality not all objects 
provide the means for the completion of satisfactory 
relationships. From the beginning there is a sharp contrast 
between situations in which the infant is enjoying satisfying 
relations of a positive kind, the forerunners of love 
relations with objects, and situations in which he is 
frustrated or deprived of such satisfactions, which are the 
forerunners of hate relationshipt with objects. The infant 
constructs inner and outer reality at one and the snme time, 
but it does not follow that an unsatisfying situation will 
result in the simultaneous construction of unsatisfying 
objects in inner and outer reality. What does in fact take 
place is the splitting of the object into its satisfying and 
unsatisfying aspects, and this conception is of first 
importance for the theory of psychic development. In 
transition theory, there is no qualitative difference between 
a constructed internal object and a constructed external 
object in terms of transactional patterns. The object which 
is split may therefore form a part of objective reality or 
part of the inner world, or it may be an endopsychic structure 
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itself. Freud pointed out that perception was connected 
with the rejection as well as the acceptance of stimuli and 
that when the ego receives stimuli from outside it absorbs 
them and makes them part of itself through introjection, but 
that when it rejects them it must project them as the 
judgment of their quality can be based only upon a trial 
introjection (Freud, 1925b). Melanie Klein further 
developed this view, linking the mechanisms of introjection 
and projection with the splitting of the ego by means of its 
identification with objects which are split through the ego's 
efforts to deal with anxiety (1946, p. 298). Ferenczi 
suggests that most likely every living organism reacts to 
unpleasant stimuli by fragmentation, and in human experience 
such processes are familiar in the symptomatology of 
schizophrenia. Fairbairn in turn has described the basic 
position in the psyche as a "schizoid position" which occurs 
after the unitary ego is split through the experience of 
unsatisfying early object -relations (1946, p. 147). In her 
later work, Melanie Klein combined Fairbairn's views and her 
own, using the term "paranoid- schizoid position" which 
precedes the "depressive position ", both of which are 
considered as part of normal development. Winnicot describes 
a similar process in the basic split in the undifferentiated 
environment -individual unit which may result in the development 
of the mind as a separate entity and the individual's becoming 
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seduced into a false life and the development of a false 
self. (1952, p. 224). 
These views will receive fuller consideration later, but 
it is important for transition theory to note that they may 
all be subsumed under the principle of departures from the 
theoretical optimum of development through expanding 
concentric systems. They are tangential deviations thrown 
off from the original dynamic ego- object nucleus through the 
failure of a transaction. Thus two or more systems may 
grow up side by side, each concentric and with a separate 
nucleus. The division of energy which results in this 
situation is important for psychopathology and the 
application of the intellect to the task of forming links 




The Beginnings of the Object System. 
In discussing the nature of reality it has been shown 
that belief in the existence of the self and the not -self is 
based upon the nature of the transactions between them. 
(Chapter 1) . The individual's capacity to act with reference 
to the things around him is the means by which the initial 
distinction between the perceiver and the perceived is 
maintained. This interaction precedes consciousness and the 
form of conscious transactions may be modified by the nature 
of preconscious experience. Similarly the preconscious 
experience may achieve its significance only in the light of 
consciousness. 
"The property of consciousness itself does not 
require word meanings, but a consciousness of consciousness 
requires linguistic thoughts." (Colby, 1955, p. 117). 
The processes of psychic growth bring about the 
incorporation of early systems in the systems which succeed 
them and these processes are energised by the drive towards 
relationships which is organised only in the human species 
into the drive towards objects. It is thus not until the 
object system that development reaches the level of humanity 
for the individual, though in fact all the earlier stages 
have been informed by the anticipation of this one. 
The simplest organism, the amoeba, maintains life through 
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the intake of foreign useful matter and the discharge of its 
own superfluous matter. Such taking in and expelling is the 
prototype of all relationship, and on this primordial pattern 
rests all the complicated structure of transactions between 
subject and object no matter how sophisticated they may on 
the surface appear to be. These basic processes are 
essential not only for maintaining life as in physical 
metabolism, but also for all differentiations or modifications 
of a living organism (Heimann, 1952, p. 129). The 
suggestion that these processes were also operative in mental 
life and that the human being achieves adaptation and progress 
by similar means came early in the history of psychoanalysis. 
Ferenczi introduced the concept of introjection in 1908, 
describing this as the way in which the child made mental 
progress by taking within himself more and more from his 
surroundings (Ferenczi, 1909). Freud, although he traced 
judgement "in the oldest, that is, the oral language" to 
introjection and projection, explicitly acknowledged the 
influence of introjection on the personality only after the 
decline of the Oedipus complex, when aspects of the parents 
were internalised. This assignment of introjection and 
projection to such a late stage of development was probably 
due to Freud's conception of primary narcissism, an 
autoerotic, objectless state of unintegrated instincts which 
Melanie Klein's work has done much to show does not exist in 
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the form which Freud postulated. It may be that Freud's 
views took this form because they arose from the analysis of 
adult patients whose ego- systems were already formed, 
whereas Melanie Klein was compelled to revision by her 
clinical experience with the very young. Freud argued 
backwards from the adult to the child, whereas in later years 
the tendency has been reversed in that discoveries from child 
analysis are being applied to the problems of adult 
psychoneuroses and psychoses. The Klein school have through 
their studies of primitive emotional development shown that 
the processes of introjection and projection are of much 
greater significance than was originally appreciated and 
that they are in operation much earlier than the classical 
Oedipus phase. It is through these processes that the ego 
develops through contacts with the physical systems which 
form the basis of objective reality. 
Freud described the original state as narcissistic, 
based on sensations and ruled by feelings, entirely autistic, 
not only lacking in objectivity but at the very first 
without awareness of external objects. This state he 
described as one of 'hallucination': painful stimuli either 
from within or without impinge upon the primitive body ego 
and all causal relations proceed from within the self. In 
object -relations theory this state is described as a lack of 
differentiation from the object, a complete absence of the 
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sense of self. This is in transition theory the embryonic 
relationship- system, before the processes of personalisation 
begin. The individual is not yet the unit, which is from 
the outside an undifferentiated individual -environment unit. 
The state of infantile dependence which Fairbairn describes 
is a continuation of this situation in some degree, but 
Winnicot has shown how the special state of the mother in 
this period facilitates not only the satisfaction of 
physiological needs but also the need for objects. In 
transitional terminology the transition from the embryonic 
system to the object system is achieved through the growth of 
transactions and the construction of objects. The 
establishment of the predominance of the object system requires 
a movement outwards from the infant towards things which are 
not of itself. There exists from the beginning a foundation 
for objectivity in experience, and in accordance with his 
hedonistic principle, Freud held that the psyche responds to 
the reality of its experiences by interpreting them in a 
subjective manner which increases its pleasure and preserves 
it from pain. This process, which is carried on by means of 
introjection and projection, forms the foundation of the 
fantasy -life. The final establishment of the object system 
in transition theory involves the replacement of a closed 
system of relationships by an open one. In the embryonic 
system, the environment -individual circle is complete and 
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must remain perfect for survival. There is no opportunity 
for alternative adaptations. The development of animals 
continues within such a closed system in which the whole 
field of relationships available to them is bounded by 
specialised instinct patterns. 
The growing foetus has motility and a basic drive towards 
the environment by the formations of systems of relationships 
which are potentially limitless and the nature of which is 
determined by the state of maturation which it has reached. 
The infant when it is born already has a predisposition 
towards a certain way of relating which is the result of a 
summation of motility experiences in which the beginnings 
of the 'not me' world have already been established through 
the opposition to movement. The quantity of energy initially 
in each foetus is presumably about the same but the amount of 
aggressive potential an infant carries when it is born may 
depend upon the amount of opposition to movement which has 
been encountered in the intra- uterine life. The response of 
the psyche to experience is therefore partially determined by 
the aggressive potential of the infant and by the degree of 
differentiation of the 'me' and 'not me' already reached. 
It is with this background that the child approaches 
perception of the outer world and achieves consciousness and 
awareness. He is biologically oriented to make relationships 
through his mouth and he is also ready to hallucinate. He 
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comes to the breast, therefore, hungry and devouring, ready 
not only for food but also for the relationships out of which 
the object system will arise. "He is ready to attach and 
also to hallucinate something fit to be attacked" (Winnicot, 
1945, p. 152). The mother's heightened sensitivity and 
adaptation to her infant's needs results in the actual 
nipple being presented at exactly the right moment for the 
infant's need to feed and readiness to hallucinate. This 
convergence of separate streams of process upon a central 
event is a familiar feature of evolution and development, 
and it is always in such a culmination that the beginnings 
of a transition are found. In this case the movement is 
from the state of primary identification with the object to 
a simple contact with external or shared reality in which he 
can take the bit of experience as either his hallucination or 
a piece of reality, and moments of illusion in which he 
believes both are the same. Even in the first feed there 
are associations of sight, sound, feel and smell which form 
part of his experience and help him on the next occasion to 
hallucinate what is really available. 
Freud held that it was the pleasure -pain principle 
which operated in the introjection and projection of objects. 
The subjective interpretation of experience was a defence 
against pain, hallucinatory gratification a substitute for 
real deprivation. Fairbairn argues against the pleasure -pain 
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principle on the ground that Freud's psychological hedonism 
encounters exactly the same difficulties as those which 
confronted J. S. Mill when he attempted to pass from 
psychological to philosophical hedonism. The change in 
Freud's thinking which arose from his clinical discovery of 
the oedipal situation involves a change from behaviour 
determined by pleasure - seeking to behaviour determined by 
object -seeking (Fairbairn, 1956, p. 55). In transition 
theory it is more correct to say that it is not the object 
which is sought but the establishment of a relationship 
system which is organised into an object by the whole 
individual. This is fully in accordance with Fairbairn' s 
later view that it is preferable to say that "it is the 
individual in his libidinal capacity (and not libido) which 
is object -seeking." (Fairbairn, 1957b, p. 335). The 
individual in his libidinal capacity can be taken as the 
person who has successfully passed from the embryonic system 
and is beginning to develop his object system, for in 
transition theory libido is one particular fora of the 
relationship drive the outward expression of which is always 
dependent upon states of maturation. 
The concept of inner reality was developed by Melanie 
Klein through the elaboration of Freud's concept of an internal 
psychic object, the super -ego, into a system based upon the 
multiplicity of ways in which infants internalise their 
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emotionally significant objects, good and bad. The process 
of introjection and projection in early infancy is motivated 
partly by satisfactions and the love of the mother, which may 
be seen as good external and internal conditions, and partly 
by frustrations and deprivations which are bad external and 
internal conditions. The introjection of these many objects 
is regarded by Melanie Klein as resulting from fantasies of 
oral incorporation occurring characteristically and primarily 
during the oral phase of infancy. In accordance with the 
postulate of one basic drive in transition theory, it is held 
that incorporation is not the result of a specific oral 
instinct but arises from the fact that at this stage of 
development the infant is biologically oriented to extend its 
object system through the medium of its mouth. Fairbairn 
holds that "the first social relationship established by the 
individual is that between himself and his mother in the 
suckling situation, in which his mother's breast provides the 
focal point of his libidinal object, and the mouth the focal 
point of his own libidinal attitude" (Fairbairn, 1940, p. 11). 
This view seems to assume too great a degree of organisation 
in the early oral phase where the initial relationship is not 
between child and mother, but between a sucking mouth and a 
satisfying nipple. The child is as yet at the very threshold 
of the object system with large segments of his experience 
still under the influence of the transactional patterns of the 
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embryonic system. For the construction of the breast and 
then the mother, the infant needs experience of separation 
and then reunion against the background of support provided 
by good mothering. Even then it is not until the 
relationship system of mouth and nipple widens outwards in a 
concentric expansion which includes the whole baby and the 
whole mother that a social relationship can be said to exist. 
To argue for a social situation in the period before a 
reasonable predominance of the object system is perhaps to 
create the same difficulty which arises through talking of 
a social situation among animals, which Fairbairn does in 
another context (Fairbairn, 1956, p. 52). 
In the early stages of the object system experience of 
good and bad objects is in terms of what tastes good and 
feels good in his mouth and is swallowed and what tastes bad 
and feels nasty and gets spat out. Initially what is 
experienced is the perception of a number of separate 
sensations associated with situations which through the use 
of illusion the child rapidly organises. When he 
hallucinates the breast in his first feed he not only 
establishes a system of relationships in the inner world 
and a similar system in the outer world, all closely bound 
up with his sensations, he also takes an important step 
towards singling himself out as an object among the objects 
around him and establishing patterns of his transactions with 
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them. 
There are obvious differences between the objects which 
comprise the world of objective reality and the objects which 
comprise the inner world of individuals. The systems of 
relationship in the outer world are between differentiated 
objects which play different parts in the systems of 
different people. Although perceived differently, there 
is a core of reality which is reflected in the actions of 
people with reference to them and the habit of people in 
referring to them as persisting elements in their experience. 
The components of fantasy on the other hand differ from those 
of external reality in that they cannot be touched or 
pointed at and form no part of common experience although 
they may depend upon the common experience of the past. 
The difficulty which arises here is to discover in what way 
the mechanism of introjection is connected with the fantasy 
of incorporation, and how a concrete body can be taken inside 
the self. Fairbairn believes (1949) that Melanie Klein has 
never satisfactorily explained how fantasies of incorporating 
objects orally can give rise to the establishment of internal 
objects at all. The difficulty is not apparent if the basic 
drive towards relationship is assumed. Freud described 
instincts as having a source, an object and an aim. The 
source lay in biological processes, the aim describes the 
behaviour to which an instinct compels and an object comprises 
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the elements in reality which embody the means for the 
fulfilment of the aim. In transition theory the aim is 
always the establishment of a relationship but the quality 
of this is modified by the biological state of the organism. 
This drive towards relationship is constantly active, and 
does not require a specific stimulus to initiate it, although 
a specific stimulus may modify it. It represents the 
endowed energy of the individual. The end is always the 
completion of a relationship system appropriate to the 
satisfaction of the biological need, when the basic drive 
energises the search for other relationships through which 
development and evolution may go forward. It requires an 
organising act of perception to create an object out of 
the data of sense impressions and such a mental act may be 
expressed as a relationship system between the individual 
and the external world. This relationship is mediated as 
are all relationship systems by transactions between 
physical systems and psychic forces within the psychic 
apparatus. The organising act may take place in response to 
messages which come from without or within or most usually 
from a mixture of both. Hence the act of organisation 
required for the organisation of a percept must closely 
resemble those at work in the production of fantasy, and it 
is only because no psychic event takes place within a 
vacuum, but always within a framework of other percepts, 
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memories, associations and purposive actions that the 
distinction can be made between internal and external 
constructs. In the same way as the drive to relationship 
expresses itself in the movement outwards from the person 
towards objective reality, it expresses itself in a 
movement towards inner reality which is still, as it were, 
directed outwards from the person: the movement is always 
in the same direction. Through this new relationship 
systems may be organised into fantasies of internal 
objects. The act of introjection therefore consists in 
setting up new or modifying old systems of relationship by 
permitting interaction with them within the psychic apparatus 
of systems established through acts of perception in outer 
reality. At the same time, systems of relationship which 
have been established between the individual and objective 
reality are themselves continuously modified by the internal 
systems which are in operation, which is how the complementary 
process of projection takes place. There is a sense in 
which the outer world is more real than the inner world and 
the situation of the individual in his environment more 
clearly apprehended by perception than by fantasy. This 
cannot be explained in terms of innate qualities, but only 
with reference to actions. The ultimate dependence of man 
upon his biological heritage is made manifest when it is 
realised that the criterion by which perception is judged to 
168. 
be more valid than hallucination is a criterion of 
psycho -biological adaptation. The psyche, which forms the 
meeting place of the inner and outer worlds, is 
unequivocably the product of biological evolution. 
Freud held that in the beginning of mental life 
"whatever was thought of (desired) was simply imagined in 
hallucinatory form as still happens in our dream thoughts 
every night" (Freud, 1911). This he called the child's 
"attempt at satisfaction by hallucination". The readiness 
to hallucinate is part of the approach to the breast and the 
experience of being mothered determines the way in which the 
infant's fragmentary hallucinations will be organised into 
objects. The type of relationship is modified by the stage 
of the child's maturation which is closely connected with 
his power of organising his systems of relationships with the 
environment into a coherent system of objects sufficiently 
like the systems of other people for action in the common 
world to be possible. At first all transactions between 
the inner world and objective reality are conducted by the 
primitive mechanisms of introjection and projection, unmodified 
by the intervention of mind and in classic Freudian theory 
the infant passes from actions dictated by the pleasure 
principle to actions at the agency of the reality principle. 
For Freud the disappointing nature of hallucinatory 
satisfaction was the beginning of adaptation to reality: 
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because hunger is not satisfied by hallucinating the breast, 
the infant is forced to turn to the external world. This 
means taking a negative view of the approach to reality as it 
is through frustration that the infant comes to make his 
adaptive acceptance of it. The approach to reality in 
transition theory is a positive one, in search of the real 
relief and satisfaction provided by the completion of 
systems of relationship appropriate to the infant's needs. 
Real milk is more satisfying than hallucinated milk. It is 
equally true that fantasy is initially positive, not an 
escape from the frustrations of reality, though it may later 
form part of a defence against objects. Relationship 
systems consist of a multitude of units of relationship at 
various levels of organisation extending from the single cell 
or single mental process to the whole person or beyond. Each 
of these elements has to establish its own system for the 
larger unit to expand and not all of them are successful as 
no individual in fact attains the perfect concentric 
expansion of systems. At the level of the person, 
unsatisfactory relationships are the cause of anxiety, but 
they are the result of failures at different levels of 
adaptation which may be persisting from the embryonic system 
or even from the non -individual focus. Thus the expansion 
of systems is achieved by successive advance and retreat of 
elements of relationship depending upon whether or not they are 
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successful in establishing their own new systems and this 
emerges at the level of the person as a mixture of positive 
and negative approaches to relationships within the object - 
system. Sometimes a. relationship system which cannot be 
established without may be established within, and both 
reality thinking and fantasy represent different ways in 
which the drive to relationship becomes transformed into a 
system of human relationships in which both sorts of 
thinking play an indispensable part. 
In their primitive form, fantasies are experienced as 
sensations but in their developed form they represent a way 
of expanding relationships which differs from that employed 
in reality thinking. Early fantasies are of bodily 
sensations because at this time the relationship systems 
for which the infant is adapted are all based upon the 
satisfaction of simple physical needs, but as the process of 
personalisation takes place the drive to relationships becomes 
more and more expressed through the medium of the establishment 
of elaborate systems in the outer world arising from 
experience and learning of physical things. This is 
facilitated by the development of the powers of the mind and 
the increasing use of symbols. Under this explanatory scheme 
it is unnecessary to invoke the two principles of operation, 
the pleasure principle and the reality principle, as the 
basic drive to relationships is fundamental to all fantasy and 
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all reality thinking and manifests itself in object seeking 
on the part of the whole individual. The nature of the 
objects which comprise the adult object- system becomeSmore 
elaborate with the growth of individual experience. The 
basis of reality- testing is not the sublimation of 
instinctual drives but the evolution of more distinctively 
human relationship systems by the recruitment of the 
specially human powers and faculties to the expansion of 
systems. 
Inner and outer worlds are structured simultaneously by 
the operation of mental processes which constantly blend and 
are interdependent. Reality thinking cannot operate without 
the support of concurrent unconscious fantasies, but at the 
same time the development of fantasy without the parallel 
development of a sense of objective reality is intolerable, 
as there are no limits to its magic, its power to hurt and to 
annihilate. Development is marked by the emergence of 
systems of relationship between the individual and objects in 
the world of reality and similar systems between the individual 
and objects in the inner world. Transactions take place 
through the medium of the psychic apparatus between the 
object -systems of the inner and those of the outer world. As 
this bridge of transactional patterns begins to be built in 
childhood, unconscious fantasies are primarily about bodies 
and very primitive functions and display systems of 
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relationship and transactional patterns based upon the very 
earliest experience. Through the enlargement of the external 
world they become more elaborate and capable of expression, 




T let apsycho1ogica1 Aspects of a Theory of TTransition. 
The word ' metapsychology' was first used by Freud in 
order to express the fact that he was concerned with data which 
went beyond conscious awareness and belonged to the realm of 
the unconscious which his new method of scientific investigation 
had caused him to hypothesise. 
"A presentation which seeks to estimate, not only 
the topographical and lnamic, but also the economic 
element is the most complete that we can at present 
imagine, and deserves to be distinguished by the term 
metapsychological." (Freud, 1920, p. 1). 
Psychoanalysis, however, developed as an empirical 
historical science and the practice of therapy, the 
construction of theory and the accumulation of research data 
proceeded simultaneously. As a result the distinction 
between the pure and applied aspects of psychoanalysis was 
not always clearly made in Freud's writings. Psychoanalytic 
research continues to be conducted almost exclusively through 
therapeutic practice, and as a result there is still perhaps 
too great an emphasis upon applied aspects and the retention 
of outmoded theoretical concepts owing to their simplicity 
and convenience in the therapeutic situation. Psychoanalysis 
has now perhaps reached the point which has been passed in 
many other sciences, at which two sets of constructs must be 
devised and two languages used for the differentiation 
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between its pure and applied aspects. (Colby, 1955, p. 146). 
The use of such a double set of concepts is familiar in the 
physical sciences, and in any attempt to classify scientific 
data it is usually possible to use alternative explanations 
in quite different terms. In physics, for instance, the 
phenomena of light may be considered in terms of wave or 
photon theories, and it is important to be clear within 
which framework of constructs a given event is being 
considered at a particular moment. It is a feature of 
the advance of science, also, that the devising of new 
constructs follows upon the discovery of new data and may 
form an integral part of new theories. 
The position of physics as the most advanced natural 
science has had the effect that in modern times thought is 
always dominated by the current conceptions of the physical 
universe and this had an undoubted effect upon Freud when 
he came to seek a theoretical model for an explanation of 
the nature of the psychic apparatus. The result was a system 
of 'impulse' psychology in accordance with the atomistic 
theories of the school of Helmholtz. This was facilitated 
by Freud's initial preoccupation with the nature of the 
repressed which resulted in his formulation of a system in 
which the controlling ego mastered instinct derivatives in 
deference to the pressures of outer reality. When he turned 
his attention to depression and obsessional neurosis, he 
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became more concerned with the instigator of repression, 
which he conceived as a kind of moral reinforcement of the 
controlling ego which he called the super -ego. Repression 
had been considered mostly in terms of function up till then, 
but with this formulation Freud began to take into account 
considerations of structure and evolved a model of the whole 
psyche in these terms. The result was very like the 
classical tripartite division of body, mind and spirit, 
with the id representing the base of instinct derivatives, 
the ego that part of the primary self which evolves through 
adaptation to the conditions of the environment and the 
super -ego over all as the instigator of repression and the 
internal representatives of authoritative parent figures 
introjected as part of the resolution of the Oedipus complex. 
He described repression as an activity carried out by the 
ego "in the service of and at the behest of the super -ego" 
and the repressed consisted of wishes arising from an 
instinctive source which conflicted with the demands imrosed 
by the super -ego upon theego. This scheme has the 
disadvantage of resting upon a mixed classification as the 
id is a concept energised by biological forces while ego and 
super -ego are dependent upon psychic energy. Freud held that 
the ego had its origins in the id and was "a part of the id 
which has been specially modified" (Freud, 1923, p. 51 -2). 
"Originally, of course, everything was id, the ego was 
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developed out of the id by the continual influence of the 
external world" (Freud, 1940, p. 43). He speaks of a 
gradual differentiation of the ego from the id, and the 
process is seen to end in the opposition of the highly 
organised structure of the ego and the unorganised, 
inherited mass of instinctive drives which is the id. 
Alexander finds this unsatisfactory, as "learning starts 
immediately at birth and it is therefore difficult to see 
at what period the sharp distinction between an unorganised 
id and an organised ego obtains" (Alexander, 1949). 
Hartmann, iris and Loewenstein suggest that there is an 
undifferentiated phase during which both the id and the ego 
are formed and that differentiation takes place through the 
alternate experience of deprivation and gratification in the 
infant's early life. (1946, p. 19 -20) . This is in close 
accordance with Winnicot's views on early mother -child 
relations. 
Freud's use of the term 'ego' is ambiguous, as 
sometimes in his writings it denotes a psychical organisation 
and sometimes a whole person. (Hartmann, 1946, p. 16). In 
addition to this, his conception of the ego underwent change 
and development. Freud's ego is an organ of adaptation, 
that part of the primary self which meets the demands of the 
environment by modifications of itself. Before the 
publication of "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (1920), it was 
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mainly a repressive, censoring agency, but with the 
development of his theory of narcissism, it became more 
comprehensive, in fact constituting "the whole person, the 
unitary total psychic self, the primary reservoir of 
libidinal and aggressive energies." In The Ego and the Id" 
(1923) he again restricts the ego to an anxiety- motivated 
adaptation to the demands of outer reality while the rest of 
the total self is relegated to the impersonal id, and he 
ascribes to perception the processes by which the ego becomes 
differentiated from the id. "In the ego perception plays 
the part which in the id devolves upon instinct" (Freud, 1923, 
p. 30). The id is not, however, a passive receptor of 
stimuli, but has a searching quality, meeting stimuli halfway 
and accepting or rejecting them in terms of the oral instinctive 
impulses. 
Consideration of the nature of repression led Freud to 
postulate a structure capable of instigating it, and the 
tripartite theory of the psychic organisation was completed 
by the concept of the super -ego. This, he considered, was 
formed roughly about the fifth year of life. It occurred at 
the time of the decline of the Oedipus complex and it was 
largely a moral phenomenon. The association of the super -ego 
with the decline of the Oedipus complex meant that its 
emergence was much later than the formation of the ego. 
Melanie Klein believes as a result of her clinical findings 
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that the processes of introjection and projection which are 
at work from earliest infancy bring about the internalisation 
of the parent figures much earlier than the classical 
Oedipus phase. This has led her to develop a view of the 
unconscious as an inner world in which complex relationships 
of the ego with internal objects are actively maintained. 
She has not proceeded from this to a revision of Freud's 
psychodynamic theory, but has accepted the existing id, ego 
and super -ego analysis of structure and the Freudian duality 
of instinct, fitting her own discoveries into this existing 
framework. Fairbairn, however, has made Melanie Klein' s 
work the basis of a thorough revision of the Freudian system 
and has developed a complete new formulation of dynamic 
endopsychic structure. 
A brief summary of Fairbairn's view of ego development 
would begin with an infant who is a whole ego from the 
beginning, seeking good, satisfying relations with the 
natural objects of his needs. Ego development is determined 
by the kind of object -relations he experiences and particularly 
by the degree of frustration of natural libidinal needs which 
is imposed on him by the environment. As a result of the 
ego's efforts to deal with the experience of rejecting objects, 
processes of splitting of both ego and object take place, 
resulting in the emergence of two factors in the personality, 
the libidinal and the anti- libidinal factor. The first of 
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these is primary, based upon instinct, while the second is 
secondary and is based upon an identification with rejecting 
parent figures. Fairbairn' s theory is throughout in 
personal terms, and he envisages a "basic endopsychic 
situation" in which there is a system of three endopsychic 
structures, the libidinal and antilibidinal egos and the 
central ego, which are in a dynamic relationship. The 
libidinal and anti -libidinal egos are repressed by the 
central ego, a situation which corresponds to Freud's 
description of the repression of the id impulses by the ego 
at the instigation of the super -ego. At a deeper level, 
however, Fairbairn holds that the libidinal ego is itself 
repressed by the anti- libidinal ego. This conception, 
which has the advantage of being in terms of personal 
relationships and dynamic ego structure, provides an 
alternative to Freud's tripartite model of the psyche which 
was conceived in terms of biological instincts and moral 
inhibitions. 
The basis of Fairbairn's theory is that 'impulses' are 
the dynamic aspect of endopsychic structures and cannot be 
said to exist in the absence of such structures, however 
immature these may turn out to be. This is contrary to the 
Freudian theory that the id is a source of energy without 
structure, and that the ego is wholly energised by the id: 
it involves the conclusion that while Freud's view of the 
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function of the ego in regulating the discharge of instinct 
tension is relatively unaffected, the ego must be considered 
as itself a source of instinct tension from the beginning. 
Fairbairn's theory repudiates the pleasure principle except 
as a secondary principle of behaviour coming into operation 
in proportion as the reality principle fails to operate. 
Fairbairn's position not only makes it impossible further to 
maintain the distinction between the id and the ego, but also 
has important effects upon the concept of the ego itself. 
Freud's definition of the ego makes it dependent upon 
its primary function of perception, a fact which is of 
central importance for a transitional theory of personality, 
since perception is itself a system of relationships of a 
highly sophisticated kind which are successors to the simple 
relationship systems of the embryonic system. The movement 
from such simple systems based upon purely biological needs 
to complex systems based upon perception and symbol formation 
is part of the transition from infantile dependence and is 
concurrent with the development of the individual from the 
undifferentiated state through the process of personalisation 
to the beginnings of the object system. One of the crucial 
questions for psychology is how the transition is made from 
biological to personal or social concepts which need not 
necessarily be mutually exclusive. In Freud's tripartite 
model of the psychic apparatus this transition took the form 
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of the development of the ego out of the unorganised id, 
which suffers from the disadvantage of postulating two 
different orders of concept and two different sources of 
energy, within and without. 
Winnicot describes the beginnings of development in 
terms of a state of unintegration from which emergence is 
gradual, through an increasing number of transactions between 
the psyche and soma aspects of the growing person, until the 
live body "is felt by the individual to form the core for 
the imaginative self ". (Winnicot, 1954, p. 244). In some 
cases the mind will 'oe found to develop a. false entity and 
a false localisation, but in satisfactory development "mind 
is no more than a special case of the functioning of the 
psyche -soma." (Winnicot, 1954, p. 244). This seems to be a 
more profound reassessment of the Freudian position than can be 
explained in terms of "equating body and id, mind and ego" 
(Guntrip, 1956, p. 90) . Winnicot recognises that the 
mind- psyche is pathological and in a further paper he 
describes a patient who had developed such dissociated 
function of intellect. Under a deep regression in analysis 
"the false self gradually became a 'caretaker self' and only 
after some years could the caretaker self become handed over 
to the analyst, and the self surrender to the ego" (Winnicot, 
1955, P. 281) (My underlining) . It seems that what Winnicot 
describes as the 'true self' is neither id nor ego in Freud's 
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sense, and that the psyche -soma represents the primary, 
natural self which. in normal development would form the basis 
of the ego. Although Winnicot himself has not suggested 
that his views require a revision of the Freudian model, 
these descriptions seem to be closely in accord with the 
concentric scheme of normal development, a fact which seems 
to emerge clearly from Winnicot's view of regression which 
the two following extracts describe. 
"We can build theories of instinct development and 
agree to leave out the environment, but there is no 
possibility of doing this in regard to formulation of 
early ego development. We must always remember, I 
suggest, that the end result of our thinking about ego 
development is primary narcissism. In primary 
narcissism the environment is holding the individual 
and at the same time, the individual knows of no 
environment and is at one with it" (Winnicot, 1954, 
p. 283). 
"For me the word regression simply means the 
reverse of progress. This progress itself is the 
evolution of the individual, psyche -soma, personality 
and mind with (eventually) character formation and 
socialisation. Progress starts from a date certainly 
prior to birth. There is a biological drive behind 
progress." (Winnicot, 1954, p. 280). 
The individual's origins in an individual- environment 
unit makes more cogent Alexander's objection (1949, p. 83) 
that it is difficult to see when the change takes place from 
an unorganised id to an organised ego, for the interaction 
between the individual and the environment began in the 
intra- uterine state. A consideration of the nature of 
psychic energy may help to elucidate how this takes place and 
may offer some explanation of how the interaction between 
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physical and psychical forces is possible. 
Fairbairn holds that Freud approached psychological 
problems from the a priori standpoint that psychical energy 
is essentially distinct from psychic structure, but it is 
doubtful whether this was indeed the case. Freud did define 
libidinal aims in terms of erotogenic zones, while Fairbairn 
says: 
"The real libidinal aim is the establishment of 
satisfactory relationships with objects, and it is 
accordingly the object that constitutes the libidinal 
goal. At the same time the form assumed by the 
libidinal approach is determined by the nature of the 
object." ( Fairbairn, 1946, p. 138). 
It can be seen that Fairbairn considers the goal of the 
object and the aim of relationship to be equivalent. 
Transition theory prefers to make a distinction, however, for 
this seems to be of some importance in a theory of ego 
development where the existence of an object demands the 
participation of the intellect. The form of the libidinal 
approach, it is suggested, is not determined by the nature of 
the object: rather it is the object which is determined by 
the nature of the approach. The nature of the object is 
dependent upon the nature of the relationship, as it is 
through the experience of similar relations and past 
transactions that the object has been structured in this 
particular way. Thus while Fairbairn correctly associates 
energy and structure and is also correct in following this 
to the conclusion that the only changes which are intelligible 
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are changes in structural relationships and relationships 
between structures (Fairbairn, 1946, p. 150), he fails to 
place enough emphasis upon the fact that an object is itself 
a structure, though he does on one occasion acknowledge that 
this is the case (Fairbairn, 1944, p. 132). As a result, 
he perpetuates the separation of mental and physical 
aspects of functioning which stands in the way of establishing 
a satisfactory genetic continuity between the behaviour of 
men and of animals on the one hand, and between social man and 
between the rudimentary environment -individual unit on the 
other. 
Freud was undoubtedly hampered in his theoretical 
formulations by the contemporary mechanist and associationist 
climate of thought, yet it is difficult to read him without 
gaining the impression that for him the theoretical unit of 
psychic life was always a complete, dynamic process. It is 
the case that he considered energy apart from structure, but 
concepts such as fixation, displacement, sublimation or 
withdrawal of libido are permissible theoretical abstractions. 
Fairbairn has assumed an implied conflict between structure 
and energy in Freud's writings which did not in fact exist. 
The difficulty is once more of levels of abstraction, and of 
relating pure theory to working clinical hypotheses. Fairbairn 
claims that his "basic endopsychic situation" provides an 
explanation of the structure of the psyche in terms of personal 
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relationships, and in particular with conflicts between love 
and hate relationships. He has demonstrated that his views 
have a direct relevance to therapy (Fairbairn, 1958), and 
it is suggested that it is at the clinical level that the 
personal object- relations frame of reference is most useful 
while questions of energy and structure are best considered 
at a level of abstraction beyond the personal. 
Brierley has suggested that the term 'personology' might 
be used to distinguish between the science of personality and 
metapsychology, thus making the distinction between the pure 
and applied aspects of the study of mental life. 
Psychoanalytic personology studies the person as a unity, 
living as a psycho -physical organism in reciprocal 
relationships with a psycho -physical or socio- physical 
environment. (Brierley, 1951, p. 124 -5). Metapsychology on 
the other hand follows the natural trend of science towards 
depersonalisation and assumes that the mental process, which 
is a wave or current of activity, is the hypothetical unit. 
Thus a dynamic person- object relationship in personology 
becomes an ego- object system in metapsychology. 
metapsychology has come to have a more precise meaning 
than Freud gave it, referring to dynamic genetic, structural 
and economic aspects of psychic processes which are 
themselves considered as of a unitary nature. Behind this 
is the basic scientific assumption of an ordered organisation 
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subject to laws which may be discovered. The dynamic -genetic 
approach is an attempt to investigate the laws which regulate 
how enregistered experience becomes integrated with 
maturational growth processes to govern personality and 
behaviour. Structural or topographic terminology is used to 
hypothesise the type of organisation within which this 
integration takes place while economic constructs are 
concerned with the quantities and distribution of energy 
within this structure. Postulating the existence of an 
order of psychic activity of course produces the logical 
difficulty that the discovery of such an order indicates only 
that the psychic apparatus itself must be an organisation. 
It represents an element in reality and is organised because 
reality is organised. The apparent circularity cannot be 
avoided, but interdependent definitions such as time and 
motion are quite commonly found in the physical sciences. 
These logical problems have been more fully discussed, 
however, in Chapter 1, though it should be emphasised that 
the metapsychologist's approach to psychological data is not 
the approach of a philosopher but rather resembles the 
physicist's approach to the study of the structure of the 
atom. 
The dynamic aspect or drive of a process may be 
distinguished from the quantity of excitation or mental energy 
involved. In Fenichel' s view the concept of a 'quantity' of 
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mental energy is justifiable as a scientific working 
hypothesis (Fenichel, 1946). The cathexis energy of ideas 
and other mental processes in the psychic apparatus has been 
related to the frequency period, synchrony and dysynchrony 
of pulsations, and a cyclic -circular model of psychic 
structure has been suggested which successfully demonstrates 
the integration of two sets of conditions, internal 
biological factors and external environmental factors (Colby 
1955). This formulation overcomes some of the main 
objections to Freud's tripartite model and is more in 
accordance with modern advances in the physical sciences. 
The hydraulic metaphor employed in the neuronal model, 
the picket model and finally the tripartite model, Freud's 
three successive attempts at a description of the psychic 
apparatus, postulated a fixed amount of energy throughout the 
apparatus. Increase of energy in one area was accompanied 
by a corresponding decrease in another, like water in a 
system of pipes. Colby's model, however, postulates 
schemas of structural organisation which have an autonomous 
activity which is modified, not given, by the nature of the 
signals they receive. The activity of these schemas is 
pulsatile and discontinuous, and particular schemas have 
particular frequencies. By the modification of these 
frequencies physical energy which originates outside the 
organism sets off cathexis energy processes in a chain 
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reaction manner. In this cyclic model consciousness and 
unconsciousness are proT erties of systems and not the names 
of spatial areas. (Colby 1955). 
Transition theory does not hold, as Brierley does, that 
instinct is the stimulus to psychic activity ( Brierley, 1951, 
p. 106), but that psychical activity is continuous and 
similar in forth to the autorhythmic activity to which 
reference is made in Chapter 6, or the continuous background 
activity recorded in an electroencephalogram. It is an 
expression of the same form of energy which is the force 
behind instinct and it is therefore equally true to say that 
psychical activity is a transformation of instinct or that 
all instinctive activity is psychic in nature. There is a 
continuity of process between simple cell division and the 
diversity of human relationships. The cyclic- circular 
model for the translation of physical into psychic energy 
which has been suggested by Colby is a reasonable hypothesis 
of the apparatus which will perform this function. Instinct 
throughout the evolutionary continuum may be seen as a 
variable dimension and similarly the apparatus for the 
conversion of physical energy into psychic process must 
undergo changes throughout the course of the individual's 
development which can be seen only at the personal level as 
successive relationship systems. Development is transitional 
in that it involves the substitution of new systems in which 
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the old are caught up and transformed. Glover concluded 
that the strength or weakness of the ego arose from the 
degree of integration of various early nuclear components. 
If these early nuclei retained autonomic functions they 
used up energy and prevented it from being distributed 
among more integrated layers (Glover, 1943). This is close 
to the position of transition theory in which successful 
development depends upon concentric expansion in which each 
new system encircles those which have gone before and the 
energy which activated the old system continues to play its 
part in activating the new. The strength or weakness of 
the ego depends upon the relative success and permanence of 
these transitions. adhere earlier relationship- systems 
remain energised, these prevent the successful development 
of later systems. The important difference which lies 
between transition theory and Glover's nuclear theory is 
that Glover speaks of the integration of various primitive but 
relatively independent ego- systems, but transition theory holds 
that there is a unit from the beginning which emerges from the 
non- individual focus a complete but not necessarily permanent 
whole, fluctuating and liable to fragmentation from the first 
through failures in transactions with the environment. 
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CHAPTER 10. 
A Transitional Theory of Childhood. 
The period between the individual's passage from the 
embryonic system to arrival at his own personal approximation 
to the state of mature sociality is described by Fairbairn as 
marked by conflict between the progressive urge to surrender 
the infantile attitude of identification with the object and 
a regressive urge to maintain that attitude. In transition 
theory this period can be divided into two parts, the first 
of which is characterised by oscillations between the 
lingering embryonic system and the establishment of the 
early object system, while the second is characterised by 
conflicts between transactional patterns appropriate to the 
early object system and those appropriate to a state of mature 
sociality. Fairbairn's theory of instinct results in his 
holding the view that the 'transitional stage' is accompanied 
by a gradual change in libidinal aim, whereby the original 
oral, sucking, biting, incorporative or predominantly 'taking' 
aim comes to be replaced by a mature, non -incorporating and 
predominantly 'giving' aim, comparable with developed genital 
sexuality. In transition theory, the aim of the basic drive, 
which is the establishment of a system of relationships 
appropriate to the stage of development which the. individual 
has reached, accords with Fairbairn's view that "it is 
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axiomatic that no scheme of libidinal development can be 
satisfactory unless it is based upon a consideration of the 
natural and biological objects of the developing individual 
at various stages." (1946, p. 144). In the early stages 
of the object -system, the breast is the appropriate 
biological object, which should be replaced in the natural 
course of development by the genital organs of the chosen 
partner. The stage which intervenes, however, is one in 
which no appropriate biological object may be distinguished 
and thus it must despite its length and complexity be 
considered purely as an intermediate stage. The process 
of development is marked at the same time, however, by 
the expansion of the closed mouth- breast circle of the 
embryonic system into a complex open system of personal 
relationships of great variety and subtle shades of 
difference. As a result, passage from the dominance of the 
embryonic system makes it no longer possible to consider 
relationships purely in terms of the appropriate biological 
object and while this first transition may be expressed as 
a change of system, the second is expressed in terms of 
modification of transactional patterns. This is because 
while failure to achieve successful passage through the first 
transition is immediately obvious as a gross developmental 
defect, there are a variety of techniques and individual 
differences in the transactional patterns adopted. It is 
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only in the most extreme cases that these patterns are so 
deviant that they result in pathology. It can be seen that 
transition to the early object system depends upon the 
experience of good early object -relations, while transition 
to mature sociality depends upon a combination of this factor 
with the transactional patterns developed in the intermediate 
stage. Often the attainment of an acceptable predominance 
of patterns of mature sociality may be hampered by 
developmental failures from earlier stages, which may remain 
undisclosed until environmental demands at puberty or 
adolescence, or perhaps not until adult life, demonstrate 
their presence through their inability to provide a basis 
for effective transactional patterns. The early 
object- system is formed in the period between infancy and 
five or six years of age, while the later object -system is 
concurrent with the emergence of transactional patterns and 
being an open system has no finite boundary in space or 
terminus in time. The adult transactional patterns, however, 
are largely established by late adolescence, although there 
are considerable individual variations in this. That part 
of the early object- system in which the embryonic system 
still predominates corresponds to the early and late oral 
passes of Abraham's revision (1924). The establishment of 
transactional patterns in transition theory overlaps the late 
oral phase and includes his two anal phases and the early 
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genital (phallic) phase. The majority of transactional 
patterns are established in the stage which Freud described 
as the ' latency period' , following upon the development of 
the super -ego. 
With the transition to the object -system it becomes 
possible to consider development in terms of object- relations 
and the inner world, which begin with the infants first 
transactions with objective reality. Classical Freudian 
theory describes object -relations as taking place only after 
the passing of the Oedipus complex, somewhere between the 
ages of three and five, and as a result of the consequent 
internalisation of aspects of the parents the psychic 
structure of the super -ego emerges. In Freud's theory, 
the emergence of the super -ego makes a decisive change from 
the determination of behaviour by the pleasure principle to 
the regulation of conduct with reference to object- relations. 
Although he came to attribute great importance to pre- Oedipal 
fixation on the mother, particularly in women (1932) and 
recognised that the true Oedipus complex might appear 
prematurely, he continued to hold the apparently conflicting 
views that the super -ego arises from the ruins of the Oedipus 
complex and yet that it contributes to its decline. The 
only consistent explanation of this is that the formation of 
the super -ego represents the culmination of a long process of 
introjection and projection which began early in infancy 
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(Heimann, 1952, p. 134). The establishment of the super -ego 
can therefore be considered as the attainment of a new level 
of structural organisation, under which the old level persists. 
(Fairbairn, 1544, p. 93). This is in accordance with the view 
of transition theory that the transactional patterns of the 
object -system are developments of those of the embryonic 
system, but that the increasing participation of the intellect 
brings about their organisation and increased complexity. 
Freud's concept of the super -ego as a moral factor in which 
conscience reinforced the controlling ego was a considerable 
theoretic advance, and meant that a change from a scheme of 
development in terras of the increasing mastery of instinct 
derivatives to consideration of conflict between psychic 
structures as theoretical wholes within the larger unit of 
the total ps yche. (Guntrip, 1956, p. 88). The development 
of this concept goes some way towards explaining the 
specially human quality of conscience and of effecting the 
important transition from biologically determined behaviour 
to actions controlled by thought. 
The origins of the Oedipus complex lie in the 
developing functions of the ego, which Freud described as the 
"surface part of the id" (1523). It serves as the mediator 
between inside and outside occurrences and it discharges this 
function through the medium of perception; in this way it 
becomes aware of the outer world and emerges as the seat of 
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consciousness. The increasing differentiation between ego 
and id is accomplished through perception which is concerned 
not only with admitting suitable stimuli, but also with 
rejecting those which are dangerous. The ego is directed 
by the instincts because it forms part of the id and must 
express the needs of the id. Transition theory, however, 
does not have the problem of accounting for the differentiation 
of the organised ego from. the unorganised id, as through its 
postulate of a single drive towards relationships the concept 
of the id is no longer required. The ego arises with the 
1Dersona1isation of the child and theoretically the ego- object 
system is the concentric expansion of the preceding 
non -differentiated embryonic system. Perception is closely 
bound up with the processes of introjection and projection 
and is a variable function, depending upon the degree of 
maturation of the organism. It requires participation of 
the intellect and cannot at any stage be divorced from 
object -relations. Under oral primacy, perceptions are 
confined to sensations received by mouth and this gradually 
becomes organised together with memory, association and 
selective attention into consciousness and rationality. Thus 
while introjection and projection are the characteristic 
transactional patterns of the embryonic system, perception, 
which. transforms and embodies these functions becomes the 
characteristic transactional pattern of the early object -system. 
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The system of relationship appropriate to the embryonic 
system is based upon primary identification, which Fairbairn 
has described as the cathexis of an object which has not yet 
been differentiated from the cathecting subject (1941, p. 34, 
note). Freud held that this state of narcissism was replaced 
by "the anaclitic choice of objects" which Fairbairn prefers 
to call "relationships with differentiated objects ". This 
transition involves not only the development of intellectual 
functions but also the abandonment of relationships based 
upon an attitude of oral incorporation. Thus ego 
development may be seen as involving at one and the same time 
a movement away from primary identification, the establishment 
of a vehicle other than the mouth through which relationships 
may be established and an increase in the intellectual 
components of perception. In transition theory it is of 
first importance that differentiation involves not only the 
object but also the subject and that the increasing clarity 
of perception of objects means the increasing clarity of the 
self as perceiver. The successful establishment of the 
object- system as a successor to the embryonic system depends 
upon the organised participation of mind which plays an 
increasingly important part as the embryonic system becomes 
more completely absorbed within the growing object system. 
When the child passes successfully through the stage of 
personalisation_ and begins to integrate previously dissociated 
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and isolated aspects of relationship into the concept of a 
person it is not one person he meets, but many, and his own 
relationship systems have to be extended not only to include 
their systems but also the systems of relationship between 
them. Initially, he meets two persons, his father ana his 
mother, and enters upon a triangular type of object -relation, 
which Foulkes calls "the model of three" (1957, p. 327) and 
which has a special significance as it represents the origins 
of the Oedipus complex. This situation is at one level 
the prototype of all the group situations which he will meet 
throughout life. At another level it is complicated by the 
persistence of elements which are left over from the early 
object system. In Freudian terms these are the Oedipal 
wishes directed towards the parent of the opposite sex, which 
are expressed through the "polymorphously perverse" nature of 
the infant's instinctive strivings, so that oral, urethral, 
anal and genital impulses are united in a chaotic mass and 
the child interprets the facts of the parent's relationship 
in terms of his own impulses. With the establishment of a 
genital primacy, realistic perception develops along with a 
greater knowledge of the different bodily parts and functions. 
There is then a crystallisation of the child's heterosexual 
object-choice and the limitation of rivalry and hatred for 
the parent of the same sex to the genital sphere. Freud 
advanced several reasons for the dissolution of the Oedipus 
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complex, including the biologically determined decline of the 
libidinal urges and the persistent frustration of Oedipal 
wishes which. lead to their abandonment through the operation 
of the pleasure principle. The loss involved in giving up 
the parents as sexual objects is so great that the 
mechanisms of introjection and projection come into play 
with the result that the super -ego, formed by the 
internalised parents, replaces the former Oedipus constellation. 
Thus identification with the parents and acceptance of their 
standards of behaviour takes the place of the Oedipal wishes. 
The balance between father and mother identifications 
depends upon the preponderance of positive or negative 
aspects of the complex, but its outcome is "the forming of 
a precipitate in the ego, consisting of these two 
identifications in some way combined together ". (Freud, 1923, 
p. 44) . Melanie Klein retains the framework of instinctive 
primacies but believes that the rudimentary stages of the 
super -ego are established in early infancy, when primitive 
fantasy determines the infant's relations with his objects. 
Splitting of objects into good and bad aspects leads to 
splits within the ego itself and the simultaneous establishment 
of good and bad internal and external objects. Frustration in 
the child's early relations with the breast stimulates sadism 
which is at first directed against the mother's breast in 
reality and which is heightened by oral frustration, 
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particularly at the time of weaning. These first 
introjected objects form the core of the super -ego (Klein, 
1952, p. 200, note), and the processes of super -ego 
formation, object- relations and adaptation to reality can be 
seen to be the result of an interaction between the 
projection of the individual's sadistic impulses and the 
introjection of his objects (Klein, 1932, p. 209). 
Fairbairn' s position is that the ego structures he 
envisages, the central, libidinal and anti- libidinal egos, 
are inherently dynamic structures resulting from the splitting 
of the original and single dynamic ego -structure present at 
the beginning. (Fairbairn, 1946, p. 148). Repression 
implies, in his view, a splitting of the ego, originating 
primarily as a defence against internalised bad -objects, 
and the super -ego represents an additional and later defence, 
which he calls the "moral defence ". The significance of 
the Oedipus situation lies in the fact that it represents the 
differentiation of the single object of the ambivalent (late 
oral) phase into two objects, one being an accepted object 
and the other a rejected object, each of which is identified 
with one of the parents. (Fairbairn, 1941, p. 37). The 
unsatisfying object is internalised in an attempt to solve 
the problem which it presents, which in turn initiates a 
functional and structural splitting of the ego. The moral 
component of the super -ego is the 'ideal object' which is all 
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that remains of the internalised object after its exciting 
and rejecting aspects have been split off in an attempt to 
deal with the inner conflict arising from their simultaneous 
presence and the resultant anxiety. (Guntrip, 1956, p. 96). 
Fairbairn agrees with the Freudian view that the introjection 
of the parents is a selective process and that projection 
plays a part in the formation of psychic structures. .Freud 
had emphasised the selective process when he noted that the 
super -ego was not only a deposit left by the earliest 
object- choices of the id, but also represented an energetic 
reaction- formation against these choices (1923, p. 44 -5). 
In transition theory, the participation of the person in the 
act of perception makes the conception of the splitting of 
objects an easy one to accommodate, since if the object is an 
intellectual construct it follows that in the act of 
introjection the individual will construct only the inner 
object which he wishes, embodying only those aspects of the 
external object which he himself has chosen consciously or 
unconsciously to incorporate. 
The view which is taken of the developmental process 
determines the view which is taken of the concept of 
ego -strength, which in transition theory is reflected in the 
inability to balance the objective and subjective elements of 
experience and to discriminate between the affective and 
cognitive aspects of functioning sufficiently to achieve 
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effective action in the environment. All transition is 
continuous but there is a critical stage in the development 
of the ego when the individual passes from the closed system 
to the open system and begins to develop his own ways of 
transacting with objects. A strong ego requires the 
energy which arises from a foundation_ of concentric 
relationship systems, while weakness of the ego results from 
dissipation of energy in tangential systems. The 
strengthening of the ego is the main developmental task of 
childhood and is achieved only through the emergence of 
transactional patterns which ensure maximum deployment of 
energy towards the maintenance of concentric systems. 
The drive towards relationships which was manifest in early 
infancy through transactions by means of the mouth, anus 
and genitals becomes now expressed in the development of 
personal relationships, the idea and practice of which. is 
initially tinged by these earlier transactional patterns. 
The Oedipal situation arises from the child's efforts to deal 
with personal relationships which have newly become possible 
through his ability at last to perceive a person where there 
was first a relationship exclusively in terms of oral, 
sadistic and genital fantasies. Thus the successive primacy 
of erotogenic zones form steps towards personal relations 
and the apparent weakening of the infantile sex drives after 
the passing of the Oedipal phase are due not to a predestined 
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biological diminution of libido but come about through the 
redistribution of psychic energy in the establishment of 
personal relationship systems. These systems in reality 
replace the Oedipal fantasies. 
Frustration may occur through the direction of the 
relationship drive to the biologically inappropriate object, 
a situation which in childhood is most likely to arise 
through the persistence of tangential systems surviving from 
early object- relations. In a theoretically perfect 
concentric development, the super -ego would not take the form 
of a separate internal object, but would form a series of 
transactional patterns by which the ego was related to 
objective reality. In fact the super -ego invariably forms 
a separate object by virtue of the frustrations which reality 
does impose upon every individual during his development 
through the object- system. The result is a tangential 
development in which the power of the super -ego is dependent 
upon the size of the system of which it forms the centre and 
thus the amount of energy absorbed by it. 
Freud called the stage of development which succeeds the 
passing of the Oedipus complex the "latency period" to 
indicate the termination of the first period of sexual 
development and the beginning of a time of relative stability 
in which there was less need for defence against the instincts. 
It is primarily characterised by the strengthening of the 
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defences, a process in which growing powers of cognitive 
reality -testing play an important part. The child is helped 
by going to school, where he learns basic automatisms and 
begins a system of intellectual relationships so that he is 
able to maintain his fantasy life safely separate from the 
pressures of reality: at home the two are often too closely 
bound up with one another. Freud held that it was the task 
of education "to enable the individual to take part in 
culture and to achieve this with the smallest loss of 
original energy." (1909). In libido theory this was 
achieved by the process of sublimation, which formed the 
basis of all cultural activities. In transition theory, 
however, it is held that the school performs the function of 
facilitating transition to mature sociality by a number of 
related processes, the most important of which is providing, 
like the adult world, a framework of reality to which the 
individual must adapt or against which he must rebel. 
Unlike the adult world, however, the school is flexible and 
allows for second attempts, providing a background of 
comparative security against which techniques of dealing with 
reality may be tried out. The most obvious result of passing 
from the home situation to the home and school situation is 
that the child is now subject to the influence of larger groups. 
In association with older and younger children of different 
combinations of age and sex from those whom he may have 
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encountered within his own family, he has the opportunity 
for stable identifications and a much wider personal 
object -choice. Love for and identification with teachers 
within the convention of the school situation, which should 
permit a close attachment without the intimacy of the home, 
are an invaluable experience for a child in the latency 
years who is trying to free his relationships from the 
complications of Oedipal entanglements. The school's 
function in this area may be summed up by saying that 
whatever the child's inner world may contain, or the systems 
of relationship he may have developed, it provides him with 
an opportunity of making conscious readjustments in his 
transactional patterns as well as helping him to develop new 
patterns to fit his changing situation. 
The diminution of libido which Freud considered to be 
concurrent with the passing of the Oedipus conflict was 
relative, a view which is supported by his opinion that during 
the latency period the energies of the child seem to be taken 
up with the task of resisting the temptation to masturbate. 
It is the case that the child's sexual activities are much 
less pronounced in the latency period than they are either 
before or after, but Melanie Klein has indicated that mutual 
sexual activities of various kinds are common in children 
during the latency period, while a moderate amount of 
masturbation of a non- obsessive kind is a normal occurrence 
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at all stages of the child's life. Such sexual activities, 
which are the rule in infancy, are much more frequent in 
latency and puberty than is usually supposed. This view is 
supported by Edith Buxbaum (1950) who considers that 6edipal 
feelings do not always recede or fade out so that there are 
children who appear not to have a latency period. Buxbaum 
holds that she has not seen in clinical practice a complete 
latency of sexual feelings. Generally, it seems that 
children show "an approximation to the sexual quiescence 
supposedly characteristic of the latency period" (Alpert, 
1941). Prolongation of infantile sexual activities into the 
latency period may be due to the excessive pressure of the 
super -ego which may be partially successful in the complete 
suppression of sexual activities but which may at the same 
time arouse the compulsion to indulge in such activities, 
(Iaein, 1932, p. 170). 
The view of transition theory is that the establishment 
of relationships on the basis of bodily sensations is a part 
of the embryonic system which will not normally be fully 
incorporated within genital systems until the attainment of 
some measure of mature sociality. This does not mean that 
libido has been withdrawn from one area in order to be 
employed in another, but that the earlier system has been 
expanded into the new. In such expansion, dangers to the ego 
inevitably arise. As a result, the latency period is not 
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only concerned with the establishment of relationships of an 
intellectual kind but is also characterised by defensive 
techniques which are designed to strengthen the ego by 
holding fast to reality and by placing all its energies at 
the service of repressive and anti- libidinal tendencies. 
At the same time the ego gains a great deal of support from 
the acceptance of group standards of behaviour and from the 
submergence of individual aims in group motivation. The 
absence of expression of fantasy which is in such a marked 
contrast to the earlier years does not mean that fantasy 
life is in abeyance, but that the tendency of the early 
object -system is towards de- personalisation and the development 
of cognitive reality- testing as part of a "flight to reality" 
(Searl, 1929) in which the problems of the inner world which 
are still unsolved tend to be translated into situations in 
the outer world in the attempt to deal with anxiety. 
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CHAPTER 11. 
The Establishment of Transactional Patterns. 
The personal object -system is expressed through the 
interaction between the psychic apparatus and the physical 
world, and while in the embryonic system the need for a 
perfect environment specifies in detail the nature of that 
interaction, the course of development may be traced through 
the emergence of increasingly varied and individual patterns 
of transaction. The growing participation of the intellect 
progressively reduces the importance of what is specified 
and places greater emphasis upon what is chosen. All 
relationships may be expressed in terms of transactions in 
which there is an exchange of energy between the systems 
which are the units of relationships, and the individual's 
origin is in such an interchange. In the same way as 
systems of relationship become through the organisation of 
the intellect relationships with objects, transactions become 
organised into patterns which are the basis of external 
behaviour and all functions of a person within a situation 
may ultimately be resolved into patterns of transaction. The 
development of the ego is dependent upon the emergence of 
successful patterns which are appropriate not only to the 
situation in outer reality in which the person has to live 
but also to the state of development which he has reached, 
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each successive stage having its own characteristic patterns. 
The primitive processes of introjection and projection which 
are the characteristic patterns of the embryonic system 
become transformed into techniques of object- relations 
through the growth of the object system. At the same time 
the ego system itself is maintained and elaborated by the 
multiplication of transactions. It is a postulate of 
transition theory that the self and reality are intellectual 
constructs based upon sense impressions which are themselves 
transactions. Consciousness is an awareness of 
transactions, but acceptance of the unconscious means that 
transactional patterns are not dependent upon consciousness, 
for unconscious transactions may modify conscious patterns 
or even in certain circumstances wholly determine them. As 
transactions precede the emergence of patterns, all 
transactions are at first unconscious and the operation of 
the intellect is required for the organisation of a 
transactional pattern. It therefore follows that while at 
the conscious level it is one of the main tasks of development 
to arrive at a sense of self and reality, part of the same 
process involves arriving at an idea of relationship. 
In the last resort, an individual's efficiency in life 
is determined by the quality of his ego functions, which 
Anna Freud lists as "the testing of inner and outer reality, 
the building up of memory, the synthetic function of the ego 
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and the ego -control of motility" (1945, p. 86). Assessment 
of the strength of the ego is based not upon any quantitative 
measurement of ego- forces but upon a qualitative evaluation 
of its relative efficiency in dealing with the situations 
which the individual meets in the course of his life. The 
variables in the ego -strength equation are thus the contents 
of the inner and outer worlds and in addition the ways the 
ego has developed of transacting between them. The strength 
of the ego therefore must be defined not only in terms of 
object -relations, but also in terms of transactional 
patterns. The functions of the mind are fundamental also to 
its development, providing the means by which the transactional 
patterns are developed through which transitions are effected. 
Although man constructs his objects for himself and may be 
said to be the only creature who inhabits his own reality, 
this is structured around a core of objectively -perceived reality 
which may be observed to be a part of the experience of other 
men. Reality -testing, or the establishment of transactional 
patterns which result in effective actions, is thus one of the 
most important functions which the ego is required to develop. 
Efficient reality adaptation is consonant with both objective 
and subjective reality and represents in the majority of 
instances a compromise between the demands of primitive 
aspects of the personality, of the environment and of 
conscience. 
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The changes in transactional patterns which accompany 
the development of the ego were explained by Freud in terras 
of the substitution of the reality principle for the pleasure 
principle. This was facilitated by the use of intelligence 
in the replacement of affective by cognitive discrimination. 
In transition theory, the individual is considered as 
arriving at his own solution of the conflicting demands of 
instinct, environment and conscience, and the strength of 
the ego is dependent upon this. Anna Freud holds a similar 
view: 
"Whether the ego will be strong or weak is 
determined by the type of life experiences it encounters. 
Obviously frequent integrating experiences will help the 
child to build a strong ego, and, conversely, repeated 
indiscriminate exposure to traumatic experiences will 
hinder ego development." (1945). 
This allows due weight to be given to the part played by 
the development of transactional patterns and points to the 
importance of the latency period which in Freud's libido 
theory tended to be underemphasised owing to his hypothesis 
of a lessening of biological drives with the passing of the 
Oedipal phase. On the other hand it does not disregard the 
basic endopsychic situation which is the product of early 
object- relations and the innate constitution of the child. 
Early transactional patterns have been described by 
Winnicot in his paper on "Transitional Objects and 
Transitional Phenomena" (1951). He uses these terms to 
describe an intermediate area of experience between the baby's 
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inability to recognise reality and his growing ability to 
accept it. The clinical observations which give rise to his 
theoretical formulations are all concerned with children's 
experience of the first 'not -me' possessions. He notes that 
in children's development a tendency arises early in infancy 
to weave other -than -me objects into the personal pattern of 
activity, and that from this situation there usually emerges 
some thing or phenomenon, a doll, corner of a blanket or 
even a word or tune, which becomes of special iwortance as 
a defence against anxiety, especially just before going to 
sleep. This may be symbolic of some libidinal object such 
as the breast or the mother, but Wirmnicot believes that its 
importance lies equally in its not being the breast or mother, 
as it represents an intermediate area of experience, between 
oral erotism and true object- relationship, between subjective 
and objective, between inner and outer objects. He notes 
that its use antedates established reality- testing and that 
in time it becomes gradually decathected, as if the 
transitional phenomena have become diffused and spread out 
over the whole intermediate territory between inner 'psychic 
reality' and objective reality. The appearance of these 
phenomena is usually in the first year of the infant's life. 
It can be seen that these phenomena represent attempts to 
establish patterns of transaction with reality in the movement 
from the embryonic system to the early object system. It is 
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particularly significant that the transitional object assumes 
such importance when the child is going to sleep, for it is 
then that there is a partial regression to the embryonic 
system. Freud held that sleep represented the return to a 
state of narcissism, a temporary withdramal from the world 
of objects which we discover at birth and "with this is 
associated the fact that we cannot endure the new state of 
things for long and that we periodically revert from it in 
our sleep to our former condition of absence of stimulation 
and avoidance of objects." (1921). ';:bile there is no simple 
correspondence between sleep and the infra- uterine state, 
sleep does involve regression with an accompanying loss of 
identity which are situations full of anxiety for the infant 
who is only at the beginning of relationships with objects 
and possesses only an insecure sense of self. These early 
transactional patterns to which Winn.icot has drawn attention 
are the prototype of later ways of relating to objects in 
which the intellect has a special part to play. At first 
intelligence has the task of supplying the deficiencies of 
the ordinary 'good' mother, releasing her from the necessity 
of providing the near -perfect environment which existed in 
the intra- uterine state. The mind of every individual, 
Winnicot believes, is rooted in this need for a perfect 
environment, providing the means for turning a relative 
failure of adaptation into an adaptive success. This function 
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of mind is closely associated with its important task in 
transition theory of effecting a link between tangential 
relationship systems. In \` tinnicot' s view, a failure on the 
part of the mother, especially erratic behaviour, may 
result in an over -activity of mental functioning which may 
in extreme cases result in a tangential development of the 
mental function itself which he describes as the 
"mind- psyche ", which may have a false localisation in the 
body and is a pathological phenomenon. (Winnicot, 1954). 
This is an important and fundamental example of the 
establishment of a relationship system which is separate 
from the main system and is based upon a de- personalised 
nucleus, resulting in faulty ego development. The functions 
of the mind develop with such rapidity in the early stages 
of the object- system and the tendency towards de-personalisation 
is so strong in the educational systems of our present 
civilisation that this situation is a commonplace feature of 
present -day child development. It represents a particular 
hazard at the latency period when there may be considerable 
guilt attached to aspects of affective functioning and 
over- emaloyment of repressive mechanisms. A split in the 
ego on this basis may be successfully concealed throughout 
childhood owing to super -ego control and the development of 
transactional patterns on a purely intellectual foundation. 
By these means difficulties may be postponed until the 
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necessity of reconciling affective and cognitive aspects of 
functioning at puberty or adolescence exposes the defect. In 
normal development the mind should not be a separate entity 
but merely a specialisation of the psyche -soma. (Winnicot, 
1949, p. 244) . In this way it contributes to the expansion 
of personal relationship systems in a concentric fashion and 
facilitates the emergence of transactional patterns which 
serve as a link between previous tangential deviations. 
The expansion of relationship systems requires the 
deployment of energy in new ways, the rearrangement of 
existing object- systems and the loss of objects in the 
elevation of new structures. These transitional processes 
are accomplished through patterns of transaction already 
established, by modification of existing patterns or by the 
evolving of new patterns if required. Such changes are not 
without danger to the developing ego, but transition theory 
does not hold that because of this ego- development should be 
considered thereafter only in terms of defences. Freud's 
description of the ego as "a poor creature owing service 
to three masters and consequently menaced by three several 
dangers" (1932, p. 82) seems to emphasise this purely 
negative aspect. Melanie Klein considers that this 
description applies particularly to the immature ego of the 
small child, and maintains that anxiety has a positive as 
well as a negative part to play in promoting the growth of 
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the ego. (1932, pp. 200 -245). Anna Freud holds that as the 
ego assumes superiority through development the position 
between ego and id is reversed while the sex drives are 
becoming latent and the reality principle becoming established. 
This is not a permanent ego- superiority and is likely to be 
overthrown through the biological increase in libido at 
puberty, and the personality of the child continues developing 
so long as the relationship between ego and id remains fluid 
and changeable. Normally, in every childhood, a number of 
methods are used in a moderate degree to defend the ego 
against anxiety, but this does not do more than create a 
certain amount of subjective and faulty functioning which is 
overcome as the position of the ego is strengthened and 
anxiety lessens in the course of normal progress through the 
latency period. In the face of excessive anxiety, however, 
the ego makes excessive and more lasting use of the defence 
mechanisms at its disposal and the harm done to the ego 
functions becomes considerably greater and of more permanent 
importance. Normally, the mechanisms of introjection and 
projection may be employed, the child appropriating from 
others what seems admirable and attributing to them the 
qualities which seem to him undesirable in himself. He may 
substitute pleasurable fantasies for painful facts by various 
mechanisms of escape, or refuse to see reality as it really is, by denial. 
In reaction-formation he hides unwelcome urges by a profusion 
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of their opposites, while by repression he may refuse to 
admit their existence by denying them consciousness. These 
defence mechanisms are all acceptable within the framework 
of transition theory, but are considered not so much processes 
of normal development as transactional patterns evolved for 
dealing with unsatisfactory relationship -systems. 
Transition theory follows closely the view of 
ego -development held by Fairbairn, which is based upon his 
conception of the schizoid and depressive states. He 
believes that the schizoid state involves the loss of the ego, 
while the depressive state involves the loss of the object. 
(1941, p. 53 -54). The schizoid state involves such a massive 
withdrawal of libido from surrounding objects that the ego 
loses the very form of energy which holds it together. This 
is equivalent to the position of the ego described in 
transition theory, where it is maintained by relationships 
which are the result of the basic biological drive through 
which the whole system is organised. If the energy which 
maintains this ego- object system is weakened by the 
enlargement of a tangential system or through regression, the 
system is threatened with annihilation. Fairbairn makes the 
important observation that the depressive state arises from 
the fact that any frustration in object -relationships is 
functionally equivalent to the loss of the object, whether 
partial or complete. The task of the intermediate period 
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between infantile and mature dependence in his theory 
therefore resolves itself into different methods of 
controlling underlying schizoid or depressive tendencies, 
which may be resolved even further into ways of dealing with 
incorporated objects. Thus the transition has both 
positive and negative aspects, requiring not only the 
establishment of relationships with differentiated external 
objects, but also the giving up of relationships established 
during the first stage of infantile dependence. The 
ambivalence of the late oral phase gives way to an attitude 
based upon the dichotomy of the object, and the original 
object towards which both love and hate are directed is 
divided into two objects, an accepted object, towards which 
love is directed, and a rejected object towards which hate is 
directed. The association of love with the oral technique 
of incorporating and hate with the anal technique of expelling 
is an essential part of Fairbairn's system. Love involves 
a relationship with an accepted object which the child wishes 
to take in, and hate involves the desire to get rid of an 
unsatisfying object. The operation of rejective techniques 
is therefore a characteristic feature of the intermediate 
stage, and Fairbairn believes it was the recognition of this 
which caused Abraham to introduce the two additional anal 
phases in his revised scheme of development (Fairbairn, 1941, 
p. 35). The conflict of this period resolves itself into a 
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conflict between an urge to expel and an urge to retain 
contents. Two different methods therefore emerge of dealing 
with what is essentially the same basic conflict and these 
arise out of two different ways of considering the object. 
The first is the phobic technique, where there is in the main 
a passive attitude in which the conflict lies between a 
flight to and a flight from the object. Contrasted to this 
is the obsessional technique, which is active and more 
aggressive in quality: here the conflict lies between the 
expulsion or the retention of the object. In the phobic 
technique, both the accepted and rejected objects are treated 
as external, but in the obsessional technique both the 
accepted and the rejected objects are treated as internal. 
Applying the same method of examination to the 
dissociative phenomena of the hysterical state, it can be seen 
that acceptance of the object is clearly implied by the 
over -valuation of objects characteristic of this condition, 
but this very exaggeration of emotional relationships suggests 
an over -compensation for rejection. Fairbairn suggests that 
what is characteristically dissociated by the hysteric is 
something within himself with which a part of himself is 
identified and this can only be the rejected object. The 
hysterical technique thus involves the externalisation of the 
accepted object and the internalisation of the rejected 
object, which gives rise to the painful physical symptoms so 
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often associated with this state. 
The paranoid state is in direct contrast to this, in 
that the paranoid individual regards objects in the outer 
world as persecutors, which means the externalisation of the 
rejected object, and while the hysterical over -valuation of 
the love -object is a form of self -depreciation, the paranoid 
individual's suspicion of outer objects is matched by an 
attitude which is grandiose and lacking in self criticism. 
This arises from the internalisation of the accepted object. 
These "techniques of transition ", as Fairbairn calls 
them, may be considered as characteristic transactional 
patterns in transition theory, with a single reservation 
concerning the rejection of objects and the abandonment of 
relationships. In transition theory relationships cannot 
be given up, only transformed into something different 
through redistribution of their elements among different 
systems. Thus, Fairbairn's phrase "coming to terms with 
objects that have already been internalised" or "trying to 
get rid of early objects which have been internalised, 
without losing them" (1946, p. 146) are considered to be more 
useful formulations than the simple concept of getting rid of 
objects or giving up relationships. Transition theory takes 
the view that while an individual may try to get rid of a 
relationship or may fantasy the rejection of an object, both 
are in fact impossible, except through the formation of new 
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relationships. 
In Fairbairn' s view, ego- development consists in the 
employment of these varied defensive techniques, often more 
than one simultaneously, for the purpose of averting on the 
one hand "the ultimate psychopathological disaster which 
follows from the loss of the ego" and on the other "the 
ultimate psychopathological disaster which follows from the 
loss of the object ". (1941, p.53 -4). This is a valuable 
contribution to the theory of development, but it is 
necessary to emphasise that the dangers to the ego arise 
from the transitional nature of this stage of development. 
If the ego remained static, or did not attempt to enter into 
new relationships, these dangers would not arise. It is 
the positive drive towards relationships which causes energy 
to be directed outwards to the objects in the environment and 
to expose itself to the frustrations which the environment 
may impose. 
The transitional theory of childhood considers that 
broad general stages of development may be discerned, but 
processes of transition are continuous and there are 
considerable individual differences in the way in which the 
processes of transition take place. The essential structures 
of the personality appear to be established in children of 
our present civilisation by the end of the -ore- school years, 
yet there are considerable differences in the behaviour 
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resulting from the presence of similar structures in 
different individuals, owing to the necessity of allowing 
for other determining factors. Transition theory does not 
hold that human personality is biologically determined, 
unless determinism is taken to mean the limitation of choice 
rather than the elimination of choice. 
Hartmann, Kris & Loewenstein also consider that the 
culmination of the formation of the main structures of the 
personality takes place about five or six years of age, and 
write: 
"Developmental processes occurring after that age 
can be described as modification, enrichment, or, in 
pathological cases, as restriction of the then existing 
structure." (Hartmann et al. 1946). 
They make the important suggestion that the ego does not, 
however, develop from this time onwards only by establishing 
defensive mechanisms for the purpose of maintaining its 
existing structure, but that "the human personality is formed 
by psychic mechanisms which serve, also, the purpose of 
defence." (Ibid). This also argues against the negative 
view of the latency period which is so difficult to avoid 
within the framework of libido theory. The essential feature 
of all stages of childhood is expansion and forward movement, 
and the task of the childish ego in the latency period is the 
facilitation of the emergence of transactional patterns, 
which are the means by which the newly completed structures 
become active, and in this task all the child's free energies 
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are employed. (Bornstein, 1951, p. 285). It is in pat holoEy 
that the earlier transitions assume primary importance: in 
normal development it is in the latency period that the 
foundations of character and temperament are laid. 
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CHAPTER 12. 
The Transition to Mature Sociality. 
The state of mature sociality involves a relationship 
between numbers of separate persons who are completely 
differentiated from one another as individual ego- object 
systems. The outstanding difference between this theoretical 
final state and infantile dependence is that dependence is 
initially absolute and the course of development through 
various stages of transition is marked by its becoming 
increasingly conditional. Since man is a social being, the 
criteria of personal normality and adjustment are not 
purely psychological but psycho -social, yet adjustment or 
social adaptation on the other hand cannot be the sole 
criteria of the maturity of an adult. Society is in a state 
of change which is effected through the development of new 
systems of relationship by various individuals, and if man 
is to develop better societies it must be through the active 
manipulation of the objects in his environment and not only 
through passive acceptance of the things which happen to him. 
The philosophical climate of a particular time or the ethical 
standards of a particular group are the measures by which an 
individual is assessed, yet it would not be in accordance with 
the uniqueness of the qualities inherent in the reflective 
nature of man if the goal of his development took no account 
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of his personal potential for changing for the better the 
society in which he lives. Mature sociality is defined, 
therefore, not only with reference to adaptation and 
adjustment, but also with reference to personal integration, 
and evidence of successful development is found not only in 
the absence of signs of stress, which may be achieved through 
a purely negative and defensive organisation of the personality, 
but in the individual's active participation in life and 
positive acceptance of new relationships. Ernest Jones 
writes: 
"We surmise that the psychological problem of 
normality must ultimately reside in the capacity to 
endure - in the ability to hold wishes in suspension 
without either renouncing them or 'reacting' to them 
in defensive ways. Freedom and self- control are 
thus seen to be really the same thing although both 
are badly misused concepts. We reach the conclusion 
that the nearest attainable criterion of normality is 
fearlessness. The most normal person is, like 
Siegfried "angst -Frei ", but we must be clear that we 
mean by this not merely manifest courage, but the 
absence of all the deep reactions that mask unconscious 
apprehensiveness. ;Where these are absent we have the 
willing and even joyful acceptance of life, with all 
its visitations and chances, that distinguishes the 
free personality of one who is master of himself." 
(Jones, 1946, D. 7). 
Normality, however, is often itself a purely negative 
term, describing a state of absence of pathology, while 
mature sociality is a state to which each individual can only 
approximate but towards which the aspirations of all may be 
consciously directed. 
Recognition of puberty and adolescence as a time of 
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transition to adult status is marked in primitive early 
societies by rituals of initiation which rest upon an 
assumption of uniform and sudden maturing which influences 
thought about this period of development even in more 
advanced social groups. Recognition of individual and 
social problems specific to adolescence appears to be of 
relatively recent growth. (Fleming, 1955), and is related 
to the fact that the process of growing up has undoubtedly 
in the twentieth century been accompanied in many parts of 
the world by conditions of considerable stress, which has 
been reflected in the behaviour both of adolescents and 
their parents ( Horney, 1937). The difficulties which young 
people encounter are related partly to the social traditions 
which demand an ever -increasing period of education before 
they are permitted to exercise the privileges and enjoy the 
responsibilities of adult life, while there is a corresponding 
and incompatible pressure upon them from commercial and other 
quarters to develop adult habits of behaviour and a 
competitive sense of values resulting in earlier and larger 
consumption of consumer goods and services. The difficulties 
are also related, however, to the emotional state and the 
unsatisfied personal needs of the parents, a fact which is 
sometimes given too little weight in discussions of the 
adolescent years. Where distress and conflict do arise, 
they can be partly attributed to the nature of the individual's 
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past history and the character of the home in which he was 
reared, both of which are reflected in his systems of 
relationship and the nature of his transactional patterns. 
Puberty and adolescence, however, do have difficulties which 
are biological or developmental in origin, and these usually 
resolve themselves into the necessity of modifying 
transactional patterns in the service of new relationship 
systems or the development of fresh patterns towards the 
same end. These changes in systems of relationship, however, 
are first felt within the family group, which means that not 
only are the nature of the object systems and transactional 
patterns of the individual of first importance, but also the 
personalities of the parents and the family, together with 
the idea of relationship which is consciously held by all of 
them. 
Acceptance of the individual's growth and aspirations is 
directly related to the parents' own degree of maturity, and 
parents who appear to have been successful with little 
children do not always mature into parents who can deal wisely 
with young boys and girls on the threshold of adult life. 
This may be due to the fact that there are features of the 
changing situation which threaten them or revive latent 
conflicts through identification with or reaction -formation 
against the sexual aspects of the growing child's behaviour 
or appearance. It also may be due to the fact that 
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unsatisfactory parents have been able to maintain an outward 
appearance of successful family life through the relatively 
easily controlled crises of the latency years and their 
unwise courses of action do not reveal the full consequences 
until adolescence is reached. The idea of relationship held 
by the adolescent is influenced not only by the system of 
relationship which he has already established among members 
of his family, school friends and so on, but by his unconscious 
fantasies reinforced by the nature of his life experiences. 
The search for a. heterosexual love -object and the desire for 
a home, children and a career are not only affected by his 
inner world, but also by the conscious idea he has formed 
of what these things are, resulting from the transactional 
patterns he has evolved in dealing with similar situations 
and the systems of relationship within which he has 
structured them. These ideas are not in a simple correspondence 
with an unconscious situation, but involve personal 
combinations of various unconscious factors and special ways 
of bringing them to consciousness. 
The similarities between infancy and adolescence which 
were noted in Chapter 5 extend over a wider area than physical 
growth or the extension of functions. In the transitional 
stage between embryonic and early object systems the infant 
was supported by the particular care of the mother in the 
accomplishment of a concentric expansion of his relationship 
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systems in which the quality of his relationship with her 
became transformed. Similarly the adolescent requires the 
support of both father and mother, the other members of his 
family and society in general for a successful transition 
from which they should all emerge in a new relationship with 
him, as part of his expanding circle of mature love -objects. 
The degree of this support varies a great deal in various 
cultures and Margaret Mead's studies in Samoa (1928) showed 
very little difference in behaviour between the group which 
is experiencing puberty and the groups which are two or 
three years younger or older, a fact which seems to arise 
from the lack of emphasis placed upon jealousy, rivalry, 
emulation or individual differences generally. In New 
Guinea, (1930) she found that although the social 
organisation was completely different, the period of 
adolescence has no special significance for the community, 
and as a result there is no special concern with problems 
specific to sexual adjustments, nor is the behaviour of 
children in any way modified as a result. In modern 
western societies emphasis upon competition and individual 
enterprise often leads to the withdrawal of support, which 
may arise through the view that 'independence' constitutes 
the goal of development. Fairbairn considers this goal 
mistaken because the capacity for relationships in itself 
implies some degree of dependence, and he prefers the terra 
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'mature dependence'. (1941, p. 34). Transition theory 
carries this further, maintaining that man not only has the 
capacity for relationships but that he in fact exists 
through relationships, so that it prefers the term 'mature 
sociality' for the theoretical final state. A state of 
independence is anti -relational, involving mechanisms of 
regression towards a closed system; successful attainment 
of this state at the personal level can be achieved only 
through the reinstatement of the closed circle of the 
embryonic system, which would in fact substitute another and 
more complete dependence for that which forms a part of 
social inter -relationships. Mature sociality is reached, on 
the other hand, through a continuous forward movement in 
which the personal systems of others can be included within 
the personal system of the individual, leaving sufficient 
energy available for the expansion to continue. 
Melanie Klein has also suggested an affinity between 
early infancy and adolescence, which she associates with the 
fact that libidinal impulses are at their height at both 
these stages, while in the latency period they are much less 
intense. She notes that at puberty, besides the more 
powerful impulses, there is a greater activity of fantasy and 
the child's ego has other aims and another relation to 
reality (Klein, 1932, p. 122). The biological accession of 
libido at puberty was held by Freud to create an imbalance 
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within the psyche and to result in intolerable stress: 
"As a result of reaching a certain period in life 
and in accordance with regular biological processes, 
the quantity of libido in the mental economy has 
increased to an extent which by itself suffices to 
upset the balance of health and establish the 
conditions for neurosis. As is well known, such 
rather sudden intensifications in libido are 
regularly connected with puberty and the menopause, 
with the reaching of a certain age in women; in 
many people they may in addition manifest themselves 
in periodicities as yet unrecognised." (Freud, 1912b, 
p. 118). 
This view of the nature of libido is not in accordance 
with the theory of instinct which has been stated in Chapter 
6, and progress by sudden movements does not accord with the 
view of evolution and development as a process of gradual 
and continuous transition. The parallel between infancy 
and adolescence can, however, be extended for different 
reasons which are fully in accordance with the postulates of 
transition theory. In early infancy the infantile ego is 
precariously maintained between the oscillating embryonic and 
growing object systems, while in adolescence it is similarly 
insecurely balanced between the transactional patterns of the 
latency period and the emerging transactional patterns of 
mature sociality. Optimum conditions of development should 
require no major revision of the already established patterns, 
but if development in the latency period has been on the 
basis of inadequate patterns or through the emergence of 
patterns covering a transitional defect, the choice may lie 
between a radical change or a complete breakdown. In the 
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latency period there is a very slow process of maturation 
analogous to the long preparations of the intra- uterine life. 
Early infancy represents a culmination of the transitional 
process in which there is a maximum conflict between the 
claims of the departing embryonic system and those of the 
developing object system. Puberty represents a similar 
culmination of the transition from the transactional patterns 
of the early object system and those of the state of mature 
sociality. 
Physiological maturation at puberty does not mean an 
access of sexual impulses causing stress in the personality 
through pressure upon defences and the testing of controls, 
but a positive step towards mature sociality, making possible 
the expression in an adult genital way of the drive towards 
relationships which has never ceased to operate. This is 
in accordance with Fairbai rn' s view that in the mature 
individual it is not that the libidinal attitude is essentially 
genital, but that the genital attitude is essentially 
libidinal. (1941, p. 32). There is an important difference 
between the oral attitude of the infant in which the mouth 
was the only vehicle by which relationships could be made and 
the genital attitude of the mature adult, who has a choice 
of ways by which he can approach his object, of which the 
genital is only one. Thus it is not that object- relations 
are satisfactory because the genital level has been reached, 
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but rather that true genital sexuality can only be obtained 
upon a basis of satisfactory object- relationships. To 
define mature sociality otherwise than in terms of the object 
system would in transition theory discount the essential 
nature of an approximation to concentric development and 
attach too much weight to the functions of genital sexuality. 
These difficulties attach to impulse psychology and libido 
theory. Conflicts occurring in adolescence cannot by their 
very nature form part of a process of normal development, 
but must arise through failures in relationships. Anxiety 
is generated not through internal stresses set up by 
physiological changes but through the individual's 
difficulties in adapting his transactional patterns to the 
changing conditions. 
It has already been noted that the transition from the 
embryonic system is facilitated on many occasions by the use 
of a transitional object, and a further parallel between 
infancy and adolescence arises through the employment in the 
latter period of a similar technique. This transitional 
phenomenon forms a familiar feature of adolescent behaviour 
and has many variations, but mostly it involves a form of 
experimental renunciation of the family for a group 
situation, a temporary use of adult transactional patterns 
in a limited environment. This group behaviour is a notable 
feature of adolescence and when the group is associated in 
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anti -social activities a source of considerable disturbance 
in most urban societies. 
Statistical observations show that children under five 
years of age may associate in groups of two or three for 
periods of between ten and forty minutes. A definite change 
can be noticed in the size and stability of groups in the 
ages between five and seven, when four to ten children can be 
associated for one to three hours. After the age of seven, 
spontaneous interest in groups does not increase and may 
even decrease slightly, until another peak of group 
development is reached in pre- adolescence and adolescence. 
According to Thrasher (1927), 51% of youth between eleven 
and seventeen belong to groups of various kinds. Buhler 
(1933) places the figure even higher, finding that 67% of 
boys and 59% of girls between ten and fifteen belong to 
groups. The incidence of group behaviour in puberty and 
adolescence and the course of development of group interests 
establishes this form of activity unequivocably as a 
transitional phenomenon. Freud writes: 
"A group impresses the individual with a sense of 
unlimited power and of insurmountable peril. For the 
moment it replaces the whole of human society which is 
the wielder of authority, whose punishments the 
individual fears and for whose sake he has submitted 
to so many inhibitions. It is clearly perilous for 
him to put himself in opposition to it, and it will 
be safer to follow the example of those around him and 
perhaps even to 'hunt with the pack'. In obedience to 
the new authority he may put his former 'conscience' 
out of action, and so surrender to the attractions of 
the increased pleasure that is certainly obtained from 
the removal of inhibitions." (Freud, 1921). 
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Adolescent groups may be classified into two large 
divisions, those which are described by Anna Freud (1936, p. 
41) as "artificial groups, requiring an external force to 
keep them together ", and those which form themselves around 
a central person spontaneously. (Redl, 1942, p. 573ff). 
The group which is maintained by an external force is for 
the adolescent who is dealing with the conflicts of 
transition equivalent to the school situation for a child who 
is dealing with the residues of the conflicts of the Oedipal 
phase. Thrasher (1927) holds that the group has a part to 
play in the life of adolescents which cannot be taken by 
any other individual relationship, but that this reflects 
needs within the child which force him into a group 
independent of educational aims, a fact which is reflected 
in so many societies setting the beginning of schooling 
between the ages of six and seven. In those groups which 
are held together by a leader, there are opportunities for 
identification and for rebellion, which are often worked out 
in the school situation also. Adolescents breaking away from 
the leader attract more attention from observers than the 
same adolescents when they submit to him, but both processes 
are of equal importance for their development. This 
alternation between submission and opposition towards the 
leader of a group shows a pattern, a swing between activity 
and passivity which is reminiscent of the repetitive character 
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of children's dramatic play. (Waelder, 1953) . 
In addition to the positive aspects of adolescent group 
formation, there may be negative aspects when the group is 
allied with a tangential ego- deviation and becomes a gang, 
a substitute for, rather than an intermediate step towards, 
mature sociality. The psychology of the gang enables 
the child to enjoy guilt - charged or dangerous gratifications 
without the expense of guilt feeling and fear. Within its 
conventions and limited code it can offer him the gratification 
of 'morality' and at the same time pride, moral indignation, 
the feeling of 'being on the right side'. The leader and 
group who help the child in his revolutionary tendencies are 
abandoned as soon as they become identified with parental 
attitudes and authority, which is one of the main reasons 
why social work with members of delinquent gangs is a 
difficult and sometimes impossible task. (Buxbaum, 1945, p. 
359). Redl (1942) noted that delinquency- identified 
youngsters in a camp situation react automatically with 
avoidance and suspicion of an adult group leader representing 
to them a member of the 'outside' adult world. When the 
adult is able to break through, they enter strong personal 
affectionate relationships. Sooner or later the adult is 
compelled to act as an authority, and when this happens he is 
'depersonalised', becoming nothing more than a symbolic 
representative of the hostile code. These negative a.siects 
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of group behaviour arise not from any special factor 
operating within adolescent groups as a whole, but rather 
from the fact that the group represents the opportunity, 
like other transitional phenomena, for the development of 
particular transactional patterns which are specially 
adapted to the individual's needs. Most adolescent group 
members do not become delinquent and most adolescent 
delinquents mature into acceptable citizens (Glueck, 1942). 
There is overwhelming evidence from the many'surveys of the 
social background of delinquency that emotionally unstable 
parents or foster -parents tend to have emotionally unstable 
children, and delinquent behaviour is associated less 
directly with the inheritance of anti -social attitudes 
than with their cultivation through the treatment which 
children have received. (Landis, 1945). 
In concentric development, the adolescent does not have 
to reject the parents and the family in order to effect the 
realignment of his relationship systems. In practice, 
however, he turns away from them at least temporarily, a 
process which is full of danger where there are lingering 
transactional patterns of the early object system. In the 
group he finds a defence against this fear, and by the 
repeated experience of breaking away from the leader and 
being allowed to resume his place, a process analogous to 
the strengthening of the infantile ego by the repeated 
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experience of bearable separation and reunion, he is less 
afraid to be fully an adult himself (Redl, 1945, 371). 
Part of the process of turning away from the parents involves 
the attempt to establish a love object and to have sexual 
relations outside his own home. It is a feature of group 
behaviour that overt sexual relations are forbidden and 
members who do find a heterosexual partner outside leave 
the group either temporarily or permanently. (Bauxbaum 1945). 
By turning away from the family and finding a heterosexual 
love object he takes the first step in finding a new family 
of his own and the final step in identification with his 
father. 
The group phase therefore forms part of the process of 
normal development, playing an essential part in the 
expansion of the object system and the establishment of 
adult transactional patterns upon which the state of mature 
sociality is based. Thrasher writes: 
"The gang is largely an adolescent phenomenon. It 
occupies a period in the life of the boy between childhood, 
when he is usually incorporated into a family structure, 
and marriage, when he is reincorporated within a family 
and. other orderly relations of work, religion and 
pleasure. The gang appears to be an interstitial group, 
a manifestation of readjustment between childhood and 
maturity." (1927, p. 37). 
Such groups are the sum of the individuals who compose 
them, and if they constitute in any society an undesirable 
feature requiring to be modified it is to the transactional 
;patterns of the pre- adolescent child that attention must be 
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-laid. The group provides a vehicle for the conscious and 
unconscious aspirations of its members and if it is an 
anti -social group it is either in the attitudes of these 
members or the nature of the society itself that the causes 




It is axiomatic that conceptions of normality in 
behaviour must be related not only to the individual' s 
subjective impressions of his experiences, but also to the 
consensus of other individuals' estimates of what in fact are 
the realities of his situation. Glover (1932 a) has pointed 
out that among a number of privileges conferred upon a medical 
practitioner by Act of Parliament, that of establishing a 
standard of normality for his patient is one of the most 
important. Had this remained restricted to the task of 
distinguishing between physiological and pathological function 
in organic medicine, the privilege might have gone unchallenged, 
he believes, but one of the results of the recognition of the 
existence of the unconscious has been that the old organic 
standards of normality have gone by the board. The 
psycho -analyst is compelled to define his standards of 
normality not only with reference to bodily symptoms and the 
absence of psychic mechanisms of a grossly aberrant type, 
but also with reference to social adjustment and the capacity 
for satisfying relationships. Glover (op. cit.) considers 
"a normal individual is anyone who is free from symptoms, 
unhampered by mental conflict and who shows satisfactory 
working capacity." He makes the important addition, later 
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and who is able to love someone apart from himself." In_ 
the same essay, he goes on to discuss the impossibility of 
establishing a standard of absolute normality, and suggests 
rather a criterion of a "social standard of adequate 
adaptation ", adding the suggestion that "normality-may be a 
form of 'madness' which goes unrecognised because it happens 
to be a good adaptation to reality ". In transition theory, 
a theoretical optimum of concentric development has been 
proposed, which is unattainable in practice because no 
individual can pass through the early object -system without 
experiencing frustrations, producing tangential deviations. 
The effects of these are minimised by the transactional 
patterns which have been devised, resulting in forms of 
behaviour of various degrees of appropriateness to the 
situation in which the individual finds himself. This does 
not mean, however, that standards of normality may therefore 
be resolved into statistical norms of adaptation to a 
particular social setting at a given period in time. 
(Hollitscher, 1943) . If it is naive to assume that there 
are absolute standards of normality, it is equally naive to 
assume that in the present state of Western civilisation 
normality and complete reality adaptation are identical. 
Adaptation to a sick society may comply with a statistical 
standard, but it would be unsatisfactory to accept such a 
criterion in a world which is changing so rapidly. The 
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factor of personal integrity cannot be disregarded, and the 
important feature of a scientific explanation of human 
behaviour which attempts to reconcile the facts of evolution 
and individual development is that it accepts from the 
beginning that both man and society are in a continuous state 
of transition. 
Freud stated: "It is iris ossible to define mental health 
except in terms of metapsychology." (1937, p. 382, note), and 
the classical Freudian view of integration involves the 
reduction of tension between id and super -ego through the 
agency of creative libido. The outlook adopted by Freud was 
inevitably affected by his stoical philosophy and is tinged 
with the pessimism which is inseparable from it. There is 
always a tendency for each person to describe integration 
in terms of the conceptions which he himself prefers. What 
Jung, for instance, would describe as "finding the self" 
analysts of other schools would refer to as "the integration 
of the total personality". In many cases the difference 
is in effect very slight, but may be of importance in 
relation to the theoretical background of the statement. 
Thus, Fairbairri in one of his most recent papers (1958) 
states that the chief aim of psycho- analytical treatment is 
to achieve the maximum synthesis of the structures into which 
the original ego has been split, making breaches in the closed 
system of the patient's inner world, so that it becomes 
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accessible to the influence of outer reality. From this it 
follows that normal development must result in an open 
system in which the inner world may be influenced by the 
events which take place outside. Such an open system also 
forms the goal of the transitional theory of development. 
Truly concentric development is not, however, attainable, so 
the most which can be achieved is the maximum practicable 
co- ordination of separately -functioning tangential systems. 
It can be seen from this that there are a variety of 
degrees of integration and that the concept of normality must 
be related not only to the theoretical view of the nature of 
this process, but also to the opinion of what constitutes an 
acceptable degree of its achievement, which is usually 
expressed with reference to the person's external behaviour. 
In psychopathology it is customary to use the term 
'abnormal' in a number of different senses, all of which may 
be related to the criterion of adaptation. Thus, mental 
activity or behaviour may be described as abnormal if it 
does not conform to an accepted theory. Suicide could be 
held to fit this category, involving the denial of the theory 
that survival has precedence over all other motives. A 
change in accustomed patterns of conduct in an individual may 
cause him or those near him to describe his behaviour as 
abnormal. The transformation of a usually open and generous 
person into a quarrelsome and suspicious one is a common 
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example in clinical practice. Where behaviour deviates from 
the standards of conduct prevailing in a particular society 
or social group to which the, patient belongs, it may also be 
described as abnormal, as, for instance, when a person steals 
without motive or exposes himself indecently. Most of these 
symptoms are also abnormal in the sense that they are 
atypical or uncommon, and this introduces a statistical 
consideration. A person may properly be described as 
abnormal if his intelligence is inferior to say 98% of his 
fellows of similar age. The fallacy lies in holding that 
the converse is true, and that each individual must 
approximate to a particular average in order to be classified 
as normal, and that the greater the deviation from this 
average, the greater the degree of abnormality. In most 
cases, the qualities which are the basis of judgment are not 
amenable to quantification in this way. These generally 
accepted psychopathological definitions of abnormality (Davis., 
1957) are all concerned with the way in which the individual 
deals now, at the present time, with situations in which he 
finds himself and which may occur in the life -histories of 
others, with whom his behaviour in similar circumstances may 
be compared. It is with reference to the quality of his 
response to them or the way in which he evaluates them that 
the individual's normality is judged. In transition theory, 
it is upon the nature of transactional patterns that all 
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hypotheses concerning pathological functioning must initially 
be based. A categorical distinction between normal and 
disordered behaviour cannot be made; the psychoneuroses and 
psychoses must be assumed to be special examples of normal 
activity, to be explained by the extension of the theories 
pertaining to normal behaviour. Psychopathology must therefore 
always rest upon an underlying theory of normal development, 
and in psycho -analytical thought it must be closely linked 
with the views which are held of the functions of the ego. 
As a result of experience, the developing child learns 
to estimate the nature of persons and things with some degree 
of accuracy, but the degree, range and reliability of 
reality- testing vary widely from person to person and in the 
same person in different situations. (Brierley, 1951). 
The emergence of successful reality -testing thus becomes one 
of the most important ways in which assessment of the quality 
of ego- development may be carried out and the failure of 
reality -testing in borderline or psychotic patients is one of 
the most frequent causes of distress and social maladjustment 
and a valuable diagnostic indicator. Glover (1932a) points 
out that the nature of the reality -sense has been investigated 
from three different points of view. Ferenczi (1916) made 
an attempt to correlate certain stages of development with 
adult psycho -pathological phenomena. He described a series 
of relations to the object -world, but gave no corresponding 
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description of the nature of the instinctive objects concerned, 
an omission which was rectified by Abraham (1924). A second 
approach was that made by Federn (1926), who attempted to 
delimit the narcissistic ego- boundaries, regarding variations 
in corporeal ego- feeling as an ascertainable symptom of 
ego- regression. By attempting a detailed study of these 
ego -boundaries and regressions he considers the reality- system 
in operation at different stages of development may be 
discovered. The third approach is made by Melanie Klein 
(1932) in her work on child analysis, which has already 
been fully discussed in earlier chapters. It emerges clearly 
from her work that the reality- systems of infants and children 
are predominantly fantastic, of a different quality from those 
of adults owing to the importance of the mental mechanisms 
of introjection and projection. Glover himself defines the 
reality -sense and reality -testing in three tentative 
statements. Firstly, reality -sense is a faculty the existence 
of which is inferred by an examination of the processes of 
reality- testing. Secondly, efficient reality -testing, for 
any person who has passed the age of puberty, is the capacity 
to retain psychic contact with the objects that promote 
gratification of instinct, including both modified and 
residual infantile impulse. Thirdly, objectivity is the 
capacity to assess correctly the relation of instinctive 
impulse to instinctive object, whether or not the aims of the 
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impulse are, can be or will be gratified. (1932b). 
It can be seen from this that the system proposed in 
transition theory may be applied to each of these statements. 
Reality -testing is the system of transactional patterns which 
the individual has evolved, while the reality -sense is 
determined by the nature of his object- system, which, of 
course, has its expression only through the transactional 
patterns. In his second statement, Glover is using the 
language of libido theory, but it is suggested that "psychic 
contact with the objects that promote gratification of 
instinct" may be described in another way as the expansion 
of the object -system in a concentric development. Lastly, 
the capacity for assessing the relationship between 
instinctive impulse and instinctive object describes the 
function of intellect in creating transactional patterns, 
particularly those linking tangential object- systems, a 
function which develops concurrently with the object -system. 
Federn's investigation of the narcissistic ego- boundaries 
represents an attempt to go directly to the nature of the 
object- system, while his study of the reality- systems is 
concerned with transactional patterns. Reality- testing 
emerges as a variable function from these speculations, and 
is dependent not only upon the nature of the object- system of 
the individual at any given moment in his development, but 
also upon the form of the transactional patterns which he has 
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evolved throughout the preceding stages. As Glover suggests, 
"adult ' morality' is a state in which infantile psychotic 
views concerning the external world have been so reduced 
that they do not interfere with possibilities of adult 
gratification: in other words it is a state in which 
the psychotic estimate of the object -world coincides 
with an objective estimate in two main respects (a) the 
amount of love that can be satisfied and (b) the amount 
of danger to the ego that is present." (Glover, 1932 a). 
'Psychosis', like 'ego', 'reality', 'consciousness' and 
so forth, is a concept which is relative to the stage of 
development of the personal object-system. Glover writes: 
"every child in the first year of life is from the adult 
psychiatric point of view in a state of panpsychosis always 
acute and very largely hallucinatory" (Glover, 1932 a). 
Such a statement, however, is of the same limited application 
as one to the effect that from the adult physical point of 
view the child is in a state of underdevelopment. It may be 
a useful aid to an understanding of adult psychoses to relate 
these to failures at particular stages of transition, but the 
recognition that infantile behaviour in an adult would be 
indicative of a disordered personality does not lead to the 
assumption that a disordered phase is part of the normal 
processes of development. There are degrees of order 
appropriate to various stages and various situations. 
Psychiatric classifications imply dysfunction, and while 
infantile ways of functioning are replaced by techniques more 
appropriate to later more complex reality- systems, they are 
while they exist normally adequate for the limited systems of 
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reality which the infant has up to that time constructed. 
At any stage of development, different grades of adequacy 
of function may be discerned, but these are assessed with 
reference to a changing standard which is connected with the 
present state of the individual's relationship systems. 
There are psychotic children as well as psychotic adults, 
and their classification and treatment must be on the basis 
of the object- systems and transactional patterns of 
childhood. 
Melanie Klein holds that early infantile anxieties 
characteristic of psychosis arise which drive the ego to 
develop specific defence -mechanisms, and in this period the 
fixation -points for all later psychotic disorders are to be 
found. (Klein, 1946, p. 292). She has emphasised, however, 
that this does not mean that she regards all infants as 
psychotic, but that the psychotic anxieties, mechanisms and 
eöo- defences have an important part to play in all aspects 
of development, including the development of the ego, the 
super -ego and object -relations. In normal development the 
child passes through a "paranoid- scizoid position" (Klein, 
1946, p. 293, note) and then a "depressive position ". The 
early ego splits its object and the relation to it in an 
active way and this brings about a corresponding splitting 
of the ego. While the splitting is in fantasy, the process 
leads in fact to feelings and relations and .later to 
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thought -processes, being cut off from one another. Later, 
when the child is able to construct a complete object against 
whom the aggressive impulses may be directed, guilt and the 
fear of loss bring about the depressive position with its 
associated states akin to mourning. (Klein, 1946, p. 308). 
The importance of this mechanism of splitting recalls the 
preliminary investigation of hysterical states upon which 
modern psychopathology was founded and which so greatly 
stimulated Freud at the beginning of his researches. 
Janet, in his attempt to devise a scientific 
explanation of the genesis of the phenomena displayed by the 
hysteric, formulated the explanatory concept of "dissociation ", 
a state in which there was a failure on the part of the ego 
to exercise its normal cohesive function with the result that 
certain parts of the personality became separated from the 
rest and passed out of the control of the ego to function 
independently. The weakness of the ego might arise from 
external traumatic situations, it might be inherent, or it 
might result from situations which imposed too great a strain 
upon the individual's capacity for adaptation. The 
connection of the dissociative process underlying hysteria 
with the weakness of the ego meant that Janet implicitly 
linked psychopathology and ego -development, as no distinction 
can be made functionally between an ego which has been 
weakened by any of the factors mentioned and an ego which had 
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not yet reached full strength through the normal processes 
of development. When Freud came to formulate libido theory 
and Abraham to elaborate his formulation in terms of the 
successive primacy of erotogenic zones, the psychoneuroses 
and psychoses were attributed to fixations at one or other 
of these particular phases. Schizoid conditions were 
related to a fixation in the early oral stage, characterised 
by the dominance of sucking, while manic -depressive states 
were attributed to a fixation at the late oral stage which 
was characterised by the emergence of biting. Paranoid and 
obsessive states were related to anal techniques for the 
retention and rejection of objects, while hysterical 
conditions represented attempts to manage relationships 
through the renunciation of the genital organs. Fairbairn 
believes that the conferring of the status of libidinal 
phases upon what are in fact techniques employed by the 
individual in his relationships with objects is a 
fundamental error; a fuller discussion of his point of view 
and his system of transitional techniques has been given in 
Chapter 11. In transition theory, of course, a similar view 
of libidinal development is held, and the mechanisms of 
splitting which Melanie Klein has described are considered to 
be the basis of tangential object -systems which may become 
-pathological if the intellect is unable to effect some 
measure of reconciliation between them. 
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Fairbairn' s view is that some measure of splitting of 
the ego is invariably present at the deepest mental level, 
or, to adapt Melanie Klein's phrase, the basic position in 
the psyche is a schizoid position. (Fairbairn, 1940). The 
majority of 'normal' individuals have experience of 
schizoid phenomena in dreams, in the ddja -vu experience and 
in feelings of calm and detachment in the face of crises. 
The important factor is the depth at which the splitting 
takes place, for splits in the ego have the effect of 
compromising its most important functions. Such splits 
may interfere with the integration of perceptions of reality, 
the integration of behaviour and discrimination between 
outer and inner reality. The extent to which these functions 
are affected determines the degree of importance of the 
schizoid phenomena, which are taken in this theoretical 
setting to range from a transient schizoid episode to schizophrenia 
proper. 
Winnicot has suggested that psychosis may be regarded as 
an "environmental deficiency disease" (1954, p. 246), holding 
that a psychotic illness is a defensive organisation designed 
to protect the "true self ". 
"In consideration of a group of mad people there is 
a big distinction to be drawn between those whose defences 
are in a chaotic state, and those who have been able to 
organise an illness." (Winnicot, 1955, p. 287). 
In some cases a psychotic illness, particularly of a 
paranoid type, may involve a high level of organisation and 
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a marked activity of intellectual functioning. The 
alternative to a complete breakdown may be a "flight to 
sanity ", a condition comparable to the manic defence against 
depression. (Searl, 1929). 
In transition theory, pathological conditions may be 
seen to fall into different groups, of varying degrees of 
severity and requiring a different sort of treatment. In 
the first group the transactional patterns are faulty and the 
underlying ego development is fairly sound. Secondly, 
there are cases in which there has been a fairly marked 
tangential deviation, with varying degrees of adequacy of 
transactional patterns, ranging from those which fully 
compensate for the original deficiency, to those which are 
inadequate for adaptation. Lastly, there are those 
situations in which the ego has failed to make a successful 
transition from an early system, or has reverted to it. 
Very broadly speaking, the psychoneuroses are the result of 
faulty transactional patterns, the organised psychoses to 
the development of divergent tangential object -systems, each 
with its own transactional patterns, and the chaotic states 
to functioning in terms of the patterns of the embryonic or 




The method which Freud devised for the investigation of 
the unconscious differed from previous medical therapeutic 
Methods in a number of ways of which perhaps the most striking 
was the relative amount of activity on the part of the patient 
on the one hand and the therapist on the other. In most 
forms of medical treatment the patient is passive, and has 
things done to him by the doctor. The success or otherwise 
of the treatment is measured by the effect of the things that 
the doctor does. The psycho- analytic method, however, 
consists in free association on the part of the patient and 
interpretation on the part of the analyst, the interpretations 
being offered at moments considered by the analyst to be 
important and it is the patient who initiates and is 
responsible for most of the activity. Freud emphasised a 
number of points of technique which were designed to reduce the 
complications arising from the interaction of the personalities 
of the psychotherapist and the patient and Winnicot (1960) 
points out that these recognise that the analyst is under a 
strain in maintaining a professional attitude. This is why 
it is considered that the maturity of the personality of the 
worker is necessary and the quality of his own analysis 
becomes important. Winnicot (op. cit.) agrees with the 
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majority of analysts that the special relationship which 
exists between the patient and the therapist, which Freud 
called the "transference" is not just a matter of rapport or 
of personal relations, but concerns the way in which a highly 
subjective phenomenon repeatedly turns up in an analysis. 
The analyst's ability to remain objective, consistent, 
powerful and indestructible within the hour is directly 
related to the degree to which his own ego has become 
strengthened so that he can remain professionally involved 
and yet maintain a distance between himself and the patient. 
The neurotic features which may impair this professional 
attitude and disturb the course of the analytic process are 
described by the terra "counter- transference ". It is through 
the analysis of the transference that access to the patient's 
inner world is obtained, and while a professional attitude 
may be built up on the basis of defences, inhibitions and 
obsessive procedures, it is only through the ability to 
understand and to handle counter- transference phenomena that 
good analytical work can be done. 
Research into the nature of personality on the basis of 
a psycho- analytical theory is dependent upon the analysis of 
the transference, but, as has already been shown, this is 
complicated by the fact that the aims of therapy and of 
research are not the same. Both require an understanding of 
the patient, but the level at which this takes place is in 
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each case different. It may be said that research proceeds 
from the particular to the general, while therapy proceeds 
from the general to the particular. Therapy demands a 
deeper understanding of the patient based not only upon the 
principles of a theory of the personality, but also upon the 
ability of the therapist to think and feel sufficiently with 
the patient to enter voluntarily into and identify partially 
with his emotional attitudes. At first sight this would 
seem to make the aims of research and therapy wholly 
incompatible, intellectual study acting in a direction 
contrary to empathy, scientific analysis opposing therapeutic 
synthesis, objectivity against subjectivity. This does not 
necessarily follow, for the ultimate goal of analysis as a 
therapeutic process must be to enable the individual patient 
to live more satisfactorily, and the establishment of general 
laws is necessary for the exercise of individual conscious 
choice of the ways in which this can be done, which would 
otherwise be dependent upon a process of individual trial and 
error. Scientific analysis may be a prelude to or a means 
towards therapeutic synthesis, and accurate observation of 
data is a necessary foundation to any theoretical scheme. 
There is good reason to believe that in psycho- analysis 
accurate observation is not so much an intellectual activity 
as a matter of correct empathy. On the other hand it is 
hardly tenable to maintain that analysis is not an intellectual 
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but an affective process. The work which the analyst does 
with his mind is the means by which he maintains the distance 
between the patient and himself, ensuring that this is not 
enlarged by the resistance of the patient nor narrowed by 
features of the counter- transference. This does not alter 
the fact that the analyst is dealing with affect, with 
manifestations of living energy expressed in active 
relationships, and that although this may afterwards be 
reduced to structural terms, these relationships are changing 
throughout each therapeutic hour as a result of the 
interpretations which the analyst gives. 'Transference' has 
come to be understood in two different senses. In one sense 
it includes all that goes on in the relationship between 
patient and analyst; in the narrower sense it is confined to 
certain emotional attitudes of the patient determined by the 
nature of his ego- object system. It seems that there are 
good reasons for the maintenance of this distinction, since 
there exist in the analytic relationship at one and the same 
time two different levels of organisation. There is first 
the total interpersonal situation, including all those aspects 
of management and professional transaction which come outside 
the analytic work itself, and second, there is the transference 
proper, which includes only certain features of the unconscious 
relationship between patient and analyst. The distinction 
which is important enough in a general application, becomes 
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an essential one in two types of case to Winnicot (1960) has 
referred: the patient who has an anti -social tendency and 
the patient who needs a regression. There are also very 
powerful reasons for maintaining this distinction in 
considering questions relating to the technique of analysis 
of children. Bornstein (1945) believes that there is a 
good reason why the child in general does not develop a 
transference neurosis in the strict sense; there is no need 
for him to repeat his reaction vicariously since he still 
possesses his original love -objects - his parents - in reality. 
Nevertheless, Melanie Klein emphasises the child's capacity 
for making a spontaneous transference owing to the much more 
acute anxiety which it feels in comparison with an adult, and 
consequently its interest in objects is in terms of their 
ability to arouse anxiety or to allay it: according to the 
therapist's ability to do one or the other of these things 
the child will rapidly develop a positive or negative 
transference towards him. (Klein, 1932, p. 50). 
It has come about that in recent years, particularly in . 
the ì l einian school, the tendency has been to concentrate 
upon the interpretation of the transference. This has been 
in some instances carried to the extent of abandoning any 
historical and genetic approach to the patient's problems in 
the conviction that the 'here and now' phenomena of the 
analytic session provide sufficient material for the purposes 
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of interpretation (Ezriel, 1951). Fairbairn has pointed out, 
however, that it is more in keeping with the Freudian 
tradition to interpret transference phenomena neither in 
terms of ' here and now' situations in the analytic sessions, 
nor exclusively in terms of the historical situations of 
childhood, but in terms of present situations in internal 
reality (1957a, p. 58). Transference phenomena in the 
presen, result from unconscious situations and relationshps, 
which, although they have their roots in past experience, 
are in fact transactional patterns which provide information 
concerning the nature of the object system as it exists in 
the present. Such interpretations, made in terms of 
present inner reality, tend as a result to be in terms of 
fantasy rather than in terms of actual situations experienced 
in the past, which is again characteristic of the kTleinian 
school. The analyst is, however, not merely a screen upon 
which the patient may project his fantasies, nor even a 
detached interpreter of fantasy, but an active participant in 
a relationship, and this relationship is in itself more 
important than details of technique. 
In the treatment of children, there are a number of 
features of this relationship which make it different from 
the relationship between an adult and his analyst in the 
setting of which the transference neurosis occurs. In the 
first place the child is usually brought by its parents, 
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while the adult most often seeks treatment in fulfilment of 
some conscious purpose of his own. Secondly there are the 
obvious obstacles to adult empathy with children which arise 
through the great differences in the ego- object systems of 
the two generations. On the one hand is the adult ego 
which functions with consistency within the pattern of its 
neurotic and normal limitations. On the other is the 
growing ego of the child, maintained by a constantly shifting 
system, progressing and regressing in the processes of 
transition and continuously in a state of transformation. 
(Bornstein, 1945). The technique which is needed varies 
not so much with the age of the child as with the degree of 
development of its object-system. Melanie Klein believes 
that the small child is still under the immediate and 
powerful influence of his instinctive fantasies, so that in 
the very first hours of analysis interpretations of its play 
in terms of coitus and sadistic fantasies are possible. In 
the latency period, on the other hand, the child has 
de- sexualised these experiences and fantasies, and in 
consonance with the intensity of repression which characterises 
this period, its games are more adapted to reality. 
Representations of primitive relationship -systems tend to take 
on rationalised forms. At puberty, however, the fuller 
development of the ego and its more grown -up interests demand 
a technique approximating t o that of adult analysis, relying 
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chiefly on verbal associations. 
The theoretical standpoint of the analyst must affect 
his approach to the therapeutic situation as Fairbairn 
illustrates by the modifications which he has felt necessary 
to introduce into his technique in accordance with the logical 
implications of his Object -Relations theory. (Fairbairn, 1958, 
p. 5) . Fairbairn's view is that since it is on the basis of 
the relationships existing between the individual and his 
parents in childhood that his personality develops and 
assumes its particular form, it is reasonable to infer that 
a personal relationship is the medium through which changes 
in his personality may be effected. Winnicot believes that 
in the treatment of psychotic patients the concept of the 
transference must be extended to cover the analysis of these 
phases in which the ego of the patient cannot be assumed as 
an established entity and there can be no transference 
neurosis, for which an intact ego is a pre -requisite (Winnicot, 
1955 -6). This applies also in the case of children, whose 
ego is in process of formation. Glover, in accordance with 
the Freudian view of the mental constitution, sees the aims 
of analytical treatment in terms of the modification of 
ego -defences and the mitigation of the severity of the 
super -ego. (Glover, 1953). This, however, implies a certain 
measure of integration. Such assumptions are even more 
extremely stated by Szasz and Hollender (1956), who hold the 
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view that psycho -analysis is not so much a form of treatment 
as a form of scientific education, Szasz making the further 
requirement in a later paper (1957) that "the analysand 
should possess a relatively mature, strong and unmodified ego." 
The patients whom Freud treated were in this category, whole 
persons whose difficulties were largely in the field of 
inter -personal relations. It is possible to consider their 
treatment in terms of the "scientific education" which Szasz 
mentions, and they are also within the range of the personal 
relationship through. which Fairbairn holds that changes may 
be effected. Patients in whom the integrity of the 
personality is only precariously maintained - and these 
include all children in the early stages of development - 
might lie within range of the definition of treatment which 
Fairbairn and Glover mention, but they are without doubt 
outside the limits of "scientific education" which Szasz 
Proposes. Those patients, however, whose problems relate 
to the very early stages of emotional development before the 
establishment of personality, among whom are the psychotic, 
the borderline psychotic and the very young transitional 
defective, form a different group and in their treatment, 
Winnicot believes that the accent is for long periods on 
management while ordinary analytic work has to be in abeyance. 
(Winnicot, 1955, p. 279). 
In numerous publications children have been described 
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who have been diagnosed as psychotic or schizophrenic. It 
is Geleerd's experience (1945) that when such children are 
treated by giving them an opportunity to establish a 
completely dependent relationship with one adult who will 
treat them with as much indulgence as possible, they respond 
favourably. Federn (1943) also stresses the inability of 
the psychotic patient to sustain his hold on reality in the 
absence of the psychotherapist. In the case of adults the 
development of the ability to extend better reality- testing 
to situations outside the therapeutic hour is found in only a 
few cases. With psychotic children the picture also does 
not often change fundamentally, the psychotic patterns 
remaining the same outside the dependent therapeutic 
relationship. This recalls the situation in early 
development in which the environment must provide not only 
an active adaptation to the present needs of the child, but 
also the conditions in which personal growth may take place. 
(Winnicot, 1955, p. 291). The children in Geleerd's paper 
may be understood as having failed to outgrow the state of 
infantile dependence. The reinstatement of a condition of 
adaptation to dependency needs through an organised clinical 
regression produced an improvement, in that so long as these 
children felt satisfied, they were bright, alert and 
interested. When the relationship was interfered with, they 
reacted with an outbreak of rage in which they were completely 
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out of touch with reality. Their illness was marked by an 
inability to give up the fantasy of omnipotence with a 
resultant failure in reality -testing. This suggests that 
Winnicot's view of psychosis as an environmental deficiency 
disease may be correct. A transitional defect results in 
a situation in which it is impossible for further transition 
to take place, while a tangential development with resulting 
object- system growth upon this basis involves the possibility 
of a return to the original situation in which the 
developmental failure occurred in an organised regression. 
Re- growth can then take place on the basis of a better 
integration of the ego, resulting in a more concentric 
development of the object -system. Perhaps the difficulty in 
the treatment of the psychotic lies in the inability of the 
therapist actively to present good mothering, (Winnicot, 
1955, p. 282), to re- create the condition of primary maternal 
pre -occupation in which the transitional failure is likely to 
have arisen. 
One conclusion which follows from acceptance of the 
principles of the theory of transition is that the majority 
of clinical work is in terms of transactional patterns. 
Where the transition to the early object -system has been 
achieved with any measure of success, no matter how deviant 
the object- systems which have developed, it may lie within 
the power of the therapist to provide a situation in which it 
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is safe for the patient to regress to the state of dependence 
and to build, with the help of the relationship with the 
therapist, an open object -system which is able to expand, in 
place of a closed system which is self -perpetuating and 
static. Fairbairn holds that the greatest of all sources of 
resistance in therapy lies in the tendency of closed systems 
to maintain at all costs the prevailing situation between the 
ego structures and their internal objects (1958). Such 
closed systems have their own transactional patterns which 
may be modified in many cases to a limited degree without 
making any real impact upon the closed system itself. This 
accounts for the superficial changes in behaviour which may 
result from techniques of management or manipulation of the 
environment and the apparently dramatic results of limited 
therapy in selected cases. It also indicates the ease with 
which changes in children's external behaviour may be 
effected by modification of transactional patterns. The 
substitution of a new symptom for a more socially unacceptable 
one, or the development of a different neurosis are often the 
results of work with children which is not directed towards 
the improvement of the child's situation, but the improvement 
of his external behaviour. Therapy must always be directed 
if it is to be in any degree successful, towards some measure 
of integration of the tangential systems and not to the 
superficial alteration of the transactional patterns. 
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An adult usually comes to treatment because there are 
aspects of his situation which are causing him dissatisfaction, 
rarely because other people are complaining of his behaviour. 
On the other hand, it is the child's external behaviour which 
is nearly always the reason behind the parents' decision to 
bring him for treatment. The result is that children are 
more often brought because of transactional patterns which 
cause problems for the adults in their environment than 
because of patterns which are indicative of the child's 
distress. This may arise from views of development which 
consider personality as something which is achieved along 
with adult status, rather than as a wholly transitional 
concept undergoing a succession of changes concurrent with 
the changes in the child's ego -object system. There are 
many more fully -adjusted children than adults, if their 
adjustment is measured against the standards of the 
reality -system within which they are at a given time 
functioning. It might be considered one of the major tasks 
of education to disseminate a better way of thinking about 
childhood and adolescence so that the process of development 
is seen as a continuous one and the child always considered 
as a person within a situation with a particular pattern of 
relationships of his own. While an improvement has 
undoubtedly taken place since the nineteenth century, it is 
with particular reference to the young adolescent that the 
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present systems within society and education seem to fail. 
Adolescents, as has been discussed in previous chapters, are 
under a number of pressures from a variety of directions to 
develop transactional patterns of a certain kind and 
sometimes these cannot be supported by the object -systems 
which some children have developed since infancy. Therapeutic 
work with adolescents is very often mainly concerned with 
the necessity of evolving adequate transactional patterns on 
the basis of the ego -object system which actually does 
exist, and helping the patient to abandon unrealistic goals. 
The therapeutic technique adopted is dependent not 
only upon the theoretical background of the analyst, but also 
upon the particular needs of the -patient. Psychotherapy 
is not so much a course of specific treatment as the provision 
of a suit able medium within which the processes of transition 
may be facilitated. It therefore follows that the medium 
must be adapted to the stage of transition at which the 
patient finds himself at the time when treatment is first 
sought. In the case of children, who are already in the 
most active phase of transition, the therapist has the task 
of helping the child by his power and his reliability and all 
the other qualities which the transference situation demands 
to return to the situation of original developmental failure 
in order to make a better attempt at a concentric system. 
The changes which take place will be reflected in the 
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relationship which the child has with the analyst, and also 
in the relationships he has with others outside the 
therapeutic hour. It follows from this not only that the 
transference is a variable phenomenon, itself liable to the 
transitional processes which it is the purpose of therapy to 
facilitate, but that the therapist requires actively to 
support the child through the period of change. The new 
transactional patterns which he develops must be appropriate 
not only to his present situation but also capable of 
adaptation as his object- system expands through the freeing 
of the drive towards relationships from the confines of 
inhibitory closed systems. 
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APPENDIX I. 
Illustrative Case Notes. 
In this section some notes of cases are given which 
briefly illustrate certain points dealt with in the text. 
The cases recorded were encountered in the course of routine 
clinical work at the Mental Health Clinic at the Union 
Hospital, Moose Jaw, in the Province of Saskatchewan, Canada, 
and in the Davidson Clinic, 58 Dalkeith Road, Edinburgh. In 
all cases the author was the psychotherapist, and he is 
indebted to the Psychiatric Services Branch, Provincial 
Department of Public Health, Saskatchewan, for permission to 
use the Canadian material, to Dr M. W. Rushforth, Medical 
Director, and to Dr Jean Biggar, in charge of the Children' s 
Department, the Davidson Clinic, for similar permission with 
respect to the Scottish cases. The author has had considerable 
personal guidance and help from Dr W. R. D. Fairbairn, whose 
Object- Relations theory forms the basis of the views which 
have been developed here: this is very gratefully 
acknowledged. Many discussions of case material with Dr 
Biggar and the psychotherapists at the Davidson Clinic have 
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illuminating and special insight into the child's world, 
informed by long clinical experience, has over a long period 
been for the author the chief source of those constructive 
speculations which have led to advances in his own thought. 
The cases included and the notes accompanying them are 
very short, and are intended to provide an indication only of 
how the theoretical system which has been outlined may help 
in the understanding and treatment of different kinds of 
cases. The names of the children are fictitious, other 
details are as they appear in the files. 
Transitional Defect. 
Alison, (Canada), a psychotic child. 
Age, 9 years when first seen. Born, 23rd October 1948. 
This child was certified as a mentally defective person 
on June 16th, 1956. She was reported to be unable to go to 
school or to respond to social training. Her speech was 
reported as being limited both in vocabulary and coherence 
and she was unable to make any approach to other children 
except an aggressive one. Psychological testing at this 
time gave her an I.Q. of 67. At the Training School for 
Mental Defectives she was a behaviour problem, aggressive, 
overactive and mischievous, tearing her clothes and smashing 
successive pairs of spectacles. Her teacher, however, 
established a good rapport with her and felt that her 
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intelligence was normal. She was referred to the Clinic for 
)sychi atric examination on April 7th, 1958. 
Brief Social History. 
She is the only child in the family. The mother was 33 
years old at time of delivery and stated that pregnancy was 
normal. Labour, however, was prolonged and was completed by 
the use of instruments. The baby was normal but had marks 
of the instrument on one eye. Physical results of this were 
inconspicuous, but the mother noticed from the beginning 
that the child did not show any affection and she maintains 
that right from the start "she pushed the mother's breast 
away with her little hands." She learned to walk at the age 
of one year and started baby talk at about two years. She 
was toilet trained at 22 years. The mother left her much 
alone when she was a small child in her crib and later in 
her play pen and the child used to roll her head a great deal. 
When she was 2i years old, she had a chronic infection of the 
tonsils and later on pneumonia, spending eleven days in 
hospital. The mother said that she was able to feed herself 
and to dress and undress. As she grew older, she became a 
severe behaviour problem. She refused to pay attention to 
her parents and never showed any affection. She could not 
play with other children, pushing and biting them, and on 
occasions threw them down stairs. At six years of age she 
began school but her behaviour was too aggressive and 
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uncontrolled and she had to be withdrawn. 
Brief Family History. 
The father, aged 39 years, worked in a semi- skilled job 
and had both legs amputated in the war. He is a heavy 
drinker and has difficulties with his artificial legs when he 
is drunk. The mother, aged 40 years at the time of 
interview, felt completely rejected by the child and had never 
been able to establish normal mother -child relations. She 
had twice attempted suicide by running the car in the closed 
garage, taking the child with her and lying on the floor. On 
each occasion neighbours had intervened before either lost 
consciousness. The age of the child at these attempts was 
not established. 
Psychiatric Interview. 
Alison was over -active, restless and unable to 
concentrate. She could not sit still and it was difficult 
to get her attention for long enough to get her to reply to a 
question. She was, however, able to answer simple questions 
and in the playroom seemed to be able to name objects and to 
be aware of their uses. She was inclined to throw things 
around and, on a few occasions, became quite aggressive. The 
psychiatrist formed the impression that she was of average 
intelligence but suffering from a psychotic illness, 
probably schizophrenic in character. 
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Notes. 
This child was seen for a period of fourteen weekly 
sessions, during which she was able to form a relationship on 
the basis of complete dependence on the therapist similar to 
that described by Geleerd (1945) in psychotic children. The 
traumatic experiences which punctuated her entire early 
history resulted in her passage from the embryonic system 
into a rudimentary object -system in which all the objects 
were threatening and persecuting, so that the transactional 
patterns she evolved were aggressive and destructive. She 
could have no relationship with an object, since all objects 
were attacking her. The result of this was a fragmented 
ego, a series of dissociated and undeveloped ego -object 
contacts which hardly qualify for the description of 
ego- object systems. In the Training School for Defectives, 
however, some development had taken place through the 
relationship with her understanding teacher, but as a result 
the transactional patterns she was developing were on the 
basis of mental defect, and such elementary relationships 
which emerged were on the model of the relationships she saw 
around her. Where she became organised at all, it was the 
organisation of a mentally defective person. Periodically, 
however, she was overcome by her fear of the object- world, 
and the anti- relational nature of her aggression was 
frequently symbolised by smashing her spectacles, without 
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which the perceptive relationship with the terrifying world 
was impossible. 
Winnicot notes; "the coincidence of love and hate is 
sornethinz that characteristically occurs in the analysis of 
psychotics, giving rise to problems of management which can 
easily take the analyst beyond his resources." (1955, p. 196). 
In Alison's case, in the first few minutes of the first 
session she said, "I love you," and only a few minutes 
later, "I hate you". The course of therapy was marked by 
the alternation of murderous attacks with child -like 
dependence, of attempts at seduction with destruction of 
the therapist's toys and the playroom furniture. 
Although therapy had the effect of releasing the child 
from some of her more pressing fears, and the destructiveness 
ceased, it was felt that the problems presented by her 
continued residence in an Institution were too great to be 
dealt with in therapy sessions on an out- patient basis and 
arrangements were made to have her admitted to a residential 
centre for psychotic children where, after a year, she was 




Aged 8 years, 11 months. 
Consultation Note. 
The mother feels that Gordon is a tense, anxious child 
who becomes over- excited and distractible. He makes Door 
progress at school due to his distractibility and nervousness. 
He is afraid of other children, especially children older than 
himself but extremely good and kind to very young children. 
When he is in company he is reserved, nervous and tense and 
has a habit when he feels like this of covering his genitals 
with his hands. The mother finds this habit very embarrassing 
and is somewhat disgusted by it. She also reports that he 
has "a terrible fascination" for telephone posts, chickens 
and ducks. When out walking or out for a drive he keeps 
staring at the telephone poles, goes over and pats them and 
has a name for each one in the vicinity. These names are 
usually girls' names or names which he makes up and which his 
mother has never heard before. When he is out walking with 
her he will leave her and go into someone's yard to look at 
the chickens. He usually throws something at them when he 
sees them and his mother feels that he likes to see them fly 
away. For days afterwards he will make chuckling noises 
like a chicken. She has invited boys of his own age to the 
house to play with him but Gordon orders them out after a 
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little while and prefers to play alone with his trains. When 
playing alone he talks to himself, often laughs and sometimes 
even cries. His conversation when he is alone is not always 
rational and she feels that he is living in a world of his 
own and is unhappy with other people. She states that 
these symptoms were present since he was two years old but 
that she thought he would grow out of them but instead of 
that he seems to be getting worse. 
Previous History. 
The patient was born in Canada, and birth was normal in 
every way. The mother's health was reported to be poor 
during pregnancy. She complained of being nervous and 
high -strung and the doctor had given her special tablets for 
her 'nerves'. He was not breast fed as the mother felt 
"she couldn't be bothered". Until four years of age he 
refused solid food. He commenced to walk at the age of 
one but talking did not commence until he was four. About 
one year old he was toilet trained. As a baby he was both a 
feeding and sleeping problem. When she attempted to give 
him solid food he would gag and vomit. He was restless at 
night and cried for hours on end. The mother says that she 
was up every night with him and she feels that this 
contributed to her nervous breakdown. He commenced school 
at the age of five, did fairly well in grade 1, but repeated 
grade 2. The mother thinks the teacher felt she might have 
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allowed him to go on to grade 3, but that it was better for 
him to repeat grade 2 now rather than to have to repeat a 
grade later on in his school life. This year he passed into 
grade 3. 
Previous Medical History. 
When he was one year old he had measles and chicken -pox. 
At the age of five he was treated for nervousness, while at 
the age of seien he was hospitalised for bronchitis and 
inflammation of the bladder. As far as his mother knows, he 
has suffered no injuries. 
Family History. 
The father works as an accountant and was hospitalised a 
short time ago for a psychosis due to thyrotoxicosis. He 
had a thyroidectomy a short time ago and has made a very good 
recovery both mentally and physically. He has now returned 
to work. The mother states that she has always been nervous 
and highly- strung. Her first attack of 'nerves' occurred 
during her pregnancy with Gordon. She has been treated on 
and off for a nervous condition but has never been hospitalised 
as a psychiatric patient. She gave the impression during 
interview of being a withdrawn, self- absorbed person who 
showed very little affect. She described the child's 
symptoms in a detached way and at times laughed inappropriately. 
There is one other child in the family, a girl of eleven years 
of age, who is attending school and in good health. The 
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patient's maternal grand -uncle was hostitalised as a mental 
patient for 15.years. He died in hospital about two years 
ago. 
Interview with Patient. 
Gordon is a blonde, good- looking boy who during interview 
was very inhibited and reserved. He spoke in a quiet voice 
and answered questions intelligently though he was very timid 
and tentative and gave the impression of being under fairly 
severe tension. Psychological testing and assessment were 
carried out. He scored an I.Q. on the Wechsler Intelligence 
Scale for Children of 65. The psychologist felt that this 
was not an accurate estimate of his intelligence and that 
other factors should be taken into consideration. There is 
some scatter in the test scores which may mean that the 
chances of emotional interference with intellectual function 
are high. He was observed in the play room for a length of 
time and it was noticed that he became more open and 
uninhibited and less reserved in his relationship with the 
psychologist. 
Impressions and Recommendations. 
It was felt that Gordon is a withdrawn, inhibited child 
who has difficulty in making friends and withdraws into a 
life of fantasy. It is impossible at this stage to decide 
whether his withdrawal is at a pathological degree or not. 
It was decided that he should be interviewed a number of 
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times at the Clinic and observed in the play room with a view 
to making a better assessment of his condition. It is also 
felt that the mother unconsciously rejects the child and that 
her personality is of a schizoid type so that she is unable 
to give Gordon the warmth, affection and understanding that 
he needs. When he has attended once or twice it may be 
necessary to arrange regular appointments for therapy. 
Notes. 
This boy was seen on the basis of once -a -week sessions 
for 36 weeks. He made an immediate and good relationship 
with the therapist but after four sessions he was admitted to 
the Union Hospital for appendectomy. This meant he was 
hospitalised in the same building in which he had his 
therapy sessions. It appeared after some eight sessions 
that he was under pressure of strong castration anxiety and 
a split in the ego- system was present based upon his 
masculine -feminine identification. His father, who had a 
great deal to do with mentally defective persons in his work, 
had a great fear that Gordon was "defective ", that is, 
mentally retarded, but the boy had sensed his father's anxiety 
and this had reinforced his fear that he was in fact "damaged" 
and unable to fill a boy's role. The appendectomy was a 
further castration, though he emerged from this with very 
positive feelings towards the therapist on the basis of his 
feminine position. When some release of the castration 
279. 
anxiety was obtained through therapy, his obsessional 
interests were seen to be related to sexual curiosity. It 
was cocks and hens and the differences between them in which 
he was interested, the various methods of coupling railway 
wagons, and the phallic significance of telegraph poles, 
snakes and horned animals which interested him. Soon after 
his curiosity was partly satisfied, he began to allow himself 
to be aggressive and started coming to the Clinic by hmself 
dressed in his play clothes instead of being brought by his 
mother dressed in his best suit. The initiation in tile 
playroom of the development of his masculine ego -object 
system was continued in his outside activities and the 
corresponding improvement of his parents' attitude towards 
him facilitated progress. Towards the end of treatment, 
he himself asked for enlightenment about some of his sexual 
fantasies, by which time he was 9 years, 9 months old. The 
relief of anxiety which resulted produced an improvement in 
his school work, he was successful in his grade examinations 
and in- elligence tests at the end of treatment showed an 
increment of fifteen points and much less scatter. 
This case, unlike that of Alison, showed a definite 
structure of the ego- object system, but the split between the 
masculine and feminine components of the personality which was 
so closely connected with his castration anxiety brought 
inhibition of aggression, over- empldyment of fantasy, "magic" 
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thinking and the crushing of libidinal relationships with 
objects. When it became less dangerous to be a boy and the 
fear of castration by his mother as a punishment for his 
masturbatory activities was lifted a little, development 
continued on the basis of a more concentric pattern through 
some measure of reconciliation of the tangential ego- object 
systems. 
Tangential Development on the Basis of a 
Shared Ego- Object System. 
Helena, (Scotland). 
Age when First Seen: 7 Years, 10 Months. 
The family consists of two older sisters, 17 and 13 
respectively, then the twins, of whom Helena is one. She 
was referred to the Clinic for stealing money from her mother 
persistently for over a year. Her mother felt that: 
"There's no rhyme nor reason behind it ", and that it was 
different from the sort of stealing the other children had 
done, but grew out of. Her mother dates this behaviour from 
the time when her twin sister, who is very clever at school, 
passed the examination for entry to a good school and was 
separated from Helena. They are not identical twins and the 
other has always been physically and mentally "ahead ". 
Developmental History. 
Birth was normal, the other twin was a breech presentation. 
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The twins were not premature and weighed equally, about 62 
lbs. They were breast fed, but Helena had to have 
supplementary feeds, as "the other took all the cream". Both 
walked around fifteen months, they twin -talked for six -months. 
The mother waited about. one year before attempting toilet 
training, then she said "It was all over in a couple of 
months. They were quick, easy babies." There is no 
history of bedwetting. 
Helena has had measles and chickenpox, but no serious 
illness or accident. She has had no operations and there is 
no history of convulsions. She has not been separated from 
her mother at any time for any period. 
The impression gained at the interview was that the 
mother was very anxious and identifying with the child to a 
very great extent. She said that she feared that there was 
something physically wrong with the child "Something 
glandular ". She also said that Helena shows "no overt 
resentment" of her twin, but "she is bound to feel inferior". 
Psychological Testing. 
The psychologist's report records an I.Q. of 94 on the 
Stanford -Binet Form L. During testing she was not noticeably 
nervous, but she gave up tasks easily. Her most frequent 
error in reading was omitting the final "s" in words, and she 
did not know how to spell her own name. 
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Psychiatric Interview. 
She was not shy at the interview, drew a house with 
crayons, said it was nice to have a twin, but didn't mind her 
going to another school. She would like to get married when 
she grew up, and have two babies: "twin girls, or maybe one 
a boy ". She doesn't dream and isn't scared of anything. 
"My sister is scared after a play, and wants me to get into 
her bed ". 
Rotes. 
After a very few sessions, it was clear that the mother 
was being very good with the twins, but that her over -meticulous 
emphasis upon treating them exactly equally had brought about 
a situation in which Helena was developing transactional 
patterns on the basis of her being half a twin rather than a 
whole person, which was shown from the very first by her 
difficulties about plurals in the psychological examination, 
and her inability to spell her own name. As a result she 
could not directly express jealousy of her sister. On the 
other hand, the repressed tangential system which was quite 
strong and which quickly became stronger in therapy caused 
her to react so much against her dependence on her sister 
that it sought an extreme demonstration of her difference by 
adopting a masculine position. This was shown by the 
remark she made about the kind of family ghe wanted in the 
psychiatric interview. It also emerged after a very few 
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sessions that while Helena was very dependent upon her 
sister, in moments of crisis it was Helena, who played the 
masculine role, taking a calm command of the situation. When 
her sister was scared, she was expected to climb into bed and 
comfort her, and when the elder sister put her hand through a 
glass door and was bleeding very badly, it was Helena who 
took control, fetching her mother, calming those who were 
weeping and generally playing the father's part. In therapy, 
when her own feminine ego- system began to develop, there was 
the further complication that Oedipal conflicts in the 
transference made her guilty about aspects of her relationship 
with the therapist. As a result for a long period she 
alternated between being very seductive on the one hand and 
trying to involve him in boyish games like cricket on the 
other, which had the effect of keeping him at a safe distance. 
The stealing stopped after she had been in treatment a 
couple of months, but it was not until she had been in 
treatment for over twenty sessions that she began to feel that 
she could have a loving relationship as a little girl with 
the therapist without too much anxiety. Development then 
became based upon a firm feminine identification and she was 
able to be aggressive to her sister. Treatment still 
continues at the time of writing, but her improvement in 
fifty sessions has been very marked. 
In this case, transition to the object- system had been 
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successful, but transactional patterns were developing along 
the lines of a perfectly- shared ego -system, belonging to both 
twins. Helena felt deprived because although the parents 
took care to emphasise that everything was carefully and 
exactly shared out, the other twin had developed her own 
object- system far more successfully than Helena, and the 
parents also made it quite clear by their anxiety that 
Helena was "lacking" in the brains which her sister had. As 
a result the stealing became a way of evening things up, 
Helena taking from her mother in order to remedy her own 
deficiency. When she stole from her Daddy, as she did 
twice just before she began treatment, she was trying to 
get something from him which would make it possible for her 
to become a boy and thus have a real ego all to herself. 
Tangential Development on the Basis of Over- Activity 
of Intellectual Function. 
Hugh, (Scotland). 
Age when First Seen: 12 Years, 6 Months. 
This boy is the youngest of a family of four, which 
comprises three girls of 22, 19 and 16 besides himself. He 
was referred for stuttering, which manifested itself as 
quite a severe block, mostly occurring in class when he was 
asked a question by the master. He knew the answer but 
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could not say it. 
Developmental History. 
Labour was normal and he was breast fed for six months. 
He vomited after each feed due to pyloric stenosis, but he 
gained weight all right. He had no feeding difficulties 
beyond a generally poor appetite. He was habit trained from 
the beginning without fuss, and was dry by day at 14 months, 
though he relapsed at 18 months while on holiday. He was 
dry by night at 2i years. He was circumcised at birth and 
his questions about sex have been answered freely by both 
parents as they arose. He had no trouble with his bowels 
and seemed a normal toddler. 
At age 4i he was on holiday at a children's home without 
the parents and he contracted tuberculosis of the lungs. He 
was kept in bed at home for six months. after the illness 
he had no interest in other children for a time and he took a 
long time to run again after his illness. Weakness in the 
legs persisted even after he went to school. At 52 he went 
abroad with his parents and went to school at 5 years 8 months. 
Since that time he has been a very conscientious scholar and 
has always been top of his class. 
Psychiatric Interview. 
Hugh is small for his age, looks about ten years old, 
bespectacled and unsure of himself. Does not remember his 
illness or being abroad, nor being weak in the legs when he 
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first went to school, but he does remember feeling he had no 
friends in his first school. He does not know what he wants 
to be and he does not like any of his lessons at school. He 
is very inhibited and is holding back all his aggression. 
It seems likely that his severe illness was felt by him as 
an injury leaving him permanently damaged. He avoided all 
spontaneous competition with boys, rough games and so on, 
and denied his feelings of inferiority by saying he did not 
share their tastes: he had other tastes. He is 
conscientious and thorough and his mother indicates he is 
always inclined to be negative about anything new. 
Psychological Test. 
He is reported to have an I.Q. of 154 on the Wechsler 
Verbal Scale. 
Notes. 
This very intelligent boy from a highly intellectual 
family is suffering from anxiety and depression due to 
conflicts arising from the repression of feelings and the 
attempt to deal with emotions on a purely intellectual basis, 
which is the family as well as his individual pattern. The 
presenting symptom of stuttering, which had never been 
severe, cleared up after eight sessions, and the underlying 
anxiety is obtaining some relief from therapy. The use of 
intellectual defences was demonstrated in the first few 
sessions by his involving the therapist in long verbal 
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arguments in which he tried to prove the therapist wrong or 
inconsistent, thus rendering him "impotent ". This intense 
resistance was felt to arise from his fear of seduction and 
the ambivalence which attaches to his passive feminine 
position. He has identified very strongly with his eldest' 
sister, and the increased stresses which have resulted from 
her marriage coinciding with his own puberty have made his 
defensive system show signs of breakdown. 
The theoretical problem, which could be solved perhaps 
only through extended analysis, is whether the intellectual 
'false self' arose from the early breast- feeding difficulties 
or whether it is the result of transactional patterns 
established in later infancy and childhood to deal with the 
anxieties and traumatic situations which form part of the 
history at that time. From the standpoint of therapy, the 
important thing is that there are tremendous anti -libidinal 
forces at work and almost all feelings, positive and 
negative, are repressed. All relationships are on an 
intellectual basis. What suggests some measure of original 
concentric development is his love of animals and the happy 
relationship he formed with a young baby while on holiday. 
Treatment continues, but as this boy has never played since 
infancy, it is difficult to avoid allowing therapeutic 
sessions to become structured according to his own defensive 
closed system, and to consist in detached intellectual 
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discussion of his situation. He has formed a good 
relationship with the therapist after successful passage 
through the initial period of intellectual "testing ". It 
is hoped that in the analysis of the transference the way to 
a breach of the closed system may ultimately be found, but 
the degree of relief achieved through some measure of 
abreaction is meanwhile improving his personal relationships 
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